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Abstract 
An Evaluation of the Family Self-Sufficiency Program in Pittsburgh Using Event History 
Analysis 
 
Jennifer M. Bert 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
The Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh’s (HACP) Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) 
program was designed to enable public housing and housing choice voucher households (HCV) to 
increase their household’s incomes and savings and to move toward self-sufficiency.  Despite 
program graduates having higher incomes and escrow savings than non-graduates, HACP reported 
low-enrollment and high attrition rates from its FSS program. In response, HACP developed an 
increased minimum rent policy which raises the minimum rent for public housing households from 
$25 to $150 and for HCV households from $50 to $150, for work-able households, unless the 
household enrolls in the FSS program.   
This study addresses the following research questions 1.) What are the outcomes of FSS 
participation? 2.) When are FSS participants most likely to leave the FSS program? 3.) What 
explains exit from the FSS program?  This study uses administrative data from 2010 to 2017 and 
an event history framework to determine whether or when FSS participants leave the program and 
uses logistic regression to explore factors that may explain an FSS participant’s likelihood of 
leaving the program prior to completion.  
This study found that there are significant differences in FSS program enrollment and 
attrition between the public housing and the HCV households.  HCV households were far less 
likely to enroll than public housing households and once enrolled, they were far less likely to 
remain in the program than public housing households. This study also finds that the increased 
 v 
minimum rent policy was not a strong incentive for residents to enroll or remain in the FSS 
program. This study also did not find any seasonal effects or point in the program when participants 
were more likely to leave the FSS program.   
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1.0 Introduction 
This dissertation evaluates the Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program at the Housing 
Authority of the City of Pittsburgh (HACP) to determine FSS program entry and exit between 
January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2017 and analyzes its outcomes. The FSS program was developed 
in 1990 by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide services 
and resources to residents in the public housing and housing choice voucher programs throughout 
the country.  HUD provides the federal funding and oversight for the public housing authorities 
and their programs. The FSS program is a voluntary five-year program available to all residents in 
HACP’s public housing and housing choice voucher programs. The FSS program aims to provide 
resources and supportive services to residents to enable them to overcome barriers to self-
sufficiency. Participants in the FSS program work with a service coordinator to develop an 
individualized training and service plan that establishes a final goal as well as milestones 
households aim to achieve during the program. Those who complete the FSS program tend to have 
higher incomes and levels of saving. Despite these economic benefits, there is still low enrollment 
in the FSS program at HACP and a high rate of attrition. This dissertation uses administrative data 
and an event history analysis framework to examine FSS participation and outcomes during the 
seven-year study period.  
This study finds that the FSS program at HACP does not lead to self-sufficiency among its 
participants. There is a low enrollment rate and a very high rate of attrition, indicating that there is 
a disconnection between the program offered by HACP and the needs of its residents. Over the 
course of the seven-year study period, there were 1,058 public housing households enrolled in the 
FSS program. Of those 1,058 participants, only 191, or 18.1%, completed 60 months in the 
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program and 99, or 9.0%, became program graduates1. The rate of completion among the HCV 
households was even lower. There were 671 HCV households that enrolled in the FSS program 
during the study period, and of those households, only 72, or 11%, completed 60 months in the 
FSS program. For HCV households, only 103, or 15.0%, graduated from the FSS program. Some 
of these participants met the graduation requirements prior the end of the fifth year while others 
may have graduated after the end of the study period and the end of the calendar year.  HACP 
reported the number of FSS participants who graduated during each calendar year, by housing 
program.  That data was matched to the data set used in this study to compare the number of 
participants that completed 60 months in the program and the number of participants that 
graduated. This analysis shows that very few participants complete the 60-month program or meet 
the graduation requirements. This shows that the FSS program leads to self-sufficiency for a very 
small number of participants.  
I argue that significant changes to the FSS program design are needed to improve the 
effectiveness of the program.  The program was designed 30 years ago and despite numerous 
studies showing that the program has not achieved the intended outcomes, there have not been any 
changes to the program design.  There have been significant changes in subsidized housing since 
the 1990s, most notably the shift from public housing to housing choice vouchers.  This study will 
show that there are systematic differences between public housing and housing choice voucher 
households in terms of their household characteristics and location, which impact their outcomes.  
The needs of these two different groups of residents are very different, and the FSS program does 
 
1 It is possible for participants to complete 60 months in the program and still not meet the requirements to 
graduate. In some instances, households can meet the graduation requirements in less than 60 months in the program. 
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not respond to those differences and is not meeting the needs of the residents.  The low graduation 
rate among the public housing residents who complete 5 years in the program is further evidence 
that the program is simply not working.  This study will also examine the impact of incentives to 
enroll and remain in the FSS program to evaluate their effectiveness.   
This study provides an in-depth examination of the FSS program at HACP and situates the 
study in the historical and local context to explain the origin of the FSS program, its 
implementation in Pittsburgh, and to provide an evaluation of the outcomes of the program. To 
evaluate the program outcomes, this study utilizes an event history framework which allows for 
the examination of changes within the participant’s household during their participation in the FSS 
program.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter will provide a thorough overview of the FSS 
program and a discussion of the importance of FSS as well as a critique of the program.  Then the 
research questions and design of this study will be explained, and finally, this chapter concludes 
with an overview of the context, terms, and organization of the dissertation. 
1.1 The Family Self-Sufficiency Program 
The FSS program was established in 1990 by the National Affordable Housing Act and 
later modified by the 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act to provide resources and 
services to families in the public housing (PH) and Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program to 
enable them to improve their financial situations, reduce their reliance housing subsidies and 
public assistance programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), General Assistance (GA), and the Children’s 
 4 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Public housing authorities with FSS program developed 
cooperative agreements with local TANF agencies to work to improve self-sufficiency among 
HUD-assisted households receiving TANF (HUD, 2000) HACP defined self-sufficiency as not 
receiving public assistance from those programs for at least one year prior to FSS graduation. Self-
sufficiency is not defined as no longer receiving housing assistance.  This is a five-year program 
that recognizes that many residents will need to improve their education or skills in preparation 
for the job market. 
This program aims to utilize stable and affordable housing as a platform for improving the 
quality of life, which was the third stated goal of HUD’s 2010- 2015 strategic plan. The HUD-
designed FSS program is based upon the theory that once families have stable housing that is safe, 
decent, and affordable, residents can begin to address other hurdles to realizing self-sufficiency, 
such as education, training, and employment (HUD, 2010). For those living in public housing, 
there are often community centers or central management offices where residents can go to meet 
their service coordinator. The service coordinator works with participants to develop an 
Individualized Training and Service Plan (ITSP) and connect with service providers who can assist 
the participants in developing the skills they need to achieve their goals. These plans typically 
include resources, such as educational programs, job training, job readiness, childcare, 
transportation, or homeownership counseling (HUD, 2011).  
To graduate from HACP’s FSS program, participants must complete the five-year FSS 
program, meet the terms of their contract of participation, including established benchmarks and 
short-term goals, and be employed and free of all forms of public assistance for at least one-year 
prior to the end of the program (24 CFR §984.303). Ideally, families would move to market-rate 
housing or homeownership, which would provide greater housing options for the family, and 
 5 
would allow the housing authority to use the subsidy to assist a family on the waiting list. However, 
in many cities, there is still a significant gap between the wages earned by low-income families 
and the cost of market-rate housing that prevents families from transitioning to market-rate 
housing. The FSS program typically lasts for five years, but under certain circumstances, illness 
or involuntary loss of employment, participants can extend their participation for up to two 
additional years. Participants can be dismissed from the program for non-compliance with their 
FSS contract, however, violation of the FSS program rules is not grounds from removal from the 
housing program.  
To further incentivize residents to enroll and remain in the program, participants are given 
an opportunity to establish savings through an escrow program. Typically, PH and HCV residents 
pay 30% of their monthly gross income in rent and as their income increases, their rent payment 
is recalculated to reflect the increase in income. However, as long as the family is participating in 
the FSS program, the housing authority diverts the increased amount of the would-be rent into an 
escrow savings account which accumulates while the family is active in the FSS program. Upon 
graduation, the escrow funds are given to the family in a lump sum. If participants leave the 
program prior to graduation, they forfeit their savings. There are some provisions that allow 
participants to access some of their funds prior to graduation from the program. If a participant has 
met their interim goals, for instance, they can use their escrow savings for expenses related to their 
individual plan. For instance, some participants use the advance on escrow funds to pay for tuition 
or transportation to their job. The escrow account is an important incentive for both enrollment 
and completion of the FSS program.  
Figure 1-1 below shows the FSS program design and the steps that participants are 
expected to take while enrolled in the FSS program. This program was built based on a theory of 
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change framework. The theory of change framework is commonly used in program design and 
evaluation when a program has an identified final objective and then identifies a set of incremental 
benchmarks to meet during the course of the program as small steps toward the larger goal. The 
theory of change framework will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.  
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Figure 1-1 FSS Program Timeline 
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1.1.1 Importance of the FSS program  
The FSS program is important for several reasons. First, the FSS program is an integral 
part in the national efforts to use the public housing and housing choice voucher program as a 
stable platform upon which low-income households can improve other aspects of life including, 
employment, education and health (HUD, 2010; HUD, 2011). The FSS program is one program 
in a set of policies developed in the 1990s as national housing policy shifted from simply providing 
housing to connecting residents with services, resources, and opportunities (HUD, 1999; Goetz, 
2013; Vale, 2013). These policies will be described in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
The second reason that the FSS program is important is that success in the FSS program 
could lead to reduced reliance on housing assistance. Households in the HCV program pay roughly 
30% of their monthly income in rent, and the housing assistance payment from HACP to the 
landlord makes up the difference between the household composition and the rent charged by the 
landlord.  As residents’ income increase, their rent payment also increases, which reduces the 
housing assistance payment from the housing authority.  If the housing authority is spending less 
on that household, they can use those funds to assist a family on the waiting list.  Also, as public 
housing households’ income increases, they may choose to move to market rate housing, which 
would make their housing unit available for a family on the waiting list. Currently the demand for 
affordable housing far exceeds the supply and shrinking federal budgets have forced housing 
authorities, including HACP, to rethink their current model of rental assistance. While the FSS 
program is just one of several approaches to improving the efficiency of subsidized housing, it 
represents an important opportunity for households to use subsidized housing, paired with 
supportive services, as a stepping-stone to self-sufficiency (HUD, 2011).  
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The third reason why the FSS program is significant is that it could offer financial benefits 
to the housing authority. Because households pay income-based rent, as the residents’ income 
increases, so does rent revenue to the housing authority. Federal funding to housing authorities has 
declined significantly over the last thirty years, and with an aging housing stock and a demand for 
subsidized housing that far exceeds the supply, housing authorities are seeking strategies for 
increasing revenue (Rohe, 2017; Lee & McNamara, 2018). FSS graduates have higher incomes 
(Geyer, et al. 2017), and thus pay more rent than households with lower incomes.   
1.1.2 Critique of the FSS Program 
As explained earlier in this chapter, the FSS program has had limited success both in 
Pittsburgh and in housing authorities across the country (Anthony, 2005; Riccio & Babcock, 2014; 
Kleit & Rohe, 2015; Lee & McNamara, 2018; Silva et al., 2011; Van Ryzin et al., 2001). The FSS 
program was designed based on the assumption that the participants work with a service 
coordinator to identify their barriers to achieving economic independence and develop a plan for 
enabling them to overcome those barriers. The ITSP consists of a series of milestones that lead the 
participant to being free of public assistance programs by the fourth year of FSS participation, and 
then graduating from the program in year 5, and complete the program with higher wages and 
savings. The problem is that this expectation that the FSS participant make linear progress toward 
self-sufficiency is not consistent with actuality.  
Low employment rates, income variability, and inflexible program policies combined with 
the expected linear progress toward self-sufficiency is unrealistic for many of the participants. Few 
households that enroll in this program complete the program in accordance to these terms. HACP 
reported in its 2017 Annual report that there were 375 public housing participants enrolled in the 
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FSS program, and of those, only 175, or 46.7%, were working. The report also showed that of the 
248 HCV households participating in the FSS program, 156, or 63%, of the households were 
employed (HACP, 2017).  
The FSS program represents an opportunity for subsidized housing to be a stable platform 
upon which residents can improve their educational and financial outcomes and achieve self-
sufficiency (Lee, Smith & Galster, 2017; Lubell, 2015). Some housing authorities, Champagne, 
IL; Charlotte, NC; Lincoln, NE; and Vancouver, WA (Lee & McNamara, 2018; Webb, 2016) have 
used their FSS programs to develop work requirements for residents. While public housing in the 
United States was initially developed as housing for the working poor, the history of public 
housing will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, many current residents, as I 
will show in Chapters 4 and 5, are unemployed. Housing the working poor - and collecting higher 
income-based rents - as opposed to the unemployed, would alleviate some of the financial burden 
to the housing authorities that rely upon rent revenue. Because residents pay income-based rent, 
the more households earn, the more rent they pay. For the voucher program, if the housing 
authority is paying smaller housing assistance payments per tenant, then the housing authority 
could issue more vouchers. While this would lead to a more efficient use of funding and could 
potentially assist more households, there have also been suggestions by HUD Secretary Carson 
about instituting work requirements or placing time limits on housing, which threatens the most 
vulnerable families living in subsidized housing. In Chapter 3, I will discuss HACP’s increased 
minimum rent policy which was designed to incentivize FSS enrollment and increase rent revenue 
to HACP. The policy is a quasi-work requirement as it raises the minimum rent to $150 a month, 
the equivalent to having an income-based rent for a person working 15 hours a week at minimum 
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wage. The policy only applies to work-able households that have not enrolled in the FSS program 
and is important to understanding the FSS program implementation and outcomes in Pittsburgh. 
1.2 Theory of Change Framework  
To provide a thorough and effective evaluation, it is essential to examine critical the 
underlying assumptions of the program and assess the extent to which the program addresses the 
problem that it aims to alleviate (Weiss, 1996). The theory of change framework enables evaluators 
to consider the ultimate objective of the program, examine the incremental steps that lead to that 
ultimate goal, and then articulate and assess the underlying assumptions.  
The FSS program was designed based on the theory that affordable housing provides a 
stable platform upon which the residents can then begin to address their barriers to self-sufficiency, 
such as education, health, and employment (HUD, 2010; HUD, 2011). The FSS program is 
designed to address barriers to self-sufficiency at the household level. This program is a 
prescriptive program that is working off the assumption that if the residents had more education, 
some basic training, and assistance with their job search, they will be able to overcome the barriers 
to self-sufficiency and move out of poverty. This approach is designed to only address barriers at 
the household level, but does not consider the availability of jobs in the local market nor does it 
acknowledge the complex systemic historical and social factors that contribute to poverty in the 
United States. These factors will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.  
The FSS program design also assumes that housing authorities are in the best position to 
offer these services to residents in their housing communities. While stable housing is essential, 
there are two problems with this assumption. The first is that the housing authority is best able to 
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coordinate the services for its residents to obtain employment. This expands the scope of 
responsibilities of the housing authority from being a housing provider to also being a social 
service agency (Bratt & Keyes, 1998). This leads to uneven quality of services as housing authority 
capacity and the availability of local partners with needed services have a large role in determining 
the outcomes of the FSS program. The second problem with this assumption is that there is a 
significant difference in providing services and resources to public housing residents who live in 
buildings owned and managed by the housing authority and to housing choice voucher residents 
who live in privately-owned properties throughout the city. This research shows that there is a 
significant difference in the outcomes of the public housing and housing choice voucher residents, 
and it is likely attributable to the differences in service availability and delivery.   
The FSS program also operates on the assumption that residents will be informed of the 
FSS program and its offerings, be interested and committed to the program, and be able to follow 
the ITSP that the participant and service coordinator develop. Prior research which included focus 
group interviews found that many of the residents at HACP did not know about the FSS program 
and did not fully understand the program offerings and expectations (Dougherty, 2014). This 
program further assumes that the residents will make linear progress during FSS participation and 
will achieve milestones during the five-year program (HUD, 1996).  This research shows that 
many participants do not remain in the FSS program for the entire five-year period, and that the 
likelihood of remaining in the program is not easily explained by participant and household 
characteristics. Furthermore, this study also shows that a high number of FSS participants, 
especially young public housing residents, move out of HACP housing while enrolled in the FSS 
program, which further questions the long time frame and whether it is reasonable to expect 
residents to remain in the program if they are not seeing the expected benefits.  Another program 
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assumption is that participant’s incomes will increase during FSS participation and that success 
paired with the escrow savings will serve as a strong incentive for the residents to remain in the 
program. The escrow savings only works as an incentive for the participants who are able to 
increase their incomes, and there are no incentives for residents who have not experienced an 
increase in income during their participation in the program.  
The FSS program design is also developed with the assumption that progress will be linear 
and residents will meet the milestones identified at program entry. As previously discussed, 
employment rates among FSS participants remains low and many FSS participants experience 
income variability during their participation and experience periods of employment and 
unemployment.  This may be attributable to the local job market and the insecurity in entry-level 
jobs, particularly those in the service industry, or it may be attributable to the participant’s 
challenges in maintaining employment.  
The FSS program is an ambitious program that has made a lot of assumptions about the 
needs of the participants, the availability of jobs for those participants, and the housing authorities’ 
ability to deliver an effective program. I have laid out a critique of several of the underlying 
assumptions of the FSS program which will be tested in this study. This dissertation challenges 
the assumptions that the five-year time frame is appropriate for this program and that residents will 
make linear progress toward self-sufficiency while in the FSS program (HUD, 1996; Bratt & 
Keyes, 1998). This dissertation uses an event history analysis framework to examine changes in 
income, housing location, and household composition to better understand the changes that 
participants encounter during their participation in the FSS program. The research design and 
questions are further detailed in the following section. 
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1.3  Research Questions and Design 
This is a retrospective evaluation examining FSS program participation between January 
1, 2010 to October 1, 2017 at HACP.  All public housing and housing choice vouchers that 
participated in the FSS program at any point of time during the study period are included in the 
initial review of the FSS program. This evaluation uses an event history analysis framework to 
determine the outcomes of FSS participation, calculate the length of time that a household 
participated in the FSS program, and analyze the factors that could contribute to the likelihood that 
participant withdrew from the FSS program.  
1.3.1 Research Question 1: What are the outcomes of the FSS program?  
There are four possible outcomes of FSS participation: 1) completed the program; 2) 
withdrew from the program prior to completion; 3) moved from HACP housing, and thus left the 
program prior to completion; or 4) remained in the program on October 1, 2017, the last day of the 
study period. An analysis of the administrative data revealed the outcome for each of the 
households that enrolled in the FSS program on or after January 1, 2010.  This question will 
determine the number of public housing and housing choice voucher households with each 
outcome of their FSS participation.  
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1.3.2 Research Question 2: When are FSS participants most likely to leave the FSS 
program?  
A time-series analysis of entry to and exit from the FSS program during the study period 
determined whether there were any trends in entry and exit based on the calendar year.  This 
analysis determined whether there were seasonal effects in the enrollment and termination of FSS 
participation.  
After testing for seasonal effects, I determined whether there were identifiably points in 
the program when participants were more likely to leave by using an event history framework to 
analyze the length of program participation. The number of months that each household 
participated in the FSS program were calculated starting at 0, the month that the household enrolled 
in the FSS program and counting each month that the household remained until the household left 
the FSS program, moved from HACP housing, reached month 60 of FSS participation, or October 
1, 2017, the last date of the study period. The number of households in the program at the beginning 
of each month from 0-60 were recorded in the life table.  By examining the number of households 
that were enrolled in FSS from month 0 to 60, I determined whether there were certain points in 
the program when participants were more likely to withdraw from the program or move from 
HACP housing.  
1.3.3 Research Question 3: What explains withdraw from the FSS program?  
After determining whether and when FSS participants were most likely to withdraw from 
the program, I conducted further analysis of the factors that may impact a participant’s likelihood 
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of leaving the FSS program prior to completion. Based on the literature, I developed two 
hypotheses about possible explanations of FSS program attrition.  
1.3.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Household Characteristics.  
These characteristics include 1) whether there are children in the household, 2) change in 
household size during the program, 3) household income at time of FSS entry and, 4) location and 
moves within HACP housing during FSS participation. These characteristics may affect the length 
of program participation for the reasons explained below.  
Participants with young children may be less likely to remain in the FSS program than 
households that do not have children because of childcare responsibilities. Changes in the 
household may represent changes in household responsibilities, as a wage earner may leave, or a 
child may join the family. These changes may shift household responsibilities and lead a 
participant to withdraw from the FSS program. 
Participants with work experience and higher monthly incomes when they enrolled in the 
FSS program may be more likely to remain in the program than those who had lower incomes at 
the time of enrollment.  It is possible that the FSS program may be more effective for households 
that aim to move from a job to a better job than for households that are trying to move from 
unemployment to employment.  
Participants who reside in neighborhoods that are closer to HACP services or jobs, may be 
more likely to remain in the FSS program than households who live farther away.  Additionally, 
participants from households that experience moves with the subsidized housing program or have 
changes in household composition may be less likely to remain in the FSS program.  If the 
household moves within HACP housing from one public housing unit to another, or for voucher 
households, from one rental unit to another, the change in location may impact the likelihood of 
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program completion.  It is possible that a household may move farther from or closer to HACP 
programs and resources.  That move may impact the household’s access to services, transportation, 
or jobs.  
1.3.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Program Characteristics.  
There are three programmatic features that may impact the household’s likelihood of 
remaining in the program.  The first programmatic feature is whether the household lives in public 
housing or has a housing choice voucher.  Conventional wisdom is that public housing households 
are more likely to remain in the FSS program than those with vouchers because the public housing 
residents live closer to the services provided by the housing authority.  Conversely, households 
with a housing choice voucher tend to earn higher salaries that their public housing counterparts, 
which may lead the voucher households to be more likely to remain in the FSS program.  
The second programmatic feature that may impact a participant’s likelihood to withdraw 
from the FSS program is whether the household has escrow savings.  Escrow savings is the main 
incentive for participants to remain in the FSS program, as it is an opportunity to accumulate 
savings, but if a household has not experienced an increase in income and has not accumulated 
savings in the escrow account, there is little incentive to remain in the program.  For households 
that have been successful in the FSS program and have experienced an increase in income and 
have acquired escrow savings, they have an incentive to complete the 60-month program.   
The third programmatic feature that may explain the likelihood of remaining in the FSS 
program is the increased minimum rent policy.  This policy will be explained in detail in Chapter 
3.  HACP implemented an increased minimum rent policy for work-able public housing and 
housing voucher households that earned less than $6,000 per year.  The increased minimum rent 
policy increased the minimum rent for the work-able public housing residents from $25 per month 
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to $150 per month and for housing choice voucher households from $50 per month to $150 per 
month.  This policy went into effect in 2010 for public housing households and in 2011 for the 
housing choice voucher households. Households that paid the increased minimum rent of $150 
prior to enrolling in the FSS program may be more likely to remain in the FSS program than 
household that did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to enrollment.  If the household paid 
the increased minimum rent of $150 prior to enrolling in the FSS program was successful in the 
FSS program and experienced an increase in income, they will then have savings in the escrow 
account and may be more likely to remain in the program.  If the household did not experience an 
increase in household income while enrolled in the FSS program, they may still be more likely to 
remain in the program so that they do not have to pay the increased minimum rent of $150 when 
they exit the FSS program.  While that is a strong explanation for why those households may be 
more likely to remain in the FSS program, it is also possible that those households will be more 
likely to withdraw from the FSS program because they may be less interested in the program, and 
enrolled only to avoid paying the increased minimum rent.  That reason alone may not be sufficient 
for keeping the participant in the program.  
These research questions as well as the research design and methods will be presented in 
greater detail in chapter three.  
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1.4 Contributions, Parameters and Organization  
1.4.1 Contributions of this study  
The analysis of HACP’s FSS program offers two theoretical contributions.  First, it 
challenges the theory of change framework upon which the FSS program was designed.  The FSS 
program was designed to help households identify long-term goals for their households and 
identify incremental steps to achieve those goals.  The analysis of the administrative data shows 
that this program design is incongruent with the challenges faces by many households residing in 
HACP housing programs.  The analysis of the income data during the study period shows that 
there are many households that experience income variability while living in HACP housing.  The 
linear progress expected by the FSS program may be difficult for many of the HACP households 
to achieve. Many households did not experience a steady and incremental increase in income while 
living in HACP housing.  
The second contribution to the literature is revisiting the notion that subsidized housing is 
a platform for improving the quality of life. The premise is that once a household has stable and 
affordable housing, the residents will then be able to turn their attention to improving the 
household’s financial, educational, and health outcomes.  This analysis has shown that stable 
housing does not necessarily translate into successful employment.  Furthermore, this analysis also 
shows that enrolling in the FSS program also does not necessarily lead to better financial outcomes 
for the household.  
My work stems from the academic literature on subsidized housing programs and furthers 
a small set of FSS program evaluations that have been conducted at the national level  (Sard, 2001; 
Silva et al., 2011), and local in-depth studies of a single housing authority such as: Charlotte, North 
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Carolina (Rohe & Kleit, 1999; Rohe & Kleit, 1997; Rohe, Webb, & Frescoln, 2015; Kleit and 
Rohe, 2015) Rockford, Illinois (Anthony, 2005); San Bernardino, California (Distelberg, Martin, 
Borieux & Oloo, 2015); Boston (Riccio & Babcock, 2014); New York City (Verma et al., 2012); 
and Pittsburgh (Dougherty, 2014; Deitrick & Bert, 2018; Blackhurst & Briem, 2018; Blackhurst 
et al., 2019). These studies have provided evidence that the FSS program can enable some families 
in the public housing and housing choice vouchers to improve their financial situation by obtaining 
jobs, earning higher wages, and establishing savings.  Those who graduate from the program do 
have better outcomes.  However, these studies have also highlighted some of the weaknesses of 
the program, particularly related to low program enrollment, high rates of attrition, and external 
challenges in terms of the local labor market, limited resources, and other external factors. While 
there is agreement that very few participants succeed in the FSS program, the program remains 
largely unchanged after thirty years.  My dissertation provides an additional case study and offers 
an evaluation of a Moving to Work (MTW) agency that used its MTW status to develop an 
incentive for residents to enroll and remain in the FSS program.  By evaluating the policy, my 
study contributes to our knowledge of FSS program incentives and quasi work requirements.  This 
builds on the studies mentioned above that have evaluated local efforts to improve the FSS 
program.  
This dissertation will also contribute to policymaking.  Policymakers have proposed an 
expansion of the MTW program to include an additional 100 housing authorities. This expansion 
will allow for housing authorities in smaller cities to benefit from the flexibility provided through 
the MTW demonstration to facilitate innovative solutions to local problems.  This evaluation of 
HACP’s increased minimum rent policy will be relevant to other housing authorities who are 
interested in increasing FSS participation and rent revenue.  As federal funding continues to 
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decline, policymakers have suggested implementing work requirements and increasing the 
minimum rent for public housing and housing choice voucher households, this evaluation of the 
FSS program and the increased minimum rent policy at HACP is useful to understanding what the 
impact of work requirements and increased minimum rents in the United States may be.   
Lastly, this study will also be useful to decisionmakers at HACP who are interested in 
understanding the impacts of the increased minimum rent policy on the FSS program, specifically, 
whether the policy has incentivized residents to enroll and remain in the FSS program.  This study 
finds that the increased minimum rent program was neither effective at incentivizing residents to 
remain or to enroll in the FSS program, as the participants who paid the increased minimum rent 
prior to FSS enrollment were not more likely to remain in the FSS program than those who did 
not.  This study also shows that the households earning less than $6,000 who would be impacted 
by the increased minimum rent were also not more likely to remain in the FSS program than those 
who earned higher incomes at the time of FSS entry.  The increased minimum rent policy will be 
explained in greater detail in Chapter 3. Furthermore, a better understanding of the length of time 
that participants remain in the program and the outcomes of FSS participation will be helpful to 
HACP as they aim to improve the program. By having a careful analysis of program attrition, 
HACP can better design supports for participants in the program and rethink the five-year program 
and consider developing some features that are designed to attend to the needs of the housing 
choice voucher participants.  
1.4.2 Limits of this study 
This study examines the FSS program in the City of Pittsburgh from January 1, 2010 to 
October 1, 2017.  The households included in this study lived in public housing in the City of 
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Pittsburgh or had a housing choice voucher issued by HACP and were enrolled in the FSS program 
during this period of time.  
There are many limitations in HACP’s FSS data. For this study, the final measure of 
success in the program is completion of 60 months in FSS. The dataset that I obtained for this 
research did not identify explicitly the households that officially graduated from the FSS program.  
This study used length of FSS participation as a proxy for graduation, by determining which 
participants remained in the FSS program for the full five years – 60 months -- of the program. 
While I was able to calculate the length of FSS participation, the dataset did not include any 
information about the other graduation requirements including whether the household was free 
from public assistance for one year prior to completing FSS and whether the participant achieved 
the goals set forth in their ITSP. HACP’s annual MTW reports show the number of public housing 
and HCV households that graduated from the FSS program during each calendar year. By 
comparing those reports with the data used in this report, it is clear that some of the public housing 
households that completed 60 months in the FSS program did not meet the graduation 
requirements, and some of the HCV participants graduated early.  This will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5.  
Second, there is also no data about participant’s use of services, accumulated escrow 
savings, or reason for exit. These data limitations contributed to the decision to focus on early exit 
from the FSS program and the examination of household and limited programmatic reasons for 
early exit. Accumulated escrow savings was calculated based on what the savings would be, but 
there is no information on whether those funds were used prior to program exit. This is explained 
in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Ideally, there would be information on the services received 
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by the participants which may lead to a richer explanation of FSS program outcomes and the 
relationship of those outcomes and the services received by the FSS participant.  
This analysis allows for determination of whether and when participants withdraw from 
the FSS and an analysis of the factors that contribute to the likelihood of a participant leaving the 
program prior to completion.  Further qualitative work on participants’ satisfaction with the FSS 
program and exit interviews would further contribute to our understanding of attrition from the 
FSS program.  Further work could investigate whether exit from the FSS program was voluntary 
or involuntary and the participants decision making process when they elected to leave the FSS 
program.  In this dissertation I do not speculate about the reasons why households may have left 
the program, as there are likely to be varied and complicated explanations and it is also possible 
that participants were dismissed from the program. 
1.4.3 Definitions and Terms 
The terms families, households, and participants are used interchangeably in this analysis.  
The data used for this study was collected at the household level, making it difficult to differentiate 
between the incomes and FSS participation of the individuals in the household.  The term families 
may also refer to a single-person household or a household with two unrelated members. The term 
affordable housing refers to housing that costs 30% or less of the household’s monthly income.  In 
some usage, affordable housing is used as a synonym of subsidized housing.   
In this study the term federally-subsidized housing refers only to the public housing and 
housing choice voucher programs and that my use of that term does not extend to include the 
privately-owned project-based HUD-subsidized housing, housing constructed using HOME 
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funding, USDA Rural Development housing, nor housing that was developed by Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credits.  
1.4.4 Organization of this Dissertation 
This chapter provided a very brief introduction to this study, the problem that it addresses, 
the questions it will address, and the research methods and data used to answer those questions. 
The following chapter offers a review of the relevant literature, discusses the contributions of prior 
work and they ways that this study builds upon that work to further our understanding of the FSS 
program design and outcomes.  Chapter Three provides additional context for this study and 
explains the data and methods used in the study.  Chapter Four presents the findings of the study 
for the public housing households and Chapter Five presents the same findings for the housing 
choice voucher households.  Chapter Six concludes the study with a discussion of the findings 
presented in chapters 4 and 5. 
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2.0 Literature Review 
This chapter will provide an overview of the history of the public housing and the Housing 
Choice Voucher (HCV) programs in the United States, as well as a review of the literature on the 
Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program. This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I will 
briefly summarize the origins of public housing in the United States and the housing choice 
voucher program at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This will 
include an analysis of the challenges and the policies that addressed those challenges. Second, I 
will explain the importance of the FSS program and offer a review the empirical literature of the 
FSS program at the national and housing authority levels. The empirical literature falls into two 
categories. The first set of studies examines the outcomes of the FSS program while the second set 
of studies aims to explain why some residents have been more successful than others in achieving 
self-sufficiency.  Third, I will further discuss the recent literature on public housing and access to 
jobs. Lastly, I will provide a brief conclusion and preview of the following chapter.   
2.1 U.S. Housing Policy  
This section provides a very brief chronological history of public housing in the United 
States to provide context for the discussion of the FSS program and its purpose. This context is 
important to understanding the origins of the FSS program and the historical and political context 
in which it was created. This contextual information is important to evaluating the underlying 
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assumptions of the FSS program. The section is arranged chronologically as U.S. housing policy 
has evolved over time based on trial and error and in response to the broader political zeitgeist.  
This section has three sub-sections.  The first sub-section discusses the origins of public 
housing and changes in housing policy from the 1930s to 1980s.  The second sub-section discusses 
housing policies introduced in the 1990s, while the third sub-section discusses policies and 
challenges from 2000 to present. This very brief overview is important to our understanding of the 
origins of the FSS program, its goals, and how it is embedded in U.S. housing policy.  
2.1.1 Public Housing 1930s – 1980s 
In the United States, public housing was originally created to improve the housing 
conditions of the working poor.  The development of public housing was authorized by the 1934 
Housing Act which established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and its mortgage 
insurance program, as well as rental assistance program for the working poor. These subsidized 
housing programs occurred during the same time as President Roosevelt’s New Deal policies that 
provided social services to the working poor following the Great Depression. This was a period 
where there was political support for poverty alleviation programs and improving the housing 
conditions for the working poor. 
From the 1935 to 1960, public housing was built as an effort to improve the housing 
conditions of the working poor and to replace substandard housing in urban slums (Vale, 2013). 
This housing tended to be barrack-style low-rise walkup buildings built around a semi-enclosed 
court to provide outdoor space to the tenants. Residents tended to be working-class nuclear 
families, many of which were military families (Goetz, 2013). Recognizing the importance of 
decent housing and the lack of affordable housing for poor families, the 1949 Housing Act 
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expanded the public housing program funding to provide decent housing to all (Orlebeke, 2000), 
with the increased funding to enable housing authorities across the country to development more 
public housing. Large public housing developments, such as: Robert Taylor and Cabrini Green 
Homes in Chicago, Rosen Homes and Schuylkill Falls in Philadelphia, Van Dyke Houses in New 
York, and Pruitt-Igoe Towers in St. Louis, were constructed during this period (Rothstein, 2017, 
32). These early public housing developments were built in areas where there was a low supply of 
housing so that they did not compete with the private rental market. This further contributed to the 
isolation of public housing communities and the low access to jobs, services, and community 
resources.  
During this time period, public housing was constructed rapidly to meet the expanding 
need among the low-income working households that could not afford decent housing from the 
private rental market. This expansion of subsidized housing coincided with the second great 
migration, during which many African Americans moved from the South to northern cities, 
including Pittsburgh, in search of jobs (Trotter & Day, 2010). These efforts to build a solution to 
the problem of large segments of the population being excluded from the private housing market 
proved to be disastrous.  
During the late 1940s and 1950s, many working-class white families moved out of the 
cities and into the suburbs (Jackson, 1985). FHA mortgage insurance, Veterans Affairs home loans 
for servicemen returning from World War II, lower construction costs, increased car ownership, 
and the highway system all contributed to the rise of the American suburbs (Jackson, 1985). As 
American’s preferences shifted to buying single family homes in the suburbs, those who were able, 
left the cities (Jackson, 1985). By the 1960s, public housing had changed from housing for the 
working poor to the housing of last resort (Goetz, 2013). The large public housing developments 
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constructed in the 1940s and 1950s proved difficult to manage and expensive to maintain over 
time. The image of public housing became dangerous, dilapidated, corrupt, and poorly managed 
(Vale, 2012) and residents also faced strong stigmas (Hays, 2012). As many jobs left the cities and 
moved to the suburbs or abroad, manufacturing jobs and low-skilled jobs were harder to find and 
the wages were lower than they had been in the past (Bluestone & Harrison, 1988; Dreier, et al., 
2001).  
While white families leaving the cities for the suburbs changed the demographics of cities, 
urban renewal projects changed the physical landscape. City government and business leaders 
advocated for urban renewal to attract businesses back to the cities by demolishing housing, 
improving highway access to cities, and developing commercial centers.  Urban renewal projects 
displaced an estimated 3.8 million people nationwide, the majority of whom were residents of 
black communities (Dreier et al., 2001). Public housing had become politically unpopular and 
many communities fought against public housing (Vale, 2013). The federal funding paid for the 
demolition of the public housing developments, but the decisions about which buildings were 
demolished was made at the local level. Public outcry and local decision making further 
contributed to public housing being located in high-poverty neighborhoods and segregated from 
middle-class neighborhoods (Goetz, 2013, p. 31). The loss of manufacturing and entry-level jobs 
in many cities coupled with the location of large public housing developments in low-income 
communities that were often cut off from the city, created a spatial mismatch as blue-collar and 
entry-level workers were no longer able to access the jobs that they needed to move out of poverty 
(Kain, 1967).   
By the 1960s, public housing in the U.S. primarily housed minority residents (Goetz, 
2003). Public housing had financial constraints, and the large public housing developments were 
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deteriorating (Bloom, 2008). Anyone who was able, moved out of public housing leaving behind 
residents who simply did not have any alternatives. Large dilapidated public housing projects that 
housed mostly minority residents, many of which were unemployed, or earned extremely low 
incomes, were in high-poverty neighborhoods that were disconnected from surrounding 
communities. In 1973, residents of public housing in Chicago filed a class action lawsuit against 
the Chicago Housing Authority for intentionally segregating public housing residents in high 
poverty areas. The case went to the Supreme Court in 1976 as Hills v. Gautreaux, which led to a 
consent decree mandating that the Chicago Housing Authority desegregate its public housing 
through scattered-site housing and housing choice vouchers (Polikoff, 2006). This case changed 
public housing policy and led to efforts to deconcentrated poverty through the housing choice 
voucher program and through low-density scattered-site public housing units. The use of housing 
choice vouchers was implemented in the early 1980s, but the efforts to redevelop public housing 
and shifting from the large high-rise developments to low density housing were not immediate. 
Those changes to the construction of public housing did not widely occur until the 1990s with 
HOPEVI.  
In the 1980s, there were important policy changes that aimed to house those with the 
greatest needs. These efforts to continue to house the poorest members of society and use 
subsidized housing as a means for reducing homelessness, is contradictory to growing concerns 
about the problems with the deteriorating condition of public housing and concentrated poverty.  
In the 1980s, public housing authorities awarded preference points to housing applications from 
those who were currently homeless or had a disability.  Housing authorities also limited the number 
of residents who earned more than 50% of the area median income, while rents were increased 
from 25% of the household’s monthly income to 30% (Vale, 2002). Because the public housing 
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authorities depended upon rent revenue as part of its budget, these policy changes further 
exacerbated the maintenance and management problems in public housing as incoming tenants 
had low incomes. The one notable exception was the New York City Housing Authority, which 
continued to admit residents with higher incomes and had better management at its sites than other 
housing authorities (Bloom, 2008). In 1983, the Section 8 Voucher Demonstration was introduced 
and was fully authorized in 1987. The Section 8 Voucher program, which later became known as 
the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, was an alternative to public housing (HUD, 2019). 
Residents in the program are issued a voucher and permitted to choose a rental unit from the private 
market, so the housing authority does not have any construction or maintenance costs for the rental 
housing. Furthermore, because the residents select the rental unit, they could move to areas with 
lower rates of poverty.  The housing choice voucher program has become an important part of 
HUD-subsidized rental assistance, as many housing authorities have shifted its resources from the 
public housing programs to housing choice vouchers.  
2.1.2 Public Housing and Housing Choice Vouchers 1990s 
In the 1990s, welfare reform was a political priority with both Republicans and Democrats 
developing plans for significant changes to the safety net programs. The Republican-developed 
Contract with America aimed to shrink government-funded social programs and shift toward 
neoliberal market-based solutions. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Act, redesigned 
safety net programs and replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children with Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), which placed time limits on assistance. The zeitgeist of 
the early 1990s is apparent in the changes to housing policy in the 1990s as there was a shift to 
reducing the cost of providing public housing by shifting to vouchers and an emphasis on programs 
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that sought to enable residents to break the cycle of poverty, move from the unsafe crime-ridden 
projects, and begin working and moving toward self-sufficiency. Urban crime was also often 
discussed in the early 1990s and the large public housing developments “the projects” were often 
cited as an example of the dangerous inner cities. This characterization of these communities 
further alienated its residents.  
It was clear to everyone that a significant change to the housing programs was long 
overdue. While the housing choice voucher program was promising, there were still serious 
problems with the condition of public housing. In most cities, the public housing constructed in 
the 1940s and 1960s were no longer safe or decent. Public housing projects were dilapidated and 
had high rates of crime and vacancy (Goetz, 2013). Despite public housing developments being 
officially desegregated in the 1960s, the vast majority of public housing residents were minorities 
due to de facto segregation through the inequality in access to jobs, homeownership, and rental 
housing (Rothstein, 2018). Large-scale public housing developments that in many cities made up 
entire neighborhoods created isolated pockets of concentrated poverty. Residential segregation and 
the resulting social isolation created an underclass of disadvantaged urban residents (Wilson, 
1987), who lived in concentrated poverty with little access to job opportunities (Massey & Denton, 
1997). In addition to poor access to jobs, many of these communities had underperforming schools 
and high-crime rates and were generally avoided by non-residents, which further contributed to 
the isolation of these communities. The most disadvantaged urban residents were concentrated in 
these areas (Wilson, 1987). Without access to jobs, transportation, high-quality education, healthy 
food, healthcare and strong social ties with residents from other communities, public housing 
residents did not have many opportunities to achieve self-sufficiency and move to market-rate 
housing.  
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Until the 1990s, public housing had been treated as a public utility and not as a social 
service (Goetz, 2013). Yet, it is impossible to study places without considering the people who 
inhabit them and to study people without considering their environment (Davidson, 2009). In the 
1990s, policymakers started seeking opportunities to utilize housing as a platform for improving 
quality of residents’ lives.  The theory being that if residents had safe, decent, and affordable 
housing paired with access to services and jobs, they would be able to improve their family’s 
financial situation and reduce their family’s need for subsidized housing. Having stable housing 
where the family is able to make decisions about where they live and when to move is critical to 
household outcomes (Lubell, 2015).  Furthermore, the stress that comes from unstable housing has 
a profound impact on household finances (Freeman, 2009).  In public housing, residents would be 
working-class households, where the higher the residents’ salary, the higher the housing 
authority’s rent revenue.  Having residents who earn higher incomes, and have higher rent 
payments, would alleviate some of the financial strain on the public housing authorities.  Public 
housing residents pay roughly 30% of their monthly gross income in rent. This is a significant 
revenue stream for the housing authorities. Housing Choice Voucher residents also pay roughly 
30% of their monthly income in rent and the housing assistance payment (HAP) from the housing 
authority makes up the difference to the landlord between the household’s contribution and the 
rent charged by the landlord. As HCV resident’s incomes increase, the amount of HAP paid by the 
housing authority is reduced, which allows the housing authority to issue more vouchers and assist 
more households.  The hope is that these public housing and housing choice voucher households 
would eventually have stable incomes that would allow them to move to market rate housing.  
A new set of policies aimed to use housing policy to deconcentrate poverty and racial 
segregation by provide services to residents, enable residents to move out of low-poverty 
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neighborhoods, and rebuild low-density public housing was integrated into existing communities 
(Massey, 2007).  These policies and programs included a new set of HUD programs coming from 
the Gatreaux consent decree and the success of the HCV program. These programs aim for public 
housing tenants and voucher recipients to live in areas with less concentrated poverty and offer 
new forms of public housing where service provision was part of the new program demonstrations.  
Those include: 
1.) Family Self-Sufficiency Program in 1990;  
2.) Moving to Opportunity demonstration in 1992;  
3.) Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) in 1993; and  
4.) Moving-to-Work demonstration (MTW) in 1995.   
Until this point, I have described policies and programs in chronological order, but since I 
have briefly explained the FSS program and MTW demonstration in the previous chapter, and 
because I will discuss them at length in the following section, I will discuss the housing choice 
voucher, Moving to Opportunity Demonstration, and HOPE VI programs in this section and the 
Family Self-Sufficiency and Moving-to-Work Demonstration in the following section. The 
Moving to Opportunity demonstration and HOPE VI are important to understanding this study of 
the FSS program because those two programs explain the efforts to improve the quality of housing 
and service delivery to tenants in public housing and the housing choice voucher program.  These 
two programs have shaped the public housing and housing choice voucher program into the current 
housing programs.  
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2.1.2.1 Housing Choice Vouchers Theory and Moving to Opportunity 
The housing choice voucher program has reduced costs for public housing authorities since 
it does not construct, maintain, nor manage the rental units, and has proven popular with residents 
who wish to select their own rental unit, but there are limitations to the success of the program. 
First, in most cities, landlords are not required to accept vouchers (Cunningham et al., 2018). 
Discrimination of source of income is a significant hurdle for housing choice voucher holders who 
seek housing in middle income neighborhoods (Graves, 2016).  While some cities have passed 
legislation that landlords cannot refuse to accept vouchers, most cities have not. Second, because 
fair market rents, the amount that a landlord can charge for a housing choice voucher household’s 
rental unit are calculated at the metropolitan statistical area, and in many cities, there are very few 
rental units that fall into those guidelines. The rental units that do meet the fair market rent 
requirements are often in low-income neighborhoods, which has limited the ability of the program 
to deconcentrate poverty. HACP, and other housing authorities across the country, have begun to 
use small area fair market rents to calculate the fair market rents for geographies smaller than 
metropolitan statistical areas.  
The Moving-to-Opportunity demonstration was implemented in 1994, to determine 
whether housing choice vouchers paired with housing counseling could enable families to move 
to diverse communities with lower poverty rates, higher performing schools, and better access to 
jobs.  As stated in the debate about the relationship between housing and quality of life, the theory 
is that if families were able to move to better neighborhoods, they and their children would 
experience better financial, educational, and health outcomes.  The demonstration was designed 
as an experiment with a randomly assigned treatment group made up of residents who received 
vouchers and housing counseling to assist them with moving to a low-poverty community and a 
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control group that only received vouchers and had no requirement to move to a low-poverty 
community.  The experiment was conducted in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and 
New York City (De Souza Briggs, et al., 2010; Katz, 2000; Chetty et al. 2016; Goering & Feins, 
2003).   
Studies have shown mixed results. Many families that participated in the demonstration 
moved back to their original neighborhoods, or similar neighborhoods after the demonstration 
ended (De Souza Briggs, et al., 2010). Others indicated that their children still participated in 
activities in the original neighborhood and did not develop a strong social network in the new 
neighborhood, which mitigated the anticipated benefits of the new community (Chetty et al., 
2016). While safety was a barrier to participation in the former neighborhoods, activity fees, 
transportation, and childcare prevented children and parents from participating in activities in their 
new communities (Zuberi, 2010). Those who left for positive reasons, (i.e. increase in income) 
tended to have better outcomes than those who left for negative reasons (i.e. eviction, non-renewal 
of lease, etc.) or remained in subsidized housing (Smith et al. 2014).   
One of the arguments for public housing and housing choice vouchers is the importance of 
stable housing for children (Manzo, Kleit & Couch, 2008; Freeman, 2009).  Because by providing 
stable and high-quality homes, children will be better positioned to obtain an education, earn 
higher salaries as adults, and ultimately break the cycle of poverty.  However, studies have shown 
mixed results in terms of the relationship between children’s outcomes and their housing.  One 
study of the impact of public housing demolition on children’s educational outcomes showed little 
effect, and those who were displaced by the demolition, tended to move to neighborhoods that 
were similar in terms of demographics and poverty rate as the ones that they left (Jacobs, 2004).  
That study also found that children who were over the age of 14, showed a slight increase in their 
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likelihood to drop out of high school, which children under 14 showed no effect (Jacob, 2004). 
Another study suggested that children who were displaced from public housing had better access 
to the labor market as adults and had better economic outcomes than those who did not move out 
of the public housing communities (Chyn, 2016).  A study has shown that school-aged children 
under the age of 13 benefited most from moving to low-poverty neighborhoods (Chetty et al. 
2016). Children whose families experienced poverty during preschool years had worse educational 
incomes than children whose families experienced poverty when they were older (Brooks-Gunn 
& Duncan, 2003). Studies have also shown that boys have worse outcomes than girls when they 
live in high-poverty neighborhoods (Shroder, 2002) or moved to areas of higher opportunity after 
the age of 13 (Chetty et al., 2016). Other studies show that students who live in public housing are 
less likely to be held back (Currie & Yelowitz, 2000), and are more likely to change schools, but 
not move to better performing schools (Currie & Yelowitz, 2003).  However, families with 
vouchers tended to live near better performing schools that children who lived in public housing 
or tax credit developments, yet families with vouchers still live near worse schools than low-
income families in market-rate housing (Horn, Ellen & Schwartz, 2004).  
2.1.2.2 Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPEVI) 
While the Housing Choice Voucher program and the Moving to Opportunity demonstration 
showed some benefits to residents and public housing authorities, vouchers still didn’t resolve the 
problem with the aging and dilapidated housing (Goetz, 2013).  The HOPE VI program, which 
operated from 1993 – 2010, was a competitive grant program that enabled public housing 
authorities to redevelop its most distressed public housing units which were not replaced.  The 
objective of the program was to demolish the high-rise public housing projects and rebuild low-
density public housing that was integrated into the community and to create partnerships with local 
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communities to provide supportive services to the residents.  These changes are built on the 
principles of new urbanism, which encourages thoughtful design to create dense communities with 
mixed-use development, public spaces, and reduce dependence on cars by promoting pedestrian 
and cyclist-friendly design as well as transit-oriented development (Deitrick and Ellis, 2004).  The 
Manchester HOPE VI development in Pittsburgh is an example of a subsidized housing 
community that was designed around these principles (Deitrick and Ellis, 2004).  
In 1995, the requirement that housing authorities replace demolished units through one-to-
one replacement was repealed (Goetz, 2013).  This led to fewer public housing units and 
displacement of many public housing residents who had to move to from their public housing units 
that were slated for demolition.  Some families were able to use the vouchers to find housing within 
their communities, while others had to relocate to other neighborhoods.  Once again, public 
housing policy had displaced many of the low-income families it aimed to serve, and housing 
subsidies were given to the working poor (Vale, 2013).  Between 1993 and 2006, 78,100 distressed 
public housing units were demolished (Curley, 2010).   
Many public housing communities redeveloped through HOPE VI included mixed-income 
communities with a mix of subsidized and market-rate housing units.  Many of these communities 
also included mixed-use buildings with commercial buildings on the ground floor and housing on 
the upper floors.  The HOPE VI program also expected public housing authorities to provide 
supportive services to its residents and expected that residents would become involved in their 
communities (HUD, 2010).  Despite the efforts to improve the conditions in public housing 
developments, residents still reported that they are unhappy with their housing and communities 
(Currie and Yelowitz, 2003).  A study examining the relationship between employment outcomes 
of residents in the newly-developed HOPE VI communities found that while the location of 
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housing was important, there was also a strong relationship between the resident’s employment 
outcomes and the amount of contact that residents had with case managers (Nguyen, et al, 2016), 
while another study found that relocation of housing and the supportive services were not enough 
to overcome the barriers to employment faced by residents (Curley, 2010).  While one of the goals 
was to increase social interaction between public housing residents and those of non-subsidized 
housing, while the physical proximity of housing increased interactions among residents, there are 
still differences among residents that limit the integration of public housing residents into the 
community (Kleit, 2005).  
The HOPE VI program ended in 2010 and was replaced by the Choice Neighborhood 
Initiative, which offers $500,000 planning and $20 million implementation grants to public 
housing authorities across the country to redevelop public housing communities.  Learning from 
the lessons of the HOPE VI program, public housing authorities have taken a three-prong approach 
to development through the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, housing, people, and community.  
This approach continues the housing as a platform for improving the quality of life, and aims to 
better integrate public housing into the community, offer benefits to homeowners in the 
community, and strengthen low and moderate-income communities. Additionally, housing 
authorities aim to develop housing at a one-to-one replacement rate, grant residents a right of 
return, and minimize the number of moves that the household makes.  To the extent possible, 
housing authorities redevelop housing in phases, allowing residents to move from their current 
residence to their new residence.  When that is not possible, tenants are moved to another public 
housing unit or given a voucher and relocation assistance to ease the transition to a private-market 
rental unit and then the transition to their new public housing unit.  
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2.1.3 Public Housing and Housing Choice Vouchers 2000 – Present 
While HOPE VI and the shift toward a tenant-based voucher program improved the quality 
of public housing and reduced construction and maintenance costs, there are still serious problems 
that needed to be addressed.  First, funding for subsidized housing has decreased and public 
housing authorities were stretched financially and sought alternatives to achieve their mission in a 
cost-effective manner.  Second, the need for subsidized housing has increased as only 24% of the 
19 million income-eligible households live in subsidized housing (Poethig, 2014).  Changing labor 
and urban housing markets alone have created a tenuous situation for low-income families in need 
of subsidized housing, a situation that has only been exacerbated by shrinking federal budgets that 
have reduced public housing authorities’ budgets. Funding cuts have reduced the housing 
authorities’ formula-based operating fund at only 75% of the amount they should receive (Kleit 
and Page, 2008). Between the years 1994 and 2012, the public housing stock has decreased by 
more than 250,000 units (Schwartz, 2015).  The worst public housing buildings have been 
demolished and replaced with low-density mixed-income developments, but at a net loss of 
affordable units. Nationally, only about one in five eligible households receive subsidized housing 
(Williamson, 2011), and more than 18% of all households, and 27% of all renters are burdened by 
housing costs that total more than 30% of their monthly incomes (Schwartz, 2015).  The rising 
cost of housing is particularly devastating to low-income households, many of which are eligible 
for subsidized housing.   
While HOPE VI did help public housing authorities to update and build new public housing 
stock, there are still public housing buildings that are in need of significant renovation, if not 
demolition.  When the prevailing model of public housing shifted from high-density housing in 
high-rise developments to low-density townhouses, mixed-income communities, scattered-site 
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housing and vouchers, housing has continued to be viewed as a platform upon which residents 
could build a better life for their families.  The problems associated with the high-density high-
rise buildings in the projects revealed the complexity of poverty in America.  Providing shelter 
was not enough, and without adequate funding, housing authorities were not able to meet the rising 
needs for subsidized housing.  Over the last twenty-five years, there has been a shift from the effort 
to provide shelter to as many families as possible to providing higher-quality housing for the 
working poor (Vale, 2012).  This new model of housing is viewed not as an end itself, but the 
stable platform that low-income families need in order to improve other outcomes such as; 
employment, education, health, and savings.  The expectation was that subsidized housing would 
be a short-term need while families achieve self-sufficiency and which time they would move to 
market-rate housing and free up a subsidized unit or voucher for a family on the waiting list 
(Santiago, Galster & Smith, 2017; Riccio & Babcock, 2012). 
2.2 Empirical Literature on Moving-to-Work Demonstration and Family Self-Sufficiency 
As explained in the previous section, there was a shift in U.S. housing policy in the 1990s 
as policymakers aimed to overcome the challenges associated with public housing and the housing 
choice voucher programs.  Their primary goal was to use the housing assistance provided through 
public housing and the housing choice voucher program as a stable base upon which residents can 
improve the financial, educational, and health outcomes of their families. In the prior section I 
discussed the HOPE VI and the Moving to Opportunity demonstration as two of these policies.  In 
this section I will discuss two other initiatives that build services models into public housing to 
improve quality of life. The remaining two programs are the FSS program, established in 1990 by 
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the National Affordable Housing Act and the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration, which was 
established in 1996. Together these policies established a framework for providing a set of services 
aimed at enabling families to achieve self-sufficiency.  
The Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration was established in 1996 to grant select high-
performing housing authorities some relief from Federal regulations to accomplish the three goals 
of the MTW demonstration:  
1) increase cost efficiency;  
2) improve residents’ self-sufficiency; and  
3) increase housing choices.   
Under the MTW designation, housing authorities have greater leeway in developing programs and 
policies to achieve optimal outcomes. The first MTW cohort consisted of 30 high-performing 
housing authorities and the demonstration was later expanded to a total of 39 housing authorities 
(HUD, 2019).  There are plans in place to further expand the program to 100 housing authorities 
by 2022 (HUD, 2019).   
Housing policy is a product of both federal regulations and the organizational decisions 
made by the housing authorities (Kleit and Page, 2008), and the MTW demonstration aims to allow 
more local innovation and decision making.  Like the Moving to Opportunity demonstration, the 
MTW demonstration was also influenced by neoliberal policies that aim to find market-based 
solutions including increasing control at the local housing authority level and decreasing regulation 
and oversight by the federal government (Webb et al., 2016). 
The MTW demonstration is closely tied to the FSS program because the second objective 
above is to increase resident self-sufficiency.  The last goal is to increase housing choices for 
public housing and HCV residents. Many MTW agencies have tailored their FSS programs to 
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respond to the needs and resources in their cities. These programs differ from the standard FSS 
program described in the first chapter.  For example, HACP developed the increased minimum 
rent policy to incentivize residents to enroll in the FSS program. While the federal regulations 
establish a regulatory framework, housing authority staff and property managers make important 
policy decisions that shape their housing programs (Kleit and Page, 2008; Lipsky, 1985; Webb et 
al., 2016).   
For example, many MTW housing authority established a rent reform policy to improve 
cost-efficiency.  Those rent reform policies either established an increased minimum rent, created 
rent bands to decrease the number of rent recalculations, or created a rent ceiling.  The review of 
the MTW plans and reports showed a range of program options from voluntary to mandatory FSS 
programs, rent reform policies, incentive systems, and services offered.  There are eight MTW 
agencies with work requirements which range between 15 and 35 hours of work per week (Webb 
et al., 2016).  A study of the work requirement implemented by housing authority in Charlotte, 
North Carolina (Rohe et al., 2016), found that residents generally responded that they thought that 
the work requirement was fair, and that their reasons for not working had little to do with not 
wanting to work, but the lack of jobs and the difficulty finding a job. The study also found that the 
work requirement did not lead to increased evictions (Rohe et al., 2016).  Other housing authorities 
with work requirements include, Lincoln, NE, which requires residents to work 25 hours per week 
and Vancouver, WA, housing authority which requires a minimum income of $9,000 per year.  
Other housing authorities, San Bernardino, Tacoma, Tulare, and Delaware State Housing 
Authority have established time limits for work-able residents (Webb, et al., 2016).  A study of 
economic disincentives to work (Shroder, 2002), showed that there was only a small negative 
relationship between housing subsidies and employment, and while public housing residents did 
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work fewer hours, they had circumstances that prevented them from working.  The public housing 
itself did not have a negative impact and a well-designed HCV program can lead to positive 
outcomes (Ong, 1998).  
While it is essential that each housing authority design its FSS program that best serves its 
residents and uses available resources efficiently, the variation in FSS programs leaves questions 
about optimal program design unanswered.  The leeway granted to housing authorities in designing 
their programs under the FSS framework, also creates variation in the investment in: 1) the 
program; 2) resources provided; 3) services; 4) program requirements (Riccio & Babcock, 2014).   
The added responsibility and discretion for the housing authorities leads to an uneven 
provision of services as some housing authorities are better able to utilize private partnerships and 
tax credits. The local housing market, economy, and politics are also key factors in shaping 
affordable housing.  These environmental elements, program design, and decisions made by the 
housing authority staff who implement policy shape the housing policies. Limited federal budgets 
and neoliberal policies has shifted housing development and ownership to the private market 
through the multifamily housing program, and the current rental assistance demonstration, and tax 
credits. More recent housing programs and policies such as HOPE VI, FSS, and MTW 
demonstration, have emphasized the importance of public-private partnership to create hybrids to 
carryout work that was traditionally in the public sector (Kleit & Page, 2015).  
2.2.1 Family Self-Sufficiency Program 
The FSS program follows the developments in HUD’s policies to deconcentrate poverty, 
improve the physical quality of housing, and to provide services to improve residents’ quality of 
life. As discussed above, the theory behind the FSS program is that subsidized housing creates the 
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stability needed to focus on improving other aspects of their lives such as employment, education, 
and health.  When low-income households are faced with numerous financial challenges, the most 
urgent needs are addressed first, as new urgent needs arise, long-term financial planning and saving 
become impossible (Wiseman & Riccio, 2015).  The intention of the FSS program is to pair 
subsidized housing with supportive services to enable residents to improve their household’s 
financial situation and achieve self-sufficiency.  Since the FSS program was first implemented in 
the 1990s, the goal of the program has shifted from moving to market-rate rental housing or 
homeownership to independence from public assistance.  For most housing authorities, program 
success is not measured by leaving subsidized housing, but by residents’ improving their 
household’s economic outcomes, and eventually leaving public assistance programs, such as 
supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP), temporary assistance to needy families 
(TANF), and general assistance.   
Subsidized housing creates stability by reducing the housing insecurity related to being 
severely rent burdened and the insecurity that comes from multiple moves (Manzo, Kleit, and 
Couch, 2008).  It also relieves strains from overcrowding (Currie and Yelowitz, 2000), paying 
high rents (Aratoni, 2010), and the anxiety and mental stress that is from unstable housing (Bogle, 
et al., 2016).  Stable housing and the elimination of these stressors allow residents to shift their 
attention and spend money on improving other aspects of life, such as education, employment, and 
health.  The FSS program is designed to capitalize on the benefits of stable housing and use housing 
as a platform for improving the quality of life (HUD, 2010; Riccio & Babcock, 2014).  
The theory of change is a large long-term goal with a series of incremental short-term goals 
that lead to the final goal.  The connection between the contributions of the incremental goals and 
the desired result is integral to the theory (Weiss, 1996), upon which the FSS program is built, as 
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stated above.  FSS participants meet with their service coordinator to identify the final goals, and 
to establish the incremental milestones that they will achieve during the program. For many low-
income residents, receiving additional education, job training, and assistance with job placement 
may be necessary pre-conditions for obtaining a job that pays higher wages, offers better benefits, 
and allows the family to achieve self-sufficiency.  The FSS program aims to provide a set of 
educational, employment, and financial tools to enable the participants to achieve self-sufficiency. 
The program is designed to help participants to evaluate their needs and establish a plan for 
overcoming barriers to self-sufficiency.  
2.2.2 Empirical literature on the FSS program  
This section reviews prior studies of FSS programs at the national and local-levels and 
summarizes what those studies tell us about the program while also identifying areas where there 
are still questions about this FSS program’s effectiveness.   
2.2.2.1 FSS Evaluations 
There have been numerous evaluations of the FSS program at the national and local levels 
since the beginning of the program.  Since the FSS program was established in 1990, there have 
been several studies of the program at the national level (HUD, 2011; Sard, 2001) and evaluation 
of the local programs in Rockford, IL (Anthony, 2005), Charlotte, NC (Rohe, Webb & Frescoln, 
2015; Kleit and Rohe, 2005), Boston, MA (Riccio and Babcock, 2014), Champaign, IL (Lee & 
McNamara, 2018), and San Bernardino, CA (Distelberg, Martin, Borieux &Oloo, 2015).   
Evaluations of the FSS program have examined the FSS program outcomes to determine 
whether the participants were successful in improving financial outcomes, and asked whether 
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graduates had higher wages, employment rates, and savings than before starting the program (Kleit 
& Rohe, 2005; Anthony, 2005).  Those studies also provided some insight as to participant and 
household characteristics that were related to successful outcomes and found that age, household 
composition, education level, and marital status (Anthony, 2005), prior work history (Rohe and 
Kleit, 1999), and vocational training (Kleit and Rohe, 2005) may have an impact on the 
household’s success in the FSS program.  
In 2011, HUD conducted a national study of the FSS program and found that FSS graduates 
had higher incomes both before and after participating in the program, and those graduates 
experienced an average increase in income from $19,902 to $33,390, while those who left the 
program prior to graduation experienced only a slight increase in income. Graduates also reported 
a 93% employment rate compared with an employment rate of just 60% for those who left the 
program early (Silva et al., 2011).  This raises the question, did those who left the program early 
did so because they were not realizing any benefits from the program?  According to HUD’s study, 
a third of participants left the program early and half of those early exits were for non-compliance 
with the program rules.  Of those who left voluntarily, about a third of those exits were because 
the program requirements conflicted with work and family obligations while others left because 
of an increase in income or marriage (Silva et al., 2011).  That study also found that those with a 
high school diploma were twice as likely to graduate from the FSS program as those who did not 
have a diploma, but did not find any other significant relationships between participant and 
program characteristics (Silva, et al., 2011).   
A study of FSS participation in Rockville, Illinois (Anthony, 2005), examined nine 
different participant characteristics and found that single, young adults, without children, and with 
high school diplomas were most likely to complete the program.  The study did not find evidence 
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to support the culture of poverty hypothesis (Anthony, 2005), but found some support for life cycle 
and rational choice theories.  The study also failed to find a significant difference in FSS outcomes 
between the outcomes of public housing and HCV households in the FSS program (Anthony, 
2005).  Those findings contradict a 2002 study that found that younger welfare recipients were less 
likely to work than older recipients and those with more than six members in the household were 
also less likely to work (Allard and Danzinger, 2002).  Household composition and the number of 
members in a household, presence of children, and changes in the household may impact the 
household’s ability to earn wages and achieve self-sufficiency.  
A study of household resilience moves beyond an analysis of the participant characteristics 
and considers mental health and social capital (Distelberg, Martin, Borieux & Oloo, 2015), as 
additional possible explanations of financial outcomes.  Escrow accounts are an important 
incentive for participants as it both negates the work disincentive through rent recalculations and 
enables residents to establish savings which is critical for achieving economic stability (Rohe and 
Kleit, 1999).   
2.2.2.2  Factors that Prevent Success 
There is agreement that FSS programs have shown some success but have limitations.  One 
of the main limitations is the lack of interest from residents and the high attrition rates (Rohe, 
Webb, and Frescoln, 2016; Santiago, Galster & Smith, 2017; Lee &McNamara, 2018).  Some of 
hesitation to participate may come from the fear of leaving subsidized housing and paying market-
rate rent.  Other participants noted that family obligations (PD&R, 2011), poor health, lack of 
childcare, long search times for housing (VanRyzin, et al. 2001) and poor prior experiences with 
similar programs prevented them from participating (Rohe & Kleit, 1999). One study examined 
the attrition rates and identified three critical junctures for those exiting the program: after four 
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months, one year, and two years. The study found that those who left after just four months tended 
to do so for non-compliance with the program rules, whereas those who left later did so for positive 
reasons including ineligibility for services or because they moved to be closer to employment or 
educational opportunities (Santiago, Galster, & Smith, 2017). However, negative exits after one 
or two years in the program tended to reflect dissatisfaction with the program, financial difficulties 
and personal and family obligations (Santiago, Galster, & Smith, 2017).  
The disappearance of jobs that do not require specialized training, but offer a living wage 
have disappeared, this has created a barrier for many low-income families that seek self-
sufficiency (Bogle et al. 2016). Many families receiving subsidized housing do have wage income, 
but they work limited hours for low-wages and there is little stability in their employment. Hours 
can be reduced and jobs can be lost due to no fault of the employee. Program exit was related to 
the number of barriers, lack of training, education, and work experience at the time of entry were 
more likely to exit (Santiago and Galster, 2008).  
2.2.2.3 No consensus in the literature 
While the housing policy literature generally concludes that the program design matters in 
terms of service provision (Riccio and Babcock, 2014; Furtado, 2014), recruitment, and incentives 
to participate (Kleit and Rohe, 2015), it offers little explanation of what constitutes a strong 
program.  The literature also suggests the importance of housing location, the local economy and 
job market, and transportation, but fails to provide clear answers about their relationship. Perhaps 
most perplexing is the inconclusive and often contradictory findings about the relationship 
between participant characteristics and outcomes. For instance, a study of FSS participants in 
Rockville, Illinois, showed that the FSS program led to significant improvement in employment 
and wages (Anthony, 2005), and a study in Champaign, IL, found that FSS participants an average 
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increase in incomes of $2,283, with larger impacts for those who had little or no work history (Lee 
& McNamara, 2018), while another study found that young participants with recent work 
experienced benefitted most (MDRC, 2014).  
Another study suggested that the FSS program does not do enough to provide the training 
and skills necessary for long-term economic success, nor does it address the other aspects of 
inequality and relative deprivation, which prevent low-income residents from achieving long-term 
economic success (Crawford, 2003).  While modest improvements are possible through the FSS 
program, evidence that this will lead to a reduced need for housing assistance remains thin (Riccio 
& Babcock, 2014).  A 2012 study of HCV households in the FSS program at the New York City 
Housing Authority found no evidence that the FSS program alone led to better financial outcomes 
of residents.  The study also examined an incentive program operated by the housing authority that 
gave a cash incentive to households that met certain criteria for hours worked.  The study found 
that the incentive was helpful in increasing the wages and hours worked among residents that were 
already employed at the beginning of the program, but did not help the residents that were 
unemployed to find jobs (Verma et al., 2012).  Additionally, the heavy reliance on partnerships 
with community-based organizations and contracting the services also proved to be challenging 
(Verma et al., 2012).  
Studies also found that it is difficult to use administrative data to predict success in the 
program, partly because of the lack of variation in the sample (Van Ryzin, Ronda, & Muzzio, 
2001; Rohe & Kleit, 2015), but also because of the role of context in terms of the program design, 
neighborhood effects, local partnerships, and local job market (Kleit & Rohe, 2005; Bogle, et al. 
2016; Lubell, 2017). A 2015 study by Kleit and Rohe ultimately found that it was difficult to 
predict success based on personal and household characteristics and suggested that other personal 
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or programmatic elements may be better predictors or success and suggested that additional 
research on participant goals, motivation, and social capital is warranted (Kleit and Rohe, 2015). 
The contradictions in the literature suggest that there are other factors that impact outcomes 
of the FSS program.  Additional studies from cities that have not been studied are needed to better 
understand how local context in terms of job markets, housing authority policies, and FSS program 
design and implementation impact FSS program outcomes and the likelihood that participants 
complete the program, have higher incomes and higher levels of self-sufficiency.   
2.3 Employment for public housing and housing choice voucher households 
Woven through the first and second sections of this chapter is the running discussion of 
poverty and low employment rates among public housing and housing choice voucher households.  
In the first section, I discussed the role of geographic and social isolation from jobs and social 
networks, the housing policies that contributed to that isolation, and the efforts to reverse that 
isolation.  In the second section, I discussed the FSS program and the incentives and services 
provided to residents to enable them to improve their household’s financial outcomes and achieve 
self-sufficiency.  Then I discussed FSS evaluations and the extent to which the FSS program has 
been successful in connecting residents to employment.  
Reviewing the neighborhood effects literature (Sampson, et al., 2002; Kling et al., 2007; 
Ludwig et al., 2012; Sharkey & Faber, 2014), FSS program evaluations, and research on the 
relationship between housing and employment have contributed to our understanding of the 
complexity of moving to self-sufficiency.  Low-income households face challenges in finding 
affordable housing and employment due to constraints in the housing and labor markets. In many 
 51 
communities, much needed mobility counseling, training, and services are not available to those 
who need them. Place-based initiatives, such as Choice Neighborhoods and HOPE VI, must 
consider the people who will live in those communities in order to create diverse mixed-income 
communities.  Future work on the relationship between housing and education and health must 
consider both household characteristics and neighborhood effects (Mueller and Tighe, 2007).  The 
rest of this section discusses access to jobs and residential stability and their impact on a 
household’s ability to achieve self-sufficiency.  The complexity of self-sufficiency and the impact 
of spatial mismatch, concentrated poverty, residential instability, and social isolation will be 
discussed in the following chapter when I discuss housing in Pittsburgh and provide local context 
for this study of the FSS program at HACP.  
2.3.1 Access to jobs 
There is a relationship between poverty and place (Jargowsky, 2997).  Neighborhood 
poverty is the result of economic conditions, segregation by race and wealth and disconnection 
from the labor market and opportunity (Jargowsky, 1997). Studies have had mixed findings about 
the relationship between proximity to jobs and wages.  One study found that proximity to jobs is 
associated with higher wages and leaving welfare (Allard and Danzinger, 2002), while another 
study found that there is no connection between proximity to jobs, even when job seekers live in 
areas with a low poverty concentration (Hu and Giuliano, 2017). These findings challenge the 
premise of the HCV program and builds on the conclusions of the MTO demonstration, that 
location alone will not improve individuals’ financial outcomes (Oakley & Burchfield, 2019).   A 
third study of vouchers in New York City showed that vouchers did increase mobility and enable 
residents to access jobs, transportation, and opportunities (Lam, 2015), and a study in Milwaukee 
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showed that when residents try to get jobs they tend to move to neighborhoods with lower poverty 
rates and more racial integration and buy a car, both of which appear to be important to improving 
employment and wages (Shen and Sanchez, 2005).  Of these two changes, this study suggests that 
living in a neighborhood with a lower poverty rate and more diversity is more important than 
proximity to jobs (Shen and Sanchez, 2005). Zuberi’s 2010 work also suggests that geography 
alone does not enable low-income families to overcome barriers; they also need supportive 
services.  
The local job market, barriers to employment for racial minorities and women and 
education programs are key factors in determining access to jobs and the long-term success of 
families who are working to move out of poverty (Bogle, et al., 2016; Clampet, Lundquist, and 
Massey, 2008; Crawford, 2003; Hannon et al., 2017).  The only certain conclusion that one can 
draw from these conflicting findings is that there is a great deal of variation among different 
housing authorities in different contexts.  This further supports the value of the MTW 
demonstration and is consistent with the FSS literature.  
There were two options for overcoming the spatial mismatch, bring jobs to the people, 
move the people to the jobs, or reduce the barriers that prevent people from accessing jobs 
(Gobillon et al. 2007). Despite efforts to reduce the density of public housing and create mixed-
income communities, public housing residents still tend to live in high-poverty areas (Lee, Smith, 
& Galster, 2017). Public housing residents tend to live in areas with entry-level or low-skilled jobs, 
but there is higher competition for those jobs (Lens, 2014).  Low-income residents also face 
barriers include high search costs, inadequate transportation, and insufficient information about 
job opportunities (Gobillon et al., 2007).   
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Economic theory suggests that housing assistance would discourage work because tenant 
rent payments are calculated as a percentage of their monthly income. Therefore, as residents’ 
income increases, the rent payment is recalculated to reflect the increase in income.  A study found 
that vouchers did not discourage work over the long-term (Wood, Turnham, & Mills, 2008).  A 
study of the Boston Housing Authority tenants found that many residents did work part-time, but 
due to the inconsistency in their work hours and low wages, they were unable to “earn their way” 
to market-rate housing (Riccio & Babcock, 2014). A national study also found that nearly half of 
public housing families who were not elderly or disabled had wage income and stayed in public 
housing for less than five years and kept their vouchers for over three years. This was longer than 
families without income that stayed for an average of just under two and a half years, while those 
with children tended to stay a year longer.  These finding suggest that subsidized housing tends to 
be a short-term solution to families’ housing needs, and does provide some level of stability for 
families who are working or have children (Lubell et al. 2003).  
A 2016 study by Bogle et al., which aimed to determine the pre-conditions necessary to 
move out of poverty found that the local context including the local job market, educational 
opportunities and barriers experienced by racial minorities and women have a significant impact 
on families that are working to move out of poverty (Bogle et al, 2016).  Studies have shown that 
the community’s demographics and poverty rate can be a predictor of the residents’ access to jobs 
and resources (Clampet, Lundquist & Massey, 2008; Hu & Guilano, 2017). However, this 
relationship goes both ways, the characteristics of the residents also impact the community and 
creates the boundaries of the social networks in which the residents interact (Leventhal & Brooks-
Gunn, 2000).  Studies have also examined the impact of housing subsidies on a household’s 
incentive to work and have found mixed results with some studies showing no effect (Shroder, 
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2002) and others finding a disincentive to work (Currie and Yelowitz, 2003). While there have 
been mixed results, vouchers have been shown to reduce homelessness, overcrowding, household 
size, and the incidence of living in temporary housing situations with friends and family (Wood, 
Turnham, & Mills, 2008). However, other research suggests that vouchers alone are insufficient 
for moving out of poverty (Schwartz, 2015).  While residents are permitted to choose a rental unit 
from the private rental market, they are still constrained by the availability of rental units that are 
within the price range determined by HUD and its calculation of fair market rent. In most cities, 
the availability and price of rental units, constrains housing choice (Schwartz, 2015).  
As the job market has shifted from manufacturing and service jobs toward professional 
jobs that often require specialized training or education, it has proven difficult for low-income 
residents to find well-paying jobs that enable them to move out of poverty (Jacobs, 2004). These 
structural barriers in the labor market and educational systems make it difficult to attain self-
sufficiency through individual efforts (Riccio & Babcock, 2014).  While the moving to opportunity 
demonstration which encouraged families to use their voucher to move to areas of higher 
opportunity, showed that the move to lower poverty neighborhoods did reduce anxiety and stress, 
it did not improve employment or income (Briggs, Popkin, & Goering, 2010).  
2.3.2 Residential stability and instability 
For many Americans, housing costs represent the bulk of their households’ monthly 
expenses (Aurand, et al., 2017).  Many Americans, and not just those who are considered low-
income, pay more than 30% of their monthly income in housing costs.  One of the objectives of a 
housing subsidy is to ensure that low-income families do not have to pay more than 30% of their 
income for housing, which will hopefully free up additional funds for other expenses including 
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education and health, while also relieving the stress that comes from not being able to make ends 
meet (Newman and Harkness, 2002). The HUD requirement that subsidized housing tenants pay 
30% of their monthly income in rent comes from the 1969 Brooke Amendment, and recent housing 
studies have called this standard into question (HUD, 2014)2.  Studies have found that subsidized 
housing has reduced overcrowding, rent burdens, housing instability that leads to multiple moves, 
reduces stress, and does allow families to spend money on other needs (Newman and Harkness, 
2002; Casciano & Massey, 2012; Mueller and Tighe, 2007).    
While the intention of subsidized housing is to provide affordable and stable housing, there 
is still a lot of movement in and out of public housing and the housing choice voucher program 
and movement within public housing and the housing choice voucher program.  These moves may 
be voluntary, as households in subsidized housing may have an increase in income that allows 
them to move to market-rate housing, or a household in subsidized housing may decide to move 
in with family or friends.  Those moves from subsidized housing could also be involuntary if the 
household is evicted or a voucher holder is unable to find a rental unit.  Moves within public 
housing could also be voluntary, a household is moving to a unit in a neighborhood or building 
that they prefer, or involuntary if a household is relocated due to demolition or extensive 
renovation of their public housing.  Households with a voucher have more flexibility with moving 
and can move from one rental unit to another at the end of its lease.  Those moves could also be 
involuntary, if their landlord does not renew the lease at the end of the contract, forcing residents 
to find a different rental unit using the voucher.  While the voucher offers residents more flexibility 
 
2 The Brooke Amendment is named for Massachusetts Senator Edward Brooke III, who sponsored Section 
213(a) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 that set the income-based rent payments at 25% of the 
tenant’s monthly income. This was raised to 30% in 1981. 
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in where the household can live, there is also added instability as landlords can choose to leave the 
program and may choose to not renew the lease (Nguyen et al., 2016).   
Lubell defined residential stability as having control over when, where, and under what 
circumstances to move (Lubell, 2015).  Even if moves are voluntary, moving could still be 
disruptive to households. A study of the mandatory moves associated with the redevelopment of 
public housing through HOPE VI, found that prior to moving, there were social ties within the 
public housing community, children played together and there was a culture of mutual assistance.  
The forced moved created anxiety, anger and resentment among residents who relied upon the 
social ties in their community, and while the community was identified as “severely distressed,” 
many residents felt a strong sense of community there (Manzo et al., 2008).  Another study found 
that after moving to mixed-income communities, residents felt that they were treated poorly by the 
residents who had higher incomes and didn’t live in subsidized housing.  Residents also reported 
that changes in screening criteria and management also led to dissatisfaction with housing despite 
the housing having physical improvements (McCormick & Chaskin, 2012).   
2.4 Pittsburgh Context and Background 
This section provides an overview of public housing and the HCV program in Pittsburgh.  
This section shows that public housing and HCV households at HACP face many of the same 
challenges faces by public housing and HCV residents in the rest of the country.  
The history of public housing in Pittsburgh mirrors the nation’s history with public 
housing. The Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, established in 1937, was the first public 
housing authority in Pennsylvania and among the first in the country (HACP, 2019). Prior to the 
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introduction of public housing, Pittsburgh, like many cities, had many poor communities with 
unsafe and overcrowded housing, and developed public housing as a way to improve the quality 
of housing for low-income residents and to reduce overcrowding.  
In Pittsburgh, the flatland along the rivers was primarily used for industry and worker 
housing was moved to hilltop communities (Kleinberg, 1989). Pittsburgh’s early public housing 
developments constructed in the 1930s and 1940s aimed to improve housing conditions for the 
working poor and were located in the hilltop communities or away from downtown. In Pittsburgh, 
planning decisions were affected by political, economic, social, and geographic fragmentation.  
The development of downtown Pittsburgh and the was prioritized over housing and social 
considerations (Bauman & Muller, 2006). By the end of the 1940s, eight public housing 
developments were constructed: Addison Terrace, Aliquippa Terrace, Arlington Heights, 
Allegheny Dwellings, Glen Hazel Heights, Broadhead Manor, St. Clair Village, and Bedford Hills 
Apartments (HACP, 2019).  Redlining maps from the 1940s shows that these public housing 
developments, which were clustered in the Hill District, Northside, Glen Hazel, and Garfield, all 
coincided perfectly with the redlining maps, which indicated areas that were deemed poor 
investments (Rutan and Glass, 2018).  These areas were identified as undesirable and residents 
would have trouble getting a mortgage to purchase property in these neighborhoods.  
Like many cities in the United States, Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods were deeply affected by 
urban renewal which included the construction of highways and the Civic Arena (Fullilove, 2004). 
The Civic Arena was built in 1958 and surrounding roadways led to the demolition of housing in 
the lower Hill District, creating a barrier between the Hill District and downtown Pittsburgh 
(Fullilove, 2004).  The Hill District had been a strong and cohesive African American 
neighborhood known for its jazz clubs and the home of playwright August Wilson and 
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photographer Teenie Harris. In her book, Fullilove defined root shock as “the traumatic stress 
reaction to the destruction of all or part of one’s emotional ecosystem” (Fullilove, 2004). The 
physical changes in the neighborhood contributed to significant changes in the social and economic 
aspects of the neighborhood. Many of those who were displaced moved to other parts of the Hill 
District or to East Liberty or Homewood. Further isolating the Hill District was the removal of the 
funicular (Penn Incline) that connected the Hill District to Penn Avenue in the Strip District in 
1953 (Fullilove, 2004). Residents of the Hill District relied upon the Penn Incline to commute to 
work and to shop in the market in the Strip District. Without the incline connecting the community 
to the Strip District and the street access to downtown through the Lower Hill, the residents were 
increasingly isolated. This includes the public housing residents who lived in Bedford Hill 
Apartments and Addison Terrace, two large public housing developments located in the Hill 
District.  
In the 1960s HACP continued to expand its public housing inventory with 12 additional 
high-rise buildings throughout the city, and began to purchase scattered-site rental units throughout 
Pittsburgh. In 1976, HACP expanded housing options by implementing a housing choice voucher 
program which allowed residents to use a voucher to subsidize their rent in a privately-owned 
rental unit (HACP, 2019). During this time period, community organizing gained momentum and 
neighborhoods became more vocal about the changes occurring.  Organizations such as ACTION 
housing developed as an advocate for these communities and to engage residents in the planning 
process (Lubove, 1996).  
In the 1970s and 1980s, many of the area steel mills closed, Westinghouse cut jobs, and 
manufacturing and blue-collar jobs were lost. Between 1979 and 1987, the Pittsburgh metro area 
lost 127,500 manufacturing jobs (Trotter & Day, 2010). The transition from manufacturing jobs 
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to service and high-tech jobs was particularly difficult for African Americans in Pittsburgh and the 
number of black workers decreased from 9,400 in 1970 to 6,000 in 1980 (Trotter & Day, 2010). 
During this time period there was a conscious shift from manufacturing jobs toward health care 
and education sector employment (Lubove, 1996).  While Pittsburgh was initially seen as a model 
for post-industrial redevelopment, the engagement of the nongovernmental sector was uneven 
across the city and wages for nonmanufacturing jobs stagnated (Deitrick, 1999).  By 1990, 41% 
of Pittsburgh’s black families were living in poverty and the unemployment rate for black men 
was 37%, compared to 13% unemployment rate among white men (Trotter & Day, 2010).   
In the 1990s and 2000s, HACP aimed to deconcentrate subsidized housing and better 
integrate subsidized housing into communities (HACP, 2019), initially with HOPE VI projects. 
By 1990, 70% of the black residents in HACP public housing wanted to move out of public housing 
(Trotter & Day, 2010). Bedford Hills Apartments, the first public housing in Pennsylvania, was 
redeveloped through the HOPE VI program. The redevelopment was done in four phases and was 
finally completed in 2009. Aliquippa Terrace and Manchester public housing were also 
demolished and redeveloped through the HOPE VI program, which created new mixed-income 
communities (Deitrick & Ellis, 2004). Despite the housing being in desperate need for 
redevelopment, there were mixed feelings among the residents about the demolition. Some 
families welcomed the change, while others felt a strong sense of home in those buildings and 
were concerned about having to move out of their communities (Trotter & Day, 2010). 
Development in Pittsburgh continued and in 2009 the first phase of redevelopment at Garfield 
Heights was also completed.   
In 2001 HACP was designated a moving to work (MTW) agency and was granted greater 
leverage to develop innovative policies to increase residents’ self-sufficiency and improve cost-
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efficiency (HACP, 2009). The redevelopment of the older properties has helped HACP to achieve 
all three goals of the MTW demonstration by reducing the cost of property maintenance and 
management, improve the provision of resident services, and to facilitate public-private 
partnerships allowing HACP to leverage public funds to attract private investment. In 2003, HACP 
began to shift to a site-based management approach which was modeled after the private sectors 
approach to property management. HACP found that the site-based management approach both 
improved rent collection rates and services to residents (HACP, 2009). 
At the beginning of the study period, January 1, 2010, HACP was in the middle of its plan 
to redevelopment of the older public housing developments. Construction on the second phase of 
redevelopment at Aliquippa Terrace was underway. Rebranded as Oak Hill, the second phase of 
development included 670 units of mixed-income units including public housing, low income 
housing tax credit (LIHTC), and market-rate housing units. During the second phase of 
redevelopment, the Wadsworth Community Center was also updated. In the same year, the 
redevelopment of 88 public housing units at Bedford Hill was also completed, as well as the 
redevelopment of the first phase of mixed-finance redevelopment in Garfield using a combination 
of public funds, tax incentives, and private investment (HACP, 2009).  
By the end of the study period, 2017, HACP had made significant changes to its housing 
inventory. In 2017, the redevelopment of Addison Terrace in the Hill District was nearing 
completion as 267 project-based vouchers and 13-market rate units were completed, and the first 
phase of the Choice Neighborhood Initiative in the Larimer neighborhood was completed, which 
included 28 project-based voucher units and the second phase of development, which would have 
150 mixed-income units and 75 subsidized units in privately-owned housing, was under 
construction (HACP, 2009). 
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Figure 2 below shows a timeline of major national policy changes and HACP development, 
demolition, and programs.  This shows that HACP’s public housing inventory expanded rapidly 
in the 1940s – 1970s when those properties had fallen into disrepair and were no longer meeting 
the maintenance standards, HACP demolished many of its high-rise and large housing 
developments and replaced them with smaller mixed-income developments through the HOPE VI 
program and Choice Neighborhood Initiative.   
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Figure 2-1. Timeline of major national housing policies and HACP initiatives 
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2.5 Current HACP Housing Development and Programs 
HACP continues to redevelop older housing and to connect that residents to resources 
offered within the community. One example of these recent efforts is the $20 million Choice 
Neighborhood Initiative grant awarded to HACP in 2009, to redevelop public housing in Larimer.  
Building from the lessons of the HOPE VI program, the Choice Neighborhood Initiative takes a 
three-prong approach to redeveloping public housing communities: housing, people, and 
community.  Along with redeveloping the public housing units, this initiative has also included 
broader community benefits including the redevelopment of parks and green space, reusing vacant 
buildings, development new community spaces, and providing employment and supportive 
services.  By leveraging the federal funds and engaging with local partners, the Choice 
Neighborhood Initiative has benefitted local homeowners by providing funding for façade 
improvements for homes in the neighborhood.   
Each public housing development partners with various community partners to offer 
services to its residents.  Community partners provide education, employment, health, and food 
access programs to the public housing residents (HACP, 2019). These services are available to all 
residents regardless of their participation in the FSS program.  The Bedford Hope Center, located 
in Bedford Dwellings in the Hill District, serves as a community center with a range of programs 
and services ranging from 24-hour childcare, computer labs, community rooms, to the creative arts 
center.   
The evolution of housing programs in Pittsburgh reflects the development of national U.S. 
housing policy over the last ninety years. A more thorough explanation of U.S. housing policy and 
the political context is provided in the following chapter. Pittsburgh is an important case for 
understanding how those policies affect local communities and residents.  
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2.6 Conclusions Drawn from the Literature 
Public housing in the United States has undergone significant changes during its history 
from slum clearance and improve housing conditions among the most vulnerable to efforts to 
house the working poor and provide the services and resources needed to improve their financial 
outcomes and achieve self-sufficiency.  The FSS program is central to these efforts, yet the 
program is not effective.  Numerous studies have indicated that the FSS program works for very 
few residents, yet the program remains largely unchanged.  These questions may be answered by 
additional studies of more cities and the relationship between local job markets, housing authority 
policies, and FSS participant outcomes.  
There is agreement in the literature that well designed and implemented FSS programs do 
lead to higher rates of employment, increased wages, and escrow savings among those who 
complete the program. However, there is no consensus on how to design and implement a 
successful FSS program that encourages and enables residents to achieve success. Many FSS 
programs have low participation rates and high rates of attrition, with few families making the 
move from subsidized to market-rate housing, which questions the definition of the term self-
sufficiency.  Housing policy scholars offer little evidence on the factors that lead to successful FSS 
programs and the relationship between participants, place, and programs.  We know that these 
programs can help those who complete the program, but we’re not entirely sure why.  We also 
don’t know what the optimal program looks like, how to leverage resources efficiently, nor do we 
understand the factors that lead to program attrition.  
This leads us to conclude that the FSS program is a promising avenue for reducing poverty, 
enabling families to realize better outcomes for their families, and could lead to some families 
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being successful in market-rate housing. However, as it is currently designed, the program is not 
leading to successful outcomes for most of the participants. 
The FSS program is designed with the expectation that participants will develop a plan, 
make consistent and linear progress meeting milestones during the program, and will continue to 
improve in accordance with the set plan, which is inconsistent with the literature. In the current 
literature on the relationship between housing and self-sufficiency, there are three types of studies; 
studies of the relationship between housing subsidies and work, studies on housing subsidies 
paired with services, and studies of housing subsidies and work incentives (Newman, 2008). This 
dissertation aims to partially bridge this gap, by offering a city-level study that examines the 
relationship between the increased minimum rent which serves as both a pseudo work requirement 
and financial incentive to enroll in the FSS program, and the outcomes of the households that 
receive the services from FSS program.   
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3.0 Methodology 
The primary objective of this study is to determine whether and when FSS participants 
leave the FSS program prior to completion. The focus of this analysis are the households that left 
the FSS program prior to completion and explaining which participants are more likely to leave 
the program prior to completion than others.  The dependent variable in this study is exit from the 
FSS program.  The contribution that this study makes to the literature is its examination on FSS 
program exit using the event history analysis framework.  The focus on the households that did 
not complete the program, as opposed to those who did, allows for a clearer analysis of the barriers 
to completing the self-sufficiency program.  
My main critique of the FSS program is that it assumes that the participants will develop 
and follow a linear path to self-sufficiency, meeting their pre-selected milestones in a timely 
fashion as they gradually and incrementally move toward self-sufficiency. This underlying 
assumption of the FSS program is not realistic for the participants.  This assumption does not 
acknowledge the complexity of poverty and the dynamics in a household over a five-year period.   
My analysis of HACP’s administrative data confirms that a very small percentage of FSS 
participants complete the program, that finding is consistent with the literature.  My analysis also 
shows is that a high percentage of FSS participants move from HACP public housing while 
enrolled in the FSS program.  Additionally, this analysis also examines changes within the 
household, such as moves within HACP housing, change in the number of household members, 
and changes in income during the program.  
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The Family Self Sufficiency (FSS) participants at the Housing Authority of the City of 
Pittsburgh (HACP) and their outcomes in the in the program are the primary focus of this study. 
This study determines the number of participants who left prior to completion, when they left the 
program, when they left the program, and explores some possible explanations for their exit.  To 
answer these questions, I used administrative data from HACP and an event history analysis 
framework.  This chapter provides additional context for this study by providing a preliminary 
description of the study subjects, the public housing and housing choice voucher households that 
participated in the FSS program, and HACP’s FSS program design.  After providing the 
background for this study, I will describe the data that is used in this study and discuss the 
limitations of the data.  That explanation will lead into a discussion about event history analysis 
and why this methodological framework was selected for this study, how those methods answer 
the questions asked and the available data. That will lead into a very detailed discussion of the 
research questions, the use of the data, the selected variables and their measurement, and the 
methods that were used to this study.  Finally, I will provide a brief summary of the chapter that 
will put all the pieces together and lead into Chapters 4 and 5 which provide the findings for this 
study.  
3.1 Context for this study 
While the FSS program is intended for work-able residents under the age of 62, all HACP 
public housing and housing choice voucher residents are eligible to participate in the FSS program.  
In 2017, the last year of this study, there were 2,381 families residing in public housing and 6,894 
families with housing choice vouchers in the City of Pittsburgh (HACP, 2017).  At the end of the 
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previous chapter, I discussed the demolition and redevelopment of many of the large public 
housing buildings in Pittsburgh. When the public housing developments were rebuilt, the new 
communities had far fewer public housing units than the building they replaced.  During the 
demolition and redevelopment process, residents were either relocated in available public housing 
in other communities or given a housing choice voucher.  During this study there was 
redevelopment of public housing buildings.  During the redevelopment, residents were either 
moved to other public housing buildings or given a tenant protection voucher, which works 
similarly to a housing choice voucher. The tenant protection voucher allows the resident to rent a 
rental unit from the private rental market, provided that it met the requirements for the physical 
inspection, fell within the Fair Market Rent guidelines, and the landlord agreed to accept the 
voucher. When the redevelopment of the public housing communities was complete, there were 
fewer public housing units and, in some instances, residents were able to return to the new 
community and in other cases, they remained in housing that they moved to. This further 
contributed to the expansion of the housing choice voucher program.  This is very important 
because this study will show that there are systematic differences between the public housing and 
housing choice voucher households in terms of the characteristics of the residents and the ability 
to provide services to those tenants. The widespread demolition of public housing units and shift 
to vouchers occurred after the FSS program was designed, and the FSS program was not adjusted 
to respond to those changes in the housing programs.  This is further evidence that the FSS program 
design should be reconsidered as it may be beneficial to redesign the program for the HCV 
households.  
The demand for subsidized housing in Pittsburgh far exceeds the supply.  HACP cannot 
meet the demand for subsidized housing and, due to the high number of applicants on the waiting 
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lists, the waiting lists for many public housing developments and the housing choice voucher 
program are usually closed.  HACP periodically opens the HCV waiting list for a short period of 
time to add new applications to the waiting list.  The most recent period when HACP accepted 
HCV applications was in December 2018. Before that, the last time that HACP accepted HCV 
applications was in Fall 2015, when the housing authority received approximately 7,000 
applications (HACP, 2017).  HACP uses a site-based waiting list for its public housing where 
residents can apply to reside in specific public housing buildings.  Site-based waiting lists allow 
the applicants to select the communities where they would like to live and since residents aren’t 
randomly assigned to housing units, there may be differences between the residents in different 
housing communities.  For instance, those who apply to live in scattered-site housing may be 
different from the residents who apply to live in apartment buildings, or those who apply to live in 
one part of the city could differ from those who apply to live in a different part of the city.  
Waiting lists are periodically opened for a short period of time ranging from two weeks to 
a month.  When the waiting lists are opened, HACP advertises the opportunity in the local 
newspaper, on its website, and on social media.  HACP accepts housing applications through its 
website, and applicants who do not have Internet access or need additional assistance can visit 
HACP’s office to use a computer to apply for housing.  Applications are reviewed by HACP staff 
to ensure that the applicant is eligible, and the application is complete, then the applications are 
randomly assigned to a position on the waiting list.  In many cases applicants wait more than a 
year for a housing unit to become available.  When an applicant nears the top of the waiting list, 
the applicant is contacted to ensure that he or she is still interested and eligible for housing.  When 
a public housing unit or housing choice voucher becomes available, the applicant goes through the 
screening process, confirms that they are income-eligible, and the housing authority completes the 
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background and credit check.  If the applicant passes the screening process, their rent is calculated 
based on their income and the household either moves into public housing or issued their housing 
choice voucher.   
Households in need of housing assistance often wait years for the opportunity to apply for 
housing and then spend years waiting for housing.  The online application process and the 
relatively short application window makes it difficult for the most vulnerable households to apply 
for housing.   
Households earning less than 80% of the Area Median Income (AMI) are income-eligible 
for public housing and those earning less than 50% are income-eligible for the housing choice 
voucher program.  Table 3.1 Below shows the area median income for the Pittsburgh metropolitan 
statistical area at the beginning of this study period in 2010 and the end of the study period in 2017.  
Eligibility for public housing and the housing choice voucher program is calculated based on the 
metropolitan statistical area, which has higher median income than the City of Pittsburgh.  
 
Table 3-1. Area Median Income for Pittsburgh Metro Statistical Area and City of Pittsburgh in 2000 and 
2017 
 2010 2017 
City of Pittsburgh Median Income $36,019 $44,092* 
Pittsburgh MSA Median Income $67,000 $72,000 
80% of AMI (Family of Four) $50,400 $36,300 
50% of AMI (Family of Four) $31,000 $36,300 
Source: HUD User: https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il.html#2017 
Source: American Factfinder https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF 
*American Community Survey 2013- 2017  
 
After an HCV household is issued a voucher, the resident finds a rental unit on the private 
rental market. If the landlord is willing to accept the voucher, the rent falls within HUD’s fair 
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market rent guidelines. When the unit passes inspection, the resident signs the lease. In Pittsburgh, 
the fair market rent for a two-bedroom apartment was $730 in 2010 and $822 in 2017.  After this 
study period, HACP has used its MTW status to develop small area fair market rent, using zip 
codes to determine the fair market rent instead of the metropolitan statistical area.  That will allow 
HACP to adjust the value of the voucher to reflect the housing costs in the zip code rather than the 
region at large.  This will increase housing choices for voucher holders by giving them access to 
neighborhoods that otherwise may not have had rental housing that fell within the MSA-level fair 
market rent levels.   
Participants in HACP’s FSS program successfully navigated the application process, met 
HACP’s screening criteria, and either accepted a public housing unit or completed the process of 
leasing a rental unit with a voucher.  Chapters 4 and 5 will discuss FSS participant characteristics 
relevant to this study such as: race, age, sex, household composition, household income, and 
housing location.  
3.2 HACP’s Minimum Rent Policy and FSS Program Design 
The first chapter provided an explanation of the FSS program goals and design and the 
previous chapter provided an explanation of the MTW demonstration and the ways that housing 
authorities in the MTW can develop their own programs and policies to further resident’s self-
sufficiency and reduce costs to the housing authority.  This section explains HACP’s increased 
minimum rent policy and its connection to the FSS program.  This policy is very important to 
understanding the extra incentive that HACP residents earning incomes less than $6,000 have to 
enroll and remain in the FSS program. This work builds off of a 2018 study by Deitrick and Bert 
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which examined the impact of the increased minimum rent policy on FSS enrollment. That study 
concluded that the increased minimum rent policy was not a strong incentive for residents to enroll 
in the FSS program (Deitrick & Bert, 2018).  This study builds upon that work and aims to 
determine whether the increased minimum rent policy is an incentive for residents to remain in the 
FSS program after they enroll.  
As an MTW agency, HACP changed its minimum rent policy in 2010 for Public Housing 
residents and in 2011 Housing Choice Voucher households. The policy increased the minimum 
rent for Public Housing households from $25 to $150 and increased the minimum rent for Housing 
Choice Voucher households from $50 to $150 for households in the housing choice voucher 
program.  
The minimum rent policy had two objectives:  
1. To incentivize households without wage income to participate in the Family Self-
Sufficiency (FSS) program; and  
2. To increase rent revenue for the HACP.   
 
At first glance, these could be regarded as conflicting goals.  Participation in FSS means 
households pay substantially lower monthly rent payments.  That also means that HACP collects 
less from them in rent.  Households that enroll in the FSS program and have higher incomes in the 
future will pay higher rents to the housing authority because residents pay a rent that is roughly 
30% of their monthly income.  As their income increases, so does the rent payment.  Alternatively, 
those household may choose to leave subsidized housing and rent from the private rental market, 
which frees up their housing subsidy for another household to use.  These outcomes are all 
compatible with the HACP’s goals and the goals of the MTW demonstration.  If the household 
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does not enroll in the FSS program, HACP charges a higher rent which increases its rent revenue.  
Either way, there is a benefit to the housing authority, either the household pays higher rent because 
their income increased through the FSS program, or the resident was charged a higher rent through 
the increased minimum rent policy.  
The increased minimum rent policy affects households that earn less than approximately 
$500 per month, because those households have an income-based rent that is calculated at less 
than $150 per month because tenants pay roughly 30% of their monthly gross income in rent. The 
minimum rent policy does not affect households with an adjusted monthly income greater than 
$500, because those households have an income-based rent calculated at more than $150 per 
month. Others who are exempt from the new minimum rent policy include:   
 
1. Households headed by senior citizens;  
2. Those with disabilities that prevent them from working;   
3. Those with an approved hardship exemption; and 
4. Recipients of full Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits. 
 
For those households earning less than $500 per month who choose not to participate in the 
FSS program, HACP collects an additional $100 per month or $1,200 per year from housing choice 
voucher households and $125 per month or $1,500 from public housing residents in rent payments.  
HACP depends upon rent revenue as part of its budget and satisfies the first goal of the MTW 
demonstration, to increase cost efficiency.  The increased minimum rent policy and FSS program 
address the third goal of the MTW demonstration in a more indirect manner. While not a stated 
goal of the FSS program, the underlying theory of the FSS program lies on the theory of subsidized 
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housing as a platform for improving the quality of life.  The theory is that affordable housing 
provides the stability families need to address other challenges related to education and 
employment. When a family has stable and affordable housing, the family can then focus on 
addressing its barriers to self-sufficiency.  As residents begin to earn more money and establish 
savings, they will be able to move to market-rate housing.  By enabling families to realize self-
sufficiency, HACP is increasing the number of housing choices available to the family.  Some FSS 
participants enter homeownership programs or move to the private rental market.  The FSS 
program is an important part of the MTW demonstration.  Each housing authority tailors its 
program to meet the needs of its residents and to best utilize the available resources.   
Aside from the increased minimum rent policy, HACP’s FSS program follows the typical 
FSS program design that was described in the introduction and throughout this study.  HACP’s 
FSS program provides numerous services and programs related to education, employment, health, 
that are available to adults and their families. Educational programs include classes at Allegheny 
Community College, health professionals training program, computer training, GED prep, and 
driver’s education. HACP also provides numerous employment services including: resume 
writing, interview preparation, job fairs, and assistance with finding clothing for job interviews. 
HACP also has programs to assist young justice-involved residents and a program promoting a 
drug-free lifestyle. Additionally, HACP partners with Catholic Charities and 412 Food Rescue to 
provide essentials to low-income residents in need of assistance with food and clothing. Programs 
for children include: community gardening, afterschool and summer programs, and the creative 
arts corner, with recording studios are located in the Bedford Hope Center and at Northview 
Heights (HACP, 2019).  
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3.3 HACP Administrative Data 
The administrative data used in this study comes from HACP’s data program that was 
designed to submit data to HUD electronically.  The priority is placed on the last record that is 
submitted to HUD, and that is the record that is most commonly and easily viewed, and HUD 
rarely conducts longitudinal studies looking at changes over time.  HUD’s priority when it reviews 
the administrative data is to see the overall occupancy rate and to ensure that the rents are 
calculated properly.  This is important to understanding the what data was collected and how the 
system is designed because it led to a large and complicated dataset.  This section will further 
explain the data collection and cleaning process, as well as the limitations of the dataset.  
3.3.1 Data Collection 
All public housing authorities are required to collect data about public housing and housing 
choice voucher households and submit the data to HUD in accordance with federal regulations 
through the Public Housing Information Center (PIC) (HUD, 2016).  The data are used by HUD 
for regular monitoring to ensure that the housing authorities are administering the housing 
programs in accordance with the regulations.  These data are recorded on the standard HUD-50058 
form, used by all housing authorities. Housing authorities are required to enter information about 
each household at the time that they enter and exit housing, and, at minimum, on a biennial basis 
while the household lives in subsidized housing.  Housing authority staff are also required to make 
an entry when the household experiences a change in income or household composition.  The main 
reasons for these entries are to show public housing occupancy, housing choice voucher utilization, 
and ensure that the housing authority is charging households the correct amount of rent.  
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A record is created in the system when a new resident enters the housing program.  For 
public housing residents, that record is given an action code of 1, to indicate that the record was 
created for a new admission to the housing program. After the household is admitted to HACP 
housing, the staff conducts a recertification every two years, to confirm that there haven’t been 
any changes in household size or income.  The staff member then submits a new record to the 
system with action code 2, annual recertification.  When there are changes in the household’s 
income or composition between the biennial certifications, a new action is made using code 3 
“interim reexamination.”  Residents are responsible for alerting the housing authority to changes 
in their household or income, but there is an additional safeguard. HUD uses the Enterprise Income 
Verification (EIV) system, which communicates with the Social Security Administration to ensure 
that all changes in income are reported.  Therefore, the Housing Authority is not relying solely 
upon the household to report their changes in income.  Because the rent is calculated as a 
percentage of the household’s income, residents are incentivized to report any decrease in income 
immediately, while they are disincentivized the report any increase in income, as that would lead 
to an increase in their rent payment.  The EIV system ensures that the housing authority has an 
accurate income reported for each household at all times.  
For housing choice voucher households, the record differs slightly, for those households 
the first record is given action code 10, issuance of voucher. This reports to HUD that the housing 
authority has issued a voucher to that household and they are currently seeking a rental unit from 
the private market that adheres to the fair market rent parameters and meets the inspection 
standards.  After the household with the voucher locates a suitable unit and signs the lease, the 
next entry in the record as an Action Code 1, New Admission.     
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The action codes used in this study, either as part of the data cleaning or data analysis are 
listed below with a brief description. 
Table 3-2 HUD 50058 Action Codes 
Action Code  Name Description 
1 New Admission Used when a public housing household enters housing and 
when an HCV household leases a rental unit.  
2 Annual re-examination Routine examination conducted every two years 
3 Interim re-examination Conducted when income or household size changes 
between the bi-annual re-examinations 
4 Portability Move-in 
(HCV) 
An HCV household moved to Pittsburgh from another 
housing authority and will use their voucher in Pittsburgh 
5 Portability Move-Out 
(HCV) 
A HACP HCV household moves to another housing 
authority and will continue to use its voucher.  
6 End of participation  Left HACP housing  
7 Change of unit Moved from one HACP public housing unit to another 
HACP public housing unit.  
14 Historical Readjustment Corrects a prior record 
15 Void Voids the record immediately before this entry 
 
3.3.2 Data Cleaning  
In 2017, HACP and the University of Pittsburgh’s University Center for Social and Urban 
Research (UCSUR) partnered on two projects (Deitrick & Bert, 2018; Blackhurst & Briem, 2018; 
Blackhurst, et al., 2019).  One was a study of the small area fair market rent in the City of 
Pittsburgh, to determine a better payment standard for the HCV program.  Prior to the study, HACP 
used the metropolitan statistical area to calculate fair market rent for the voucher program.  This 
study provided the data necessary for a policy change from the MSA level to the zip code level.   
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The second study was an evaluation of the increased minimum rent policy to determine the 
extent to which that policy incentivized households earning less than $6,000 per year to enroll in 
the FSS program.  The study also calculated the increase in rent revenue for HACP from the 
households that paid the increased minimum rent of $150 per month.  The data used in this 
dissertation is the dataset that was collected for the increased minimum rent study.   
HACP collected the data for this set of studies by generating a report of its records from 
2010 to 2017.  The HUD-50058 form requests information to identify the resident, demographic 
information, household information, information about the household’s income, information about 
the housing authority’s rent calculation for that particular household, and information about 
services received by the household.  For this study, HACP provided only de-identified data.  
Typically, households are identifiable by the social security number or name of the head of 
household.  HACP removed that information and replaced it with a unique household identifier.  
Each record containing a separate transaction number, date that the record was submitted, effective 
date, and action code, allowing a household’s records to remain together sequentially for analysis.  
The initial dataset included duplicate entries and data that had been voided or corrected by 
the housing authority.  The data had to be cleaned so that only the correct entries appeared in the 
dataset that was used in this analysis.  
3.3.3 Abilities and Limitations of the Data  
As explained above, the data from HACP are primarily used by HUD to ensure that the 
housing authority maintains an acceptable public housing occupancy and housing choice voucher 
utilization levels and that the rents are calculated properly.  While the housing authority does 
collect additional information on its FSS program, that data was not included in the dataset, 
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because the dataset was initially created for the two UCSUR studies.  Unfortunately, the 
information on residents’ level of education, services received while in the FSS program, use of 
escrow funds and sources of income were not available for this study.  
Those limitations aside, this data does record every change in household location, income, 
and household composition throughout the household’s participation in the FSS program as well 
as basic information about the participants such as: age, race, and sex.  Each change in the data are 
date stamped allowing for a very thorough understanding of changes in this household during FSS 
participation.  These data are important to answering the questions about whether and when the 
participants left the FSS program and the changes that occurred in household’s during FSS 
participation.  The following section will explain how these data are used in the event history 
analysis framework.  
3.4 HACP FSS Program and Event History Analysis 
The administrative data collected by HACP from January 1, 2010 to October 1, 2017, 
included all of the entries made to the system during that time period.  Those entries included data 
on the household demographics and composition, household location, and income.  Because I had 
multiple entries for each household, I was able to identify changes in household composition, 
location, and income during the study period.  I was also able to identify the point when households 
entered and left FSS, which allowed me to calculate the length of FSS participation.  This data 
were ideal for an event history analysis that aimed to determine whether and when households left 
the FSS program.    
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3.4.1 HACP FSS Program Design 
The figure at the end of this subsection depicts the various paths that residents could follow 
while in HACP’s public housing or housing choice voucher programs.  The figure starts with all 
residents of an HACP housing program.  Households with a head of household that is over the age 
of 62 or has a disability that prevents them from working are not considered to be work-able.  
Those households may reside in housing that is designated for seniors or persons with physical 
disabilities, or they may live in a general occupancy “family” development.  Those households are 
not subject to HACP’s increased minimum rent policy and, while they are certainly welcome to 
participate in the FSS program and receive services from HACP, they are not the target audience 
of the FSS program.   
While all residents in HACP’s housing programs are eligible for the FSS program, the 
program is designed for households with a head of household who is under the age of 62 and 
without a disability that prevents them from working. The households with a head of household 
that is over the age of 62 or have a disability that prevents them from working are not subject to 
the increased minimum rent policy.  FSS participation is voluntary and is available to residents in 
both the public housing and housing choice voucher programs.  Residents can voluntarily enter or 
exit the FSS program at any time and for any reason.  Residents who earn monthly incomes of 
more than $500 pay roughly 30% of their monthly income in rent, $150 or more regardless of 
whether they are enrolled in the FSS program.  Households earning less than $500 per month have 
the option to enroll in the FSS program and continue paying the same amount in rent, but if they 
do not enroll in the FSS program, they will be charged $150 in rent, in accordance with HACP’s 
increased minimum rent policy.  Households that initially opt to pay the increased minimum rent 
of $150 always have the option of enrolling in the FSS program and paying the higher of 30% of 
 81 
their monthly income in rent or the former minimum rent of $25 for public housing households 
and $50 for housing choice voucher households.   
For the households that enroll in the FSS program, they will follow the FSS program rules 
and working with their service coordinator to develop their personalized Individualized Training 
and Service Plan (ITSP) and begin to take strides toward self-sufficiency by addressing their 
personal barriers to employment.  If the participant does not make satisfactory progress toward 
their goals in accordance, they can be dismissed from the FSS program. Those households are then 
subjected to the increased minimum rent if their household income is less than $500.  If their 
income is higher than $500, they pay income-based rent of 30% of their monthly income.  
As mentioned earlier, another reason that participants commonly leave the FSS program is 
that they leave HACP housing and either move to market-rate housing, or in some cases, transfer 
to housing provided by a different housing authority. If the FSS participant is in good standing 
when they leave HACP housing, they receive their escrow savings. If they transfer to a different 
housing authority, their escrow account transfers with them, and they resume the FSS program at 
the other housing authority.  
For the households that remain in the FSS program for the full five-year program, achieve 
the goals set forth in their ITSP, and are free from other forms of public assistance for one year 
prior to FSS completion, they graduate from the FSS program and receive their escrow savings in 
a lump sum. Those households may remain in HACP after FSS completion, and will pay income-
based rent, 30% of the household’s income. Figure 3 below shows this process in a flow chart.  
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Figure 3-1 HACP FSS program and Increased Minimum Rent policy. 
 
The process described above reflects the FSS program design but does not consider other 
changes within participants’ households while they are participating in the FSS program.  The 
analysis in the following two chapters will show that many FSS participants experience significant 
changes within their households while enrolled in the FSS program.  These changes include moves 
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within HACP housing, changes in their household composition, and income variability as 
participants are employed and unemployed.   
3.4.2 Event History Analysis Framework 
Event History Analysis, also called survival analysis, is often used in medical research to 
better understand a patient’s likelihood of survival after a medical intervention.  It is also widely 
used in engineering to measure the lifespan of a machine, bridge, or other product.  This method 
can also be applied to social sciences and any other discipline when researchers are trying to 
answer questions about whether or when a particular event will occur (Box-Steffensmeir & Jones, 
2004).  Event history analysis is appropriate for this study because we are interested in knowing 
whether an FSS participant left the FSS program, and if so, when did they leave the program.  
Event history analysis allows for an examination of all of the households that entered the FSS 
program after January 1, 2010 to calculate the length of time that the participant was in the 
program.  The households that did not complete the program or remained in the FSS program at 
the end of the study period are included in the models for the period that their participation was 
observed.  This allows for a much richer analysis because it includes a larger number of study 
subjects.   
Because so many participants left the program prior to completion, it would be difficult to 
use typical longitudinal analysis techniques because there would be very unbalanced panels and 
so few participants have 60 observations.  Event history analysis is specifically designed for 
datasets such as this where there is a high rate of attrition from a program.  There are two data 
requirements for an event history analysis. First, there has to be a failure event that represents the 
dependent variable that is being explained.  In this study, the failure event being explained is 
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withdrawing from the FSS program prior to completion. Second, there has to be a consistent 
measurement of time to event (Singer & Willet, 2003; Cleves, et al. 2016).  In this study, the 
measurement of time is in months. This dataset has satisfied both of these requirements.  
In the following section, I will revisit the research questions and provide the details about 
why those research questions were selected, and how the data was used to answer those questions.  
3.5 Research Questions and Variables 
This research answers three questions about HACP’s FSS program using an event history 
analysis framework.   
3.5.1 Research Question 1: What are the outcomes of FSS participation?  
The first step in this analysis was to identify the outcomes of FSS participation. There are 
four possible outcomes of FSS participation.  
1.) Participant left the FSS program prior to completing the 60-month program but 
remained in HACP housing. These households are the focus of this study.  
2.) Participant completed 60-months in the FSS program.  
3.) Participant moved from HACP housing while enrolled in the FSS program, and thus 
left the FSS program.  
4.) Participant remained in the FSS program on October 1, 2017, the last day of the study 
period.  
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This analysis starts by identifying the households that were enrolled in the FSS program 
for any period of time during the study period, which started January 1, 2010 and ended on October 
1, 2017.  After identifying the households that participated in the program, I then identified the 
households that entered the program prior to the beginning of the study period.  Because the 
households entered the FSS prior to the beginning of the study period, their entry to the FSS 
program was not observed and their length of FSS participation cannot be calculated and their 
outcomes in the FSS program cannot be determined. 
In this study, time is measured in terms of the length of FSS participation.  The time of FSS 
entry is T=0 and the length of program participation is measured by the number of months in the 
program between 1 and 60.  Participants who remained in the FSS program for 60 months reached 
the end of 5-years in the FSS program and have completed the full term of the program.  Months 
were selected as the unit of analysis because households pay rent on a daily basis and any change 
in rent goes into effect on the first day of the following month.  By examining the data at the month 
level, I was able to offer a finer analysis than if the analysis was done by year.  Using the month 
as the unit of analysis allows for up to 60 observations per households, whereas an analysis using 
year as the unit of time would only offer up to five observations per household.  
In addition to identifying whether or when an event occurs, event history analysis is useful 
in instances when data is censored, meaning that there is only a partial record for a particular 
participant where either FSS entry or exit were not observed (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004; 
Singer & Willet, 2003). In this study there are three reasons why a participant’s data may be 
censored.  
1. Left censored – a participant entered the FSS program prior to the beginning of the 
study period, January 1, 2010 and the participants’ entry to the FSS program is not 
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observed. Therefore, their length of FSS participation cannot be determined.  As 
described above, these households were not included in the analysis as their length of 
participation and outcomes could not be determined.  
 
2. Right censored – the participant remained in the FSS program on the last day of the 
study period, October 1, 2017, and their outcome in the FSS program was not 
captured in the dataset.  While the outcomes of these participants cannot be 
determined, they are included in the dataset for the period of time they are observed.  
 
3. Moved from HACP housing – these participants moved from HACP housing while 
enrolled in the FSS program and their outcome in the FSS program cannot be 
determined.  It is impossible to determine whether those households would have 
completed the FSS program had they not moved from HACP housing.  For statistical 
purposes, these participants are treated like the right censored participants and are 
included in the study for the period of time during which they were observed.  
Figure 3-2 below shows the four possible outcomes of participants in this FSS study.  
Again, the left censored households were not included.  As an example, the first scenario (from 
top to bottom) shows a household that left the FSS program after 7 months of participation.  This 
household left the FSS program but remained in HACP housing.  This is the group of participants 
that are the focus of the study and their exit is the event that is being explained by the analysis. 
The second scenario shows a participant who remained in the FSS program for 60 months, even 
though the figure only captures the first 16 months and completed the FSS program.  The third 
scenario shows a participant moved out of HACP housing after only 3 months in the program.  
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This household was handled the same way as the right censored households, and its data was 
included in the analysis for the three months that the household was observed.  The fourth and 
final scenario is that the household remained in the FSS program on October 1, 2017, the last day 
of the study period and is considered right censored. In this example, the household was only 
observed in the dataset for the first 12 months of its FSS participation.  The data for those 12 
months is included in the study, but the final outcome is unknown. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Possible Outcomes of FSS Participation 
 
The expectation of HACP is that the increased minimum rent policy will create a sufficient 
financial incentive for its residents earning less than $500 per month to enter the FSS program and 
once in the FSS program, the residents will work with their service coordinator to establish a plan 
to achieve self-sufficiency during the five-year program.  In the next two chapters, I will show that 
the program is not working as HACP had intended.  The increased minimum rent policy did not 
create a sufficient incentive for residents to enroll in the FSS program, and those who did enroll, 
are unlikely to remain in the program. The figure on the following page compares the ideal 
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scenario, where the FSS participant follows the expected linear path through the program making 
incremental progress along the way.  The figure also shows some of the other possible outcomes 
of participants and some of the factors that may contribute to those outcomes. This list of 
alternative scenarios is not exhaustive and represents only some of the scenarios that occurred for 
FSS participants.  
 
Figure 3-3 Scenarios for FSS Outcomes 
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3.5.2 Research Question 2: When are FSS participants most likely to leave the FSS 
program?  
After determining the outcomes of FSS participation, I wanted to know whether there were 
certain times when households were more likely to leave the FSS program than others.  First, I 
tested seasonal effects to determine whether there were particular times during the year when 
residents were more likely to leave the program.  I expected to find that residents may be more 
likely to leave the program in the summer when children are out of school because there is a change 
in childcare responsibilities.  I also expected to find that there may be changes in FSS participation 
around the winter holidays when there may be a change in seasonal work patterns.  
After testing seasonal effects, I then tested to see whether there was a particular point in the 
program when households were likely to leave. Using the event history analysis framework 
described in the previous section, I calculated the length of FSS participation for each household 
in terms of the number of months they participated in the program.  I then constructed two life 
tables, one for public housing and the other for housing choice vouchers.  The life tables are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5, that present the findings of the analysis and the 
tables are in Appendix A.   
The tables also show the number of households that withdraw from the FSS program each 
month, the number of households that moved from HACP housing during the month, and the 
number of participants that were right censored at the end of the month. The life table identifies 
the median lifetime, or the point when 50% of the participants remained in the program. This point 
is very important to identify as it allows for an understanding of whether participants tend to leave 
early or late in program participation.  
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The table is also used to calculate the hazard function, or the proportion of the participants 
at the beginning of the month who left during the month, and the survival function, the participants 
that were still enrolled in the FSS program at the end of the month.  The life table allows for 
identification of periods of time in the program when participants were more likely to withdraw 
from FSS. The table for the public housing households is in Chapter 4 and the life table for the 
housing choice voucher households is in Chapter 5. The life table is also the basis for the Kaplan-
Meier survival estimates that were used throughout this study as a way of graphically showing 
when participants leave the program. That analysis is described in greater detail in the following 
section about the possible explanations for FSS program exit.   
3.5.3 Research Question 3: What explains exit from the FSS program?  
After answering the first two questions, whether and when households leave the FSS 
program, I wanted to explore some of the factors that may explain FSS program exit.  Based on 
the literature and conversations with HACP staff, I developed two hypotheses for explaining exit 
from the FSS program.  The first hypothesis is that household characteristics can explain the 
likelihood of an FSS participant leaving the FSS program prior to completing five years in the 
program.  The second hypothesis is that FSS program characteristics that were created by HACP 
and HUD can explain the likelihood that a participant will leave the FSS program prior to 
completion.  The null hypothesis is that household and program characteristics do not explain exit 
from the FSS program.  
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3.5.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Household Characteristics.  
There were four variables that were tested in the household characteristic hypothesis: 
household income at the time of FSS entry, whether the household moved within HACP housing 
during the FSS program, and whether there was a change in household composition during 
participation in the FSS program3.   
 
1. Children under the age of 18 in the household.  
Households with children under the age of 18 may be less likely to complete the FSS program 
because of childcare responsibilities and may have less time to complete the FSS program. These 
were recorded as a binary variable, either there were children under the age of 18 in the household 
or there were not.  Additionally, I tested variables preschool and school-aged children to see if 
there was a difference in the likelihood of leaving the FSS program prior to completion in 
households with preschool children who were under the age of 5 and households with school-aged 
children between the ages of 5 and 17. This builds off of prior FSS evaluations that tested whether 
having children in the household impacted the likelihood of FSS completion (Anthony, 2005; Kleit 
& Rohe, 2015).  There were contradictory findings in the literature, so this variable is included in 
this study to determine whether having children in the household impacted the likelihood of FSS 
completion for HACP residents.  
 
2. Changes in household composition 
 
3 Race was not considered in this analysis because more than 90% of heads of household were Black.  
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Similarly, I was also interested in knowing whether households that had family members 
entering or leaving the household were as likely to complete the program as households that did 
not have changes in household composition.  Households that had an adult leaving the household 
may be less likely to complete the FSS program because of changes in their household 
responsibilities. Also, households that had additions to the household may also be less likely to 
complete the program because of a change in their household responsibilities.  The variable “HH 
change” indicated whether or not there was a change in household composition during 
participation in the FSS program.  Households with at least one change in the number of household 
members received a “1” while households with the same number of occupants during FSS 
participation received a “0.”  
 
3. Household Location and Moves 
The underlying objective of public housing and housing choice vouchers is to provide stable 
housing.  As discussed in Chapter 2, frequent moves can be disruptive to households and can make 
it difficult for residents to improve their educational, health, and employment outcomes (Manzo, 
et al.,2008; Bogle, et al., 2016).  Subsidized housing paired with the FSS program aim to create a 
stable platform for improving the quality of life while providing resources and services needed for 
residents to achieve their goals (HUD, 2010; Riccio & Babcock, 2014).   
While income-based rent payments do provide some stability, it is still not uncommon for 
public housing and housing choice voucher residents to move within HACP housing while 
participating in the FSS program.  These moves may be voluntary or involuntary.  Voluntary 
moves are done at the residents’ request and may be a move to a community that is closer to family 
or employment or may be to a housing unit that the resident prefers.  Involuntary moves occur 
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when HACP is redeveloping its property or repairs need to be performed on a particular unit.  
While there aren’t any indicators in the dataset about whether the moves are voluntary or 
involuntary, Addison Terrace was redeveloped during this study period and caused involuntary 
moves (HACP, 2016).  I was interested in understanding whether households that moved within 
HACP housing were as likely to complete the FSS program as households that remained in the 
same housing unit for the duration of its FSS participation.  This builds off of the Moving to 
Opportunity and housing mobility literature discussed in Chapter 2.  I created a variable named 
“moves” by determining whether a household had multiple addresses listed while they participated 
in FSS.  Households with two or more addresses listed received a “1” while households that only 
had one address listed received a “0”.   
 
4. Income at FSS entry  
I wanted to know whether households that entered the FSS program with a higher household 
income would be more likely to remain in the programs than households that had less income at 
the time that they entered the program.  Participants with higher incomes had some work history 
and may be more successful in the FSS program than households that did not have any wage 
income when entering FSS.  Households that were working when they entered the FSS program 
and had employment history may be able to use the FSS program to find their next job, which 
would be a better paying job or offer more hours than the job that they had at the time of the FSS 
program entry.  Those households may be more likely to remain in the program than households 
that were seeking their first job. To create an easily testable dichotomous variable, I found the 
median household income at the time of FSS entry and determined whether the household’s 
income at entry was above or below the median.  Households with an income above the median at 
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the time of FSS entry were assigned a 1 and households with an income below the median were 
assigned a 0.   
3.5.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Program Characteristics.  
The second hypothesis tests two program characteristics to determine whether they explain 
exit from the FSS program.  This builds off the finding from Kleit and Rohe (2015) that program 
characteristics impacts the participants likelihood of success.  The first variable tested is whether 
the household paid increased minimum rent prior to enrolling in the FSS program.  This variable 
is unique to HACP housing as it is the only housing authority in the country that implemented an 
increased minimum rent policy to incentivize residents to enroll in the FSS program.  The second 
variable that was tested was the amount of escrow savings that a household had.  The escrow 
savings program was developed by HUD in 1990 as part of the initial FSS program as an incentive 
for FSS participants to remain in the FSS program.   
 
1. Paid increased minimum rent prior to participating in the FSS program. 
The increased minimum rent policy was designed to incentivize households to enroll in the 
FSS program. This policy may also incentivize those households to remain in the FSS program so 
that they did not have to pay the increased minimum rent of $150 when they left FSS.  To measure 
this variable, first, I reviewed the administrative data to identify the households that paid the 
increased minimum rent during the study period.  In order to identify those households, I looked 
for households that had a value in column “TTP_9H” of $150 indicating that the minimum rent 
for that household was the increased minimum rent of $150.  Households that only had a value of 
$25 for PH households or $50 for HCV households, were excluded from the study as they were 
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exempt from the increased minimum rent policy.  I confirmed that the households with $150 
recorded in the hardship column were not exempt by ensuring that there was a “N” recorded in the 
column that indicates that the household was not exempt from paying the increased minimum rent 
due to a hardship.   
After I identified the households that could be charged the increased minimum rent during 
the study period, I identified the households that had a total tenant payment, which is 30% of the 
households adjusted monthly income, calculated at less than $150, recorded in column “TTP_9F” 
which is the total tenant payment based on the adjusted income.  Then as a double check, $150 
was recorded in column “TTP_9J” which is total tenant payment that was charged.   
I then performed the same analysis of the households that participated in the HCV program.  
Once I determined whether the household paid the increased minimum rent during the study 
period, I created a variable to identify households that had paid minimum rent during the study 
period and assigned a 1 to households that had paid the increased minimum rent of $150 during 
the study period and a 0 to households that did not. Then I identified the households that paid the 
increased minimum rent and participated in the FSS program, and finally, I determined whether 
the household paid the increased minimum rent before or after participating in the FSS program.  
I created a variable to identify households that paid the increased minimum rent prior to FSS entry 
and those who had were coded with a “1” and households that did not were coded with a “0.”  
 
2. Escrow Savings 
Escrow savings is the primary incentive for households to remain in the FSS program.  
Escrow savings is a standard part of the FSS program that is utilized by most housing authorities. 
HACP has not made any changes to the escrow savings incentive.  As previously explained, public 
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housing and housing choice voucher households pay income-based rent, which is roughly 30% of 
the households’ monthly income.  As the household’s income increases, the rent is recalculated to 
reflect 30% of the current income.  One of the benefits of FSS participation is that participants are 
permitted to divert the would-be rent increase into an escrow savings account and receive it in a 
lump sum upon FSS graduation.  If the household does not graduate from the FSS program, they 
forfeit the money to the housing authority.  
The escrow savings amount for each household was not included in the dataset, but easy 
to calculate.  I used the rent payment at FSS entry as the base rent and then calculated any rent 
increases during FSS participation and multiplied it by the number of months in order to calculate 
the cumulative escrow savings amount for each household.  Then I calculated the median escrow 
savings and created a variable “escrow savings above median” and households with escrow 
savings above the median receiving a “1” and those with escrow savings below the receiving a 
“0.”  I also used this data to conduct additional analysis to examine the differences among 
households with differing amounts of escrow savings.   
The increased minimum rent policy is an incentive for households to enroll and remain in 
the FSS program for the households who had annual incomes of less than $6,000.  The escrow 
savings account is an incentive for the households who have increased their earnings, and savings, 
during the FSS program to complete the program.    
The below table summarizes the hypotheses and variables tested, the data source for those 
variables, and a connection to the literature.  These hypotheses are embedded in the literature. 
These hypotheses and selected variables further the literature and what is known about the FSS 
program by testing hypotheses that have been tested in other studies with inconclusive outcomes, 
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or outcomes from a particular study which may or may not be consistent with the findings of this 
study.  
 
Table 3-3 Crosswalk for Variables  
Hypothesis 1: Household Characteristics 
Variable 
Data Source From HUD-
50058 
Prior Studies 
Children in the household Field 3h = Y 
Lee & McNamara, 2018; 
Rohe & Kleit, 1997; Wood, 
Turnham & Mills, 2008. 
Moved 
Field 5a more than one 
address listed for the 
household during study 
period.  
Lubell, 2015; Manzo, Kleit, 
& Couch, 2005; McCormack, 
Joseph & Chaskin, 2012; 
Shin, 2019. 
Income at entry Field 7i Lee & McNamara, 2018 
Household composition 
change 
Field 3T change during study 
period. 
Shroder, 2002 
Hypothesis 2: FSS Program Characteristics 
Public Housing or Housing 
Choice Voucher  
Field 1c 
Ong, 1998; Nguyen, et al., 
2016 
Escrow Savings  
Calculated field 9j – 9j at FSS 
entry, multiplied by the 
number of months. 
Santiago, Galster & Smith, 
2017; Sard, 2001; Ficke & 
Piesse, 2004; Rohe &Kleit, 
1999. 
Increased Minimum Rent  
Y if 9h = 50, and 9j <150, 
and 9k=150. 
Lee & McNamara, 2018; 
Rohe, Webb & Frescoln, 
2016; Verma, et al., 2013. 
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3.5.4 Testing the Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis that household characteristics, such as children in the household, 
changes in household composition, moves within HACP housing, and income at the time of FSS 
program entry may explain the likelihood of an FSS participant leaving the program prior to 
completion.  The null hypothesis is that these household characteristics do not impact the 
likelihood of leaving the FSS program prior to completion.   
The first step in the analysis was to create a basic table showing the number of households 
that had children in the household and those that did not and show those numbers by FSS program 
outcome, left the FSS program, completed the FSS program, moved from HACP housing, and 
right censored.  
Then I compared the likelihood of survival (remaining in the FSS program) for the 
households that had children in the household and those that did not by using the Kaplan-Meier 
survival estimate. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate uses the observed data to describe the 
distribution of event occurrence (Willet & Singer, 2003). This survival estimate provides a clear 
graph showing the survival estimate for participants in each group. The graphs for the public 
housing households is in Chapter 4 and for housing choice voucher households, it is in Chapter 5. 
The first step is to calculate the conditional probability of event occurrence at time j.   
p̂(tj) = n events 
n at risk 
 
The Kaplan Meier survival estimates are the conditional probability showing the likelihood 
that an FSS participant remains in the FSS program for the next month given that they had 
remained in the FSS program up to that point in the program.   
S(tij) is the probability that an individual will remain in the program past time period j.  
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S(tij) = Pr[T1 > j] 
ŝ (tj) = the number of participants who have not left FSS during time period j / n in the data 
set. 
Ŝ (tj) = ŝ (tj -1) [1-ĥ(tj)] 
The survivor function starts at 1 and declines toward 0 during the time in the program.  By 
plotting the data, one can identify the point in the program when participants are most likely to 
leave the program. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate is particularly useful for examining the 
survival curves of two different groups in univariate analysis (Singer & Willet, 2003).  
After creating the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for the variable, children in the 
household or no children in the household at time of FSS entry, I wanted to compare the two 
survival estimates to determine whether there was a significant difference between the two groups.  
To do that comparison, I completed a log-rank test of equivalency.  
 
3.5.5 Log-rank tests  
Log-rank is a test of equivalency and uses a X2 test of the null hypothesis that there is no 
statistical difference between the expected survival of two groups (Cleves, et al, 2016).  The log 
rank test is a non-parametric test that does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the 
data. The log rank test determines how many events are expected for each group if the likelihood 
of failure were equivalent between the groups, then compares the number of expected observations 
against the number of observed observations to determine whether one group was statistically more 
likely to experience a particular outcome.  The log-rank compares the observed number of 
participants who withdrew from the FSS program during a particular month with the number of 
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participants are expected to withdraw from the FSS program if the two groups have the same risk 
of leaving the program.  The test statistic is the sum of (Observed – Expected )2 /E for each group. 
The log-rank test tells us whether one group is statistically more likely to withdraw from the FSS 
program than the other group.  
Then I repeated this process for each of the variables in the first hypothesis, household 
characteristics, and then conducted the same analysis for the variables in the second hypothesis, 
program characteristics.  
 
3.5.6 Logistic Regression 
After completing the univariate analysis of each of the variables in the study, I fitted several 
logistic regression models to better understand the relationship between the explanatory variables 
and the likelihood that a household would leave the FSS program. In this logistic regression, the 
outcome variable is left the FSS program prior to completion.  The households included in the 
regression have either left the FSS program prior to completion, 1, or completed the FSS program, 
0.  The households that moved from HACP housing during the study period or were still in the 
program at the end of the study period were not included in the regression analysis because their 
FSS outcome could not be determined. The logistic regression determines that likelihood that a 
household would leave the FSS program prior to completion given a set of explanatory variables.  
The below equation shows that the probability of y=1 given x (Wooldridge, 2016). 
P(y=1|x) = β0 + β1x1 +   β2x2 +    β3x3 + … βnxn 
The logistic regression produces the odds ratio, which allows for comparison between the 
two groups, those that withdrew from the FSS program prior to completion (y=1) and those who 
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did not drop out of the FSS program and completed the 60-month program (y=0) (Sperandei, 
2014).  
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided additional context for carrying out this study in Pittsburgh and 
explained HACP’s FSS program and its increased minimum rent policy which aimed to incentivize 
households to enroll in the FSS program. This chapter provided an in-depth explanation of the data 
used in this study including the origin of the data, data management, and the strengths and 
limitations of the dataset.  Then I provided an explanation of the methodological framework for 
this study with a discussion about the use of event history analysis and justification for why it was 
selected for this study.  Then I returned to the research questions that were originally posed in the 
introduction to provide additional information about how the data were used to answer those 
questions and provided information about the hypotheses tested and variables used in the study.  
Then I explained the statistical testing and the use of tools of event history analysis: life tables, 
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, and log-rank tests of equivalency.  I explained the benefits and 
the shortcomings of those univariate methods and explained how the logistic regression was able 
to complement that analysis by providing a multivariate analysis to examine interactions between 
the variables.  
This chapter sets up the next two chapters, Chapter 4 which presents the findings of the 
study for the public housing households and Chapter 5 which presents the findings for the housing 
choice voucher households.  The analysis of the FSS program was split by public housing and 
housing choice voucher households because there are stark differences between the nature of the 
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housing program and between the residents themselves.  The analysis for the two groups is 
identical and each analysis starts with a detailed description of the FSS participants and their 
characteristics.  In the final chapter of this study, Chapter 6, I will provide a comparison of the 
FSS program between the public housing and housing choice voucher residents and compare and 
contrast the outcomes of the analysis.  That chapter will provide the evidence that supports my 
argument that these two housing programs serve different groups in different ways and these 
groups have very different experiences in the FSS program.  I further argue that there should be 
adjustments to the FSS program based on these differences.  The findings in the following two 
chapters will provide the evidence used in my argument which will be discussed in the final 
chapter.  
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4.0 Public Housing Findings 
This chapter presents the findings of the analysis of the public housing households that 
were enrolled in the Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program during the study period of January 1, 
2010 to October 1, 2017.  This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section addresses the 
first research question: What are the outcomes of FSS participation? That section describes the 
FSS participants and determines the outcomes of the FSS participants, which will set the base for 
the rest of the study.   
The second section addresses the second research question: When do participants leave the 
FSS program?  This question seeks to determine whether exit from the FSS program is determined 
by time and whether there is a particular time in the calendar year or point in the program when 
participants are most likely to leave. First, the time series analysis shows FSS program exit to 
identify whether there was time when the number of exits from the FSS program were particularly 
high. Second, the event history framework is used to calculate the length of time that each 
household participated in the program and uses a life table and Kaplan-Meier survival estimate to 
determine whether there was a point in the program when households were particularly likely to 
leave.  
The third research question is: What explains exit from the FSS program? It is divided into 
two hypotheses, household characteristics and program characteristics. The third section of this 
chapter presents the findings of the first hypothesis, household characteristics. The household 
characteristics are: household composition, changes in household composition, location of HACP 
housing, moves within HACP housing, and income at time of FSS entry. As discussed in chapter 
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two, these variables were selected based upon the literature and contradictory findings in prior 
studies.  
The fourth section of this chapter presents the findings of the second hypotheses, program 
characteristics and the fifth and final section concludes the chapter with a multivariate logistic 
regression analysis and comparison of those results to the results of the Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimates and Log Rank tests of equivalency.  Then I used a multivariate logistic regression to 
determine whether there were relationships among the variables tested in the univariate Kaplan-
Meier survival estimates and the Log Rank tests of equivalency.  
4.1 Research Question 1: What are the outcomes of FSS participation? 
This section examines FSS participation of public housing households at HACP to 
determine the extent to which households leave or complete the 60-month FSS program.  First, I 
determined the number of participants that complete the FSS program and the number of 
households that left the FSS program prior to completion.  The households that participated in the 
FSS program during the study period had one of the following outcomes: left censored, completed 
the FSS program, withdrew from FSS, moved from HACP housing, or right censored.  
 
Table 4-1 Outcomes of FSS participants between January 2010 and October 2017 
Outcome Number Percent 
Left Censored – households that enrolled in the FSS program 
prior to January 1, 2010 
593 35.9 
Withdrew from the FSS program prior to month 60 202 12.2 
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Completed 60 months in the FSS program  191 11.6 
Moved from HACP housing while enrolled in FSS program – 
which ended participation in FSS program 
436 26.4 
Right Censored – remained enrolled in the FSS program on the 
last day of the study period, October 1, 2017 
229 13.9 
Total 1,651 100 
 
Households that are left censored entered the FSS program prior to January 2010, and their 
entry into the FSS program is not observed.  Because their entry into the FSS program is not 
observed, the duration of their participation in the FSS program cannot be calculated.  For that 
reason, these households are noted in this first section but not included in any further analysis.  The 
left censored households accounted for a total of 593 (35.9%) of the public housing households 
that participated in the FSS program for some period of time during the study period.  These 
participants are compared to the households that have an observed entry to the FSS program to 
determine whether those households were different from those who enrolled later in terms of 
demographics.  
Households that remained in the FSS program for at least 60 months completed the FSS 
program.  This does not necessarily mean that the household graduated from the FSS program as 
the data set does not provide information about whether the household has been free of other public 
assistance programs (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental Nutritional 
Assistance Program, or General Assistance) for at least one year prior to program completion. In 
some cases, households can graduate from the FSS program in less than five years if they met the 
graduation criteria of being free of public assistance for one year and have completed the steps 
identified in their Individualized Training and Service Plan (ITSP) (HUD, 2016).  The households 
categorized as completed FSS have completed the standard 60 months of the FSS program. A total 
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of 191 (11.6%) public housing households participated in the FSS program for at least 60 months.  
There were occasions when households participated in the FSS program for longer than 60 months, 
which is permissible if HACP staff agrees to extend the FSS contract.  If a household has had 
extenuating circumstances such as an illness or being laid off from a job, the household can remain 
in the FSS program for a longer period of time to allow extra time for the household to achieve its 
stated goals and to allow for a chance to establish self- sufficiency from other types of public 
assistance (HUD, 2016). For the purposes of this study, those households were identified as having 
completed 60 months in the program.  
Households that withdrew from the FSS program completed fewer than 60 months of the 
FSS program.  There are a number of reasons why these households may have left the program 
such as; the program didn’t meet their needs, they didn’t like the program, they weren’t seeing 
positive results, they did have time to participate, were dismissed by HACP for noncompliance, or 
left for other reasons.  These households entered the FSS program after January 1, 2010 and left 
the program prior to completion. Their entry and exit from the FSS program are observed and these 
households remained in HACP housing for at least one month after withdrawing from the FSS 
program. There were 202, or 12.2%, of public housing households that withdrew from the FSS. 
There was a large number of households that did not have an observable exit from the FSS 
program.  These households fall into two categories: 1) moved from HACP housing while enrolled 
in the FSS program and 2) those who remained in the FSS program at the end of the study period, 
October 1, 2017, and together they comprised 40.3 percent of the original group of FSS 
households.  The households that moved from HACP housing while in the FSS program are 
included in the survival analysis for the length of time that their participation in the FSS program 
can be observed.  These 436, or 26.4%, public housing households moved from HACP while 
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enrolled in the FSS program between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2017.  For statistical 
purposes, these households are considered right censored, however, the fact that these households 
moved from HACP housing is informative from a policy standpoint.  One of the underlying 
assumptions of the subsidized housing and the FSS programs is that these programs provide 
stability to low-income households and aim to reduce the rent burden, overcrowding, and number 
of moves that a household makes.  The high number of households that move within this study 
period is worthy of note, and raises questions about whether 5 years is an appropriate length of 
time for the FSS program. Those households were kept separate from the households that remained 
in the FSS program at the end of the study period for greater comparison.  
Similarly, right censored households, those that were enrolled in the FSS program on the 
last day of the study period, October 1, 2017, also provided limited information about their FSS 
program participation.  Like the households that moved from HACP housing, the right censored 
households are included in the survival analysis for the period of time that their FSS participation 
is observed, but because these household remained in the FSS program on October 1, 2017, their 
outcome in the FSS cannot be observed using this dataset.   
While there were 1,651 FSS participants in the full dataset, only 393 FSS participants had 
an observed entry and exit from the program during the study period.  Table 4-2 below shows the 
outcomes of the 393 with an observable entry and exit from the FSS program less than half, 48.6%, 
completed the FSS program.  It is important to note that some of the right-censored households, 
those who were in the FSS program may complete the program after the study period, but of the 
households with an observed entry and exit during the seven-year study period, less than half 
completed the program.  
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Table 4-2 Withdraw and Completion of FSS Program Among Households that Completed or Withdrew from 
the FSS Program. 
 Withdraw from FSS Complete FSS Total 
N % N % N % 
Public Housing 202                 51.4 191               48.6 393                 100 
 
Despite 191 households completing the FSS program, only 99 participants met the 
graduation requirements (see Table 4-3).  HACP’s MTW Annual reports provided the number of 
public housing households that graduated from the FSS program each year (HACP, 2017), 
showing that only 99 public housing participants completed the FSS program during the study 
period, far less than the 191 households that completed five years in the program. It is important 
to note that while this study is focused on attrition from the FSS program, that does not imply that 
those households met the FSS graduation requirements.  
Table 4-3 PH Households that Graduated by Year 
Year N 
2017 40 
2016 32 
2015 27 
Total  99 
 
Of the public housing households that participated in the FSS program, the majority of 
households (84.5%) had a female head of household.  Table 4-4 below shows the breakdown of 
the sex of the head of household by FSS program outcome, to determine whether the sex of the 
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head of household was related to the outcome in the FSS program. This table clearly shows that 
the FSS outcomes are not related to the sex of the head of household.  
Table 4-4 Public Housing FSS Outcomes by Sex of Head of Household 
Outcome Left 
Censored 
Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Sex N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Female 499 84.1 161 84.3 162 80.2 386 88.5 187 81.7 1,395 84.5 
Male 94 15.9 30 15.7 40 19.8 50 11.5 42 18.3 256 15.5 
Total 593 100.0 191 100.0 202 100.0 436 100.0 229 100.0 1,651 100.0 
 
The below table, Table 4-5 shows that 95% of the public housing households that 
participated in the FSS program during the study period had a head of household who was Black. 
Of the 1,651 households, only 71, or 4.3%, of households had a white head of household.  Only 
three households had an Asian head of household and 7 households had an American Indian or 
Native Hawaiian head of household.  
Table 4-5 Public Housing FSS Outcomes by Race of Head of Household 
Variable Left 
Censored 
Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Race N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Black 570 96.1 179 93.7 196 97.0 404 92.7 221 96.5 1570 95.1 
White  21 3.5 12 6.3 6 3.0 25 5.7 7 3.1 71 4.3 
Asian 1 0.02 0 0 0 0 2 0.5 0 0 3 0.2 
American 
Indian / 
Hawaiian 
1 0.02 0 0 0 0 5 1.1 1 0.4 7 0.4 
 Total 593 99.7 191 100.0 202 100.0 436 100.0 229 100.0 1,651 100.0 
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Of the 1,651 public housing households that participated in the FSS program during the 
study period, only 18, or 1.1%, identified as Latino/a.   
Table 4-6 Public Housing Households Participating in the FSS Program by Ethnicity 
Variable Left 
Censored 
Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Latino/a 4 0.07 3 1.0 2 1.0 7 1.6 2 0.9 18 1.1 
Non-
Latino 
589 99.3 188 98.4 200 99.0 429 98.4 227 99.1 1,633 98.9 
Total 593 100.0 191 99.4 202 100.0 436 100.0 229 100.0 1,651 100.0 
 
 
After comparing the FSS outcomes by sex and race of the head of household, I compared 
the FSS program outcomes by the age of the head of household. Table 4-7 below shows the number 
of public housing households that participated in the FSS program by the age of the head of 
household at the FSS entry and the outcome of the household’s FSS participation.  Of the 1,651 
households that participated in the FSS program, 51.6% were under the age of 30.  This analysis 
shows that households with a young head of household under the age of 30 were more likely to 
leave HACP housing than households with an older head of household.  Of the 436 households 
that left HACP housing while enrolled in the FSS program, 70.6% had a head of household under 
the age of 30.  There was not much difference between the age of the head of household of those 
who completed the FSS program and those who left the FSS program.  
Table 4-7 Public Housing Age of Head of Household 
Variable Left 
Censored 
Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
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Age N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Under 20 27 4.6 11 5.8 13 6.4 54 12.4 6 2.6 111 6.7 
20-24 142 23.9 51 26.7 55 27.2 171 39.2 68 30.0 487 29.5 
25-29 83 14.0 22 11.5 24 11.9 83 19.0 42 18.3 254 15.4 
30-34 58 9.8 24 12.6 20 9.9 34 7.8 31 13.5 167 10.1 
35-39 49 8.3 12 6.3 15 7.4 29 6.7 27 11.8 132 8.0 
40-44 50 8.4 21 11.0 19 9.4 16 3.7 20 8.7 126 7.6 
45-49 53 8.9 22 11.5 25 12.4 20 4.6 11 4.8 132 8.0 
50-54 61 10.3 17 8.9 11 5.5 14 3.2 9 3.9 112 6.8 
55-59 40 6.7 10 5.2 10 5.0 6 1.4 10 4.4 76 4.6 
60+ 30 5.1 1 0.5 10 5.0 7 1.6 5 2.2 53 3.2 
Age Totals 593 100 191 100 202 100.1 436 99.6 229 100.2 1,651 99.9 
 
Figure 4-7 below shows the age of households for the public housing residents that 
participated in the FSS program during the study period.  This figure includes households that 
were left censored, completed the FSS program, left the FSS program prior to completion, moved 
from HACP housing, and those who were right censored and remained in the program on October 
1, 2017. Figure 4-7 below shows that most of the FSS participants were under the age of 30, with 
a high proportion of FSS participants between the ages of 20 and 24 years of age.  
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Figure 4-1. Public Housing Age of Head of Household 
 
This section has shown the number of households that participated in the FSS program 
during the study period and identified the small portion of the participants who had both an 
observed entry and exit from the FSS program.  Of that group, less than half completed the FSS 
program.  This section also showed the number of households that had an observed entry to the 
FSS program but an unobserved exit, either because they moved from HACP housing while 
enrolled in the FSS program or remained in the program on the last day of the study period, October 
1, 2017. Those households with an observed entry but not exit, were included in the analysis in the 
following three sections for the length of time that their participation in the FSS program was 
observed.  While we cannot make any inferences about their outcomes, they are informative while 
observed in the program.  As previously mentioned, the left-censored households, those who 
enrolled in the FSS program prior to January 1, 2010, the first day of the study period, were less 
informative as I could not calculate the length of their participation in the FSS program.  Those 
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households were included in the demographic tables to show that they did not differ from the 
participants who enrolled in the FSS program after January 1, 2010, in any systematic way.   
Now that I have identified the possible outcomes of FSS participation and the number of 
households in each of the five categories, I will examine the exit from the FSS program in terms 
of calendar year and length of time in the program to determine whether time, by either measure, 
explains FSS program exit.  
4.2 Research Question 2: When do FSS participants leave the FSS program? 
This section examines FSS entry and exit by calendar date to determine whether there were 
seasonal patterns in FSS enrollment or exit. One possible explanation for FSS exit is that 
households are more likely to withdraw from the FSS program during the summer months when 
children are no longer in school and adults may have more childcare responsibilities. Examining 
FSS entry and exit by calendar date may show other seasonal or temporal patterns in the data that 
may explain exit from the FSS program.  
The below time series (Figure 4-2) shows FSS enrollment and exit by public housing 
households during the study period. This shows that there is a gentle downward trend in FSS 
enrollment. The scale is relatively small with the variation in FSS entry ranging from 30 
households in a month in October 2011, to just one participant entering the program in January, 
March, May, and September of 2017. Aside from a decline in the number of FSS enrollment that 
seems to start in January 2014, there are not any other detectable patterns in enrollment based on 
calendar date.  This figure includes the households that completed the FSS program, left FSS prior 
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to completion, moved from HACP housing and those that were right censored, remained in the 
program on October 1, 2017. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Number of Participants Entering the FSS Program by Month 
 
Figure 4-3 below shows exit from the FSS program and participants that left HACP 
housing.  This shows that more FSS participants moved from HACP while enrolled in the FSS 
program than the number of FSS participants who withdrew from the FSS program but remained 
in HACP housing.  A major contributor to the low FSS graduation rates among public housing 
households is the high number of households that leave HACP housing. The graph and survival 
tables both show that the number of participants were generally higher than the number of FSS 
participants who left the FSS program but remained in HACP housing. While this graph appears 
to have a drastic change in the number of households exiting each month, it is important to note 
that the scale is small and the number of exits from the FSS program range from zero to 13, and 
the number of households that left HACP housing during the study period range from zero to 14.  
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Figure 4-3. Number of Participants Exiting the FSS Program Due to Move from HACP Housing or Exit from 
the FSS Program and Remaining in HACP Housing. 
 
The time series analysis of FSS program entry and exit, and exit from HACP housing while 
enrolled in the FSS program does not support the hypothesis that there were certain points in the 
calendar year when participants were more likely to enter or leave the FSS program.  
4.2.1 Life Table: Public Housing Households  
The time series analysis showed that entry and exit from the FSS program cannot be fully 
explained by factors related to calendar dates.  This survival analysis examines whether FSS exit 
is related to the length of time that the household has participated in the FSS program.  Rather than 
being more likely to exit the FSS program on a certain date on the calendar, households may be 
more likely to exit at a certain point in the program, for instance, FSS participants may be more 
likely to leave FSS after participating in the FSS program two or three years.  
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The life table shows the number of FSS participants enrolled in the FSS program each 
month during the 60-month program.  This table does not include the public housing households 
that were left censored because they enrolled in the FSS program prior to the beginning of the 
study period and their length of FSS participation could not be determined.  
The life table includes the FSS participants with an observed entry to the FSS program and 
calculates the number of participants at each month. The number of FSS participants decline each 
month due to participants leaving the FSS program, leaving HACP housing, or right censoring. 
The life tables, located in Appendix A, are divided into public housing and housing choice voucher 
households because there is a marked difference in the survival rates of PH and HCV households.  
The life tables show the number of households enrolled in FSS each month, the number of 
participants that leave the FSS program during the month and the percentage of participants 
remaining and the hazard rate, which is the inverse of the survival rate. The left censored 
households are not included in this analysis because their length of participation in the FSS 
program cannot be calculated.  The two types of right censoring, those that moved from HACP 
housing while participating in FSS program and those who remained in the FSS program at the 
end of the study period, October 1, 2017, are included in the analysis for the period of time that 
they are observed. Those right censored households are included in the count of the number of 
households that were enrolled in the FSS program at the beginning of each month, and when their 
FSS participation is no longer observed, either because they left HACP housing or the study period 
has ended, those households drop off the analysis and are removed from the count of the number 
of households enrolled in the FSS program at the beginning of the month.  
Column 1 of the life table identifies the month, 0 – 60 of the FSS program.  Column 2 
displays the number of households that are at risk of the event, withdrawing from the FSS program, 
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during the month.  Column 3 identifies the number of FSS participants that left the program during 
the month, but remained in HACP housing.  Column 4 identifies the number of households that 
were lost either due to moving from HACP housing or were in the group of households that were 
right censored, and were at that particular point in the FSS program on October 1, 2017.  Those 
households may remain in the program, but their participation during the next month was not 
observed in the data. Column 5 shows the probability that the participant would remain in the FSS 
program during each month, given that the participant was enrolled in the FSS program on the first 
of the month.  
The life table also shows the median survival time.  The median of 1,058 is 529, and by 
consulting the below table, we see that during month 30, there were 529 public housing households 
remaining in the FSS program.  This happens to coincide with the middle point of the 60-month 
program, which provides additional evidence that the decline in the number of FSS participants is 
gradual during the course of the 60-month program.  
The table shows that attrition from the FSS program was particularly high in the first three 
months of the program, it was also high at the 2-year point, 24 months, when 10 participants left 
the program.  Aside from those two time periods, attrition from the program was gradual.  
[ See Appendix Table 1. Public Housing Life Table] 
4.2.2 Survival Function: Public Housing Households  
As explained in Chapter 3, the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate measures the probability 
that the FSS participant will remain in the FSS program past time t.  The estimate is the number 
of FSS participants that remained in the FSS program at the end of the month divided by the 
number of FSS participants who were in the program.  The right censored participants, those who 
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left HACP housing or were enrolled on October 1, 2017, are not included in the denominator.  
Only those FSS participants that are “at risk” for leaving the FSS program are included.  For 
instance, at the beginning of the first month of the FSS program, there were 1,058 public housing 
FSS participants enrolled in the FSS program.  During the first month, five participants were lost 
due to censoring.  Of those five participants, four moved out of HACP housing and one was in 
their first month of the FSS program on October 1, 2017.  During the first month, 11 FSS 
participants left the FSS program.  The survival rate for the first month is 1,047 / 1,058= 98.9%.  
The below Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows the 98.9% survival rate on the second step of 
the curve.  The survival curve starts at 1 and declines toward 0 as participants leave the program, 
either due to program attrition or right censoring.  
Figure 4-4 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate, which indicates that the slope is 
flatter during the first 24 months of the program and slightly steeper in the following 36 months.  
Showing that households may be slightly more likely to leave later in the program.   
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Figure 4-4. Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for public housing households 
 
Because it is difficult to determine whether there were significant changes in the likelihood 
of exit from the program at the month level of analysis using the Kaplan Meier survival estimate, 
I also examined the changes in FSS participation by year.  The analysis of the month level shows 
little change between the months, but the analysis by year shows that more FSS participants 
withdrew during years one and two than the other years, but left at the highest rates during the first 
year (6.5%) and the fifth year (10.1%).  Households that moved from HACP housing while 
enrolled in the FSS program were also more likely to do so during the first and second year of the 
FSS program.  One possible explanation for households being more likely to remain in the program 
if they made it to the third year is the incentive to complete the program and receive the savings in 
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the escrow account.  That hypothesis will be tested in the final section of this analysis when I 
examine the impact that different programs have on the household’s likelihood of remaining in the 
FSS program.  
Table 4-8. Public Housing Households that Withdraw from FSS by Program Year 
Beginning 
of Year 
# enrolled in 
FSS at 
beginning of 
year 
# Left FSS 
during the year 
Moved from 
HACP 
Right Censored 
 N N % N % N % 
1 1,061 69 6.5 148 14.0 38 3.6 
2 803 42 5.2 104 13.0 50 6.2 
3 607 32 5.3 75 12.4 40 6.6 
4 460 27 5.9 76 16.5 40 8.7 
5 317 32 10.1 33 10.4 64 20.2 
End of 
Year 5 
191  
 
This section has shown that time does not fully explain exit from the FSS program.  The 
hypotheses that there are seasonal effects or a particular point in the program when participants 
are more likely to leave the FSS program were not supported by the data. 
4.3 Research Question 3: What explains exit from the FSS program? 
In the first section, I determined the number of households who left the FSS program prior 
to completion.  In the second section I examined the time, measure both by calendar date and 
length of time in the program to determine whether either of those measurements explained exit 
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from the FSS program.  Neither of those offered a meaningful explanation of FSS exit. In the next 
section I will examine the household characteristics to determine whether they offer an explanation 
of which households are more likely to exit the FSS program prior to completion.   
 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Household Characteristics  
The variables examined in this section are: household composition, change in household 
composition, housing location, moves within HACP housing, and income at time of FSS entry.  
Each variable and its relationship to the hypothesis that household characteristics explains FSS 
exit will be explained in greater detail in each subsection.  
 
4.3.1.1 Household Composition 
There is not a consensus in the literature regarding whether public housing households with 
children are more or less likely to complete the FSS program.  Households with children may be 
less likely to complete the FSS program because childcare responsibilities prevent them from 
meeting the program requirements.  On the other hand, households with children may be more 
likely to complete the FSS program because the children provide a motivation for the head of 
household to earn more money.  Table 4-9 below shows the number of public housing households 
that do and do not have children identified by FSS program outcome.  
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Table 4-9. Public Housing Households – Number of Household Members 
 Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved from 
HACP  
Right 
Censored 
Total 
No. of Household 
Members  
N % N % N % N % N % 
One HH member 60 31.4 63 31.3 122 28.0 51 22.3 296 28.0 
Two or More 131 68.6 138 68.2 314 72.0 178 77.7 762 72.0 
Total 191 100.0 202 99.5 436 100.0 229 100.0 1,058 100.0 
 
Households that have more than one adult may be more likely to complete the FSS program 
when there is another adult in the household to share the household duties. Table 4.10 below shows 
that more than 83% of all households have only one adult in the household.  Table 4.10 shows that 
households that completed the FSS program had a smaller portion of one-person households, only 
74.3% than the other outcomes.  Households that moved from HACP had the highest portion of 
single adult households, 92.0%. This may be at least partially explained by the high number of 
FSS participants under the age of 30 who moved out of HACP housing.  
Table 4-10. Public Housing Household Composition 
Variable Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Household N % N % N % N % N % 
One Adult 142 74.3 163 80.7 401 92.0 178 77.7 884 83.6 
Married 3 1.6 2 1.0 5 1.1 8 3.4 18 1.7 
Full-time 
Student 
10 5.2 14 6.9 1 0.2 14 6.0 39 3.7 
Other Adult 36 18.8 23 11.4 29 6.7 29 12.7 117 11.1 
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Total 191 99.9 202 100 436 100 229 99.8 1,058 100 
 
Table 4-11 shows the number of public housing households that had and did not have 
children in the household and the outcomes of those households.  This analysis shows that nearly 
half of the FSS households have children.  
Table 4-11. Households with and without children by FSS program outcome 
 Completed 
FSS 
Left FSS Moved from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Children 109 57.1 136 67.3 306 70.2 179 78.2 730 68.9 
No Children 82 42.9 66 32.7 130 29.8 50 21.8 328 31.0 
Total 191 100.0 202 100.0 436 100.0 229 100.0 1,058 99.9 
 
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows that there is little difference in likelihood of 
completing the FSS program for public housing households that had children under the age of 18 
and those that did not.  
[ See Appendix Figure 1. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for public housing households 
with and without children.] 
The below table showing the log-rank test for equivalency shows that public housing 
households with children are not significantly more likely to withdraw from the FSS program than 
those that do not have children. In fact, households with and without children under the age of 18 
are almost equally likely of leaving the FSS program prior to completion. 
Table 4-12. Log-Rank Test for Equivalency: Public Housing Households with and without children under 18. 
 Observed Expected 
No children under 18 82 81.25 
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Children under 18   120   119.75 
Total  202 201.0 
Chi2= 0.00      Pr>chi2= 0.9712 
 
4.3.1.2 Changes in Household Composition 
People entering and leaving the household could create different levels of support and 
stress on the FSS participant.  For instance, the addition of a new baby could prevent the FSS 
participant from participating in the program and meeting the program requirements.   On the other 
hand, an additional adult may provide additional support to the FSS participant and those 
household may be more likely to complete the program.  Changes in household composition are 
coded as 0 if there were no changes in the number of household members during participation in 
the FSS program and a 1 if there was a change in the number of household members during 
participation in the FSS program.   
Table 4-13. Number of Households that Experienced a Change in Household Composition While Partcipating 
in the FSS Program by Outcome. 
 Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Left HACP 
Housing 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
HH 
Change  
79  41.4 62  31 107  24.5 78  34.1 326 30.8 
No HH 
Change 
112  58.6 140  69 329  75.5 151  65.9 732 69.2 
Total  191 100 202 100 436 100 229 100 1,058 100.0 
 
This shows that households were more likely to have a change in household composition 
than they were to move from one public housing unit to another.  Of the households that completed 
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the FSS program, 41.4% experienced a change in household composition, while 31% of the 
households that withdrew from the FSS program experienced a change in household composition.   
The Kaplan-Meier estimate shows that households that had a change in composition were 
more likely to remain in the FSS program at all times during the FSS program. 
[See Appendix Figure 2. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate Public Housing FSS participants 
with changes in household composition.] 
Table 4-14 below shows that households that had a change in household composition were 
significantly, p<0.001, more likely to remain in the FSS program than those participants who did 
not experience a change in household composition.  I expected to find that household members 
entering and exiting the household would create a disruption that would lead to the FSS participant 
being less likely to complete the program, but in fact, households that experienced changes were 
more likely to complete the program.  Table 4-14 below shows that of the 202 public housing 
households that did not complete the FSS program, 140 public housing households did not 
experience a change in household composition.  
 
Table 4-14. Log-Rank Test of Public Housing Households that Experienced a Change in Household 
Composition while enrolled in the FSS Program. 
 Observed Expected 
No Change in HH composition 140 110.11 
Change in HH Composition 62 91.89 
Total 202 202 
Chi2 = 17.92     Pr>Chi2 = 0.0000 
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This above analysis compared the public housing households who had a change in 
household composition while enrolled in the FSS program and those who did not experience a 
change to determine whether households with a change in household composition represented a 
disruption in the households that led those households to being more likely to leave the FSS 
program than households who did not experience a change in household composition.  Due to the 
mechanics of this analysis, households who remained in the FSS program for a longer period of 
time had more time to experience a change in household composition then the households who 
remained in the FSS program for a shorter period of time.  To determine whether this test measures 
the impact of changes in household composition rather than length of time in the FSS program, I 
compared public housing households who experienced a change in household composition early 
in FSS participation, during the first 24 months of the program, with the public housing households 
who did not experience a change in household composition while enrolled in the FSS program.  
There were 47 public housing households that experienced a change in household composition and 
left the FSS program within the first two years of the FSS program, and there were 140 public 
housing households that did not experience a change in household composition during that time 
period. There were an additional 15 public housing households that experienced a change in 
household composition while enrolled in the FSS program and left the program after month 24 but 
before month 60.    
Table 4-15. Public Housing Households that Experienced a Change in Household Composition During the 
First 24 months of FSS Participation Compared to Those who did not Experience a Change.  
 
 Observed Expected 
0 140 131.57 
1 47 55.42 
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Total 187 187.00 
Chi2: 1.84            Pr>Chi2: 0.1750 
 
This analysis shows that the public housing households who had a change in household 
composition during the first 24 months of the FSS program did not experience a disruption that 
led them to be more likely to leave the FSS program than the public housing households who did 
not experience a change.  This test also shows that the public housing households who experienced 
a change in household composition early in FSS participation were less likely to remain in the FSS 
program.   
4.3.1.3 Public Housing Location  
This section examines the outcomes of FSS participation by location of the public housing 
development to determine whether there are public housing developments where participants are 
more likely to remain in the program than others.  If residents of some buildings are more likely 
to remain in the program than others, it may suggest that service delivery is uneven across HACP’s 
housing portfolio. Figure 4-5 below shows the location of the public housing development where 
the FSS participants when they enrolled in the FSS program.  
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Figure 4-5. Location of PH FSS Participants at FSS enrollment. 
   
Table 4-16 below shows the outcomes of FSS participation by location at the time of FSS 
enrollment.  The following section will address moves within HACP housing.  As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, Addison Terrace was redeveloped during the study period, which led to many of its 
residents being rehoused in other public housing communities or exiting public housing to move 
to market-rate housing or moving from public housing with a housing choice voucher.  
Table 4-16. Outcomes of FSS Participation by Housing Location at FSS Enrollment 
Development Name Left FSS Completed Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
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 N % N % N % N % N % 
Addison Terrace 2 3.9 1 2.0 48 94.1 0 0 51 100 
Bedford Dwellings 25 12.7 41 20.8 94 47.7 37 18.8 197 100 
Arlington Heights 29 26.6 13 11.9 50 45.9 17 15.6 109 100 
Allegheny Dwellings 33 20.4 17 10.5 83 51.2 27 17.9 160 100 
Northview Heights 27 12.4 47 21.7 79 36.4 62 29.5 215 100 
Pennsylvania – Bidwell 5 50.0 1 10.0 2 20.0 2 20.0 10 100 
Pressley Street 1 14.3 0 0 3 42.9 3 42.9 7 100.1 
Homewood North 12 10.4 12 10.4 42 36.5 49 42.6 115 99.9 
Scattered Sites South 11 29.7 18 48.6 5 13.5 3 8.1 37 99.9 
Murray Towers 1 50.0 1 50.0 0 0 0 0 2 100 
Glen Hazel Heights 21 41.2 9 17.6 12 23.5 9 17.6 51 99.9 
Bernice Crawley  9 81.8 2 18.2 0 0 0 0 11 100 
Scattered Sites North 2 5.3 9 23.7 12 31.6 15 39.5 38 100.1 
Caliguiri Plaza 1 50.0 1 50.0 0 0 0 0 2 100 
Finello Pavilion 2 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 100 
Morse Gardens 3 75.0 1 25.0 0 0 0 0 4 100 
Gualtieri Manor 1 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 100 
Oak Hill 10 43.5 6 21.7 4 17.4 4 17.4 24 100 
Silver Lake Commons 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0 1 100 
Bedford Hill 3 33.3 6 55.6 0 0 2 11.1 9 100 
Garfield Heights  4 30.8 6 46.2 1 7.7 2 15.4 13 100.1 
Total 202 19.0 191 17.9 436 40.9 232 22.2 1,061 100 
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4.3.1.4 Moves Within HACP Housing 
This subsection examines the impact that moves from one public housing unit to another 
within HACP housing has on public housing household’s likelihood to complete the FSS program. 
The analysis shows that 16.97% of households moved from one public housing unit to another 
during their participation in the FSS program. This represents a fairly small number of FSS 
participants.  The table below shows the number of households that moved by outcome: completed 
FSS, withdrew from FSS, left HACP housing, and right censored. Moves within HACP housing 
were coded as 0 if the household remained in the same residence for the duration of its participation 
in the FSS program and a 1 if the household moved at least once within HACP public housing 
while participating in the FSS program.   
This table shows that while most households did not move within HACP housing while in 
the FSS program, those who did move were more likely to complete the FSS program.  While I 
expected to find that moves within HACP housing would be disruptive and would have a negative 
impact on the household’s likelihood to complete the program, the opposite was true.  This 
suggests that moves within HACP public housing were positive and lead to better outcomes for 
the household.  Unfortunately, the data does not indicate whether these were voluntary moves or 
forced moves.   There are some instances when public housing families have to move within public 
housing due to construction or rehabilitation of a public housing building.  Also, families can 
request to move to a different development or unit due to changes in household composition, 
problems at their former residence, or other preferences.   
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Table 4-17. Number of PH Households that Moved Within HACP by FSS Program Outcome 
 Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Left HACP Right 
Censored 
Total  
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Moved 
within 
HACP 
50 26.2 38 18.8 45 10% 47 20.5% 180 17.0 
Did not 
move 
141 73.8 164 81.2 391 89.7% 182 79.5% 878 83.0 
Total  191 100 202 100 436 99.7% 229 100% 1,058 100.0 
 
The table below shows that many of the moves within HACP housing during the study 
period were from Addison Terrace to other public housing developments.  These were involuntary 
moves due to redevelopment of the Addison Terrace property which was transformed into the 
mixed-income property, Skyline Terrace.  During the redevelopment, some tenants were relocated 
to other properties. In addition to moves from Addison Terrace, there were 12 households that 
moved within their development from one unit to another.  This could have been to accommodate 
the resident’s request for a different unit, or due to a change in household composition that lead to 
the participant moving to a larger or smaller unit depending upon the size of the household.  Other 
moves between public housing units occurred at a smaller level with one household moving from 
one public housing development to another.  For brevity, they are not included in this table.  
Table 4-18. Households that completed the FSS program and moved while enrolled in FSS 
Moved From Moved To Count 
Addison Terrace Bedford Dwellings 7 
Addison Terrace Northview Heights 6 
Addison Terrace Arlington Heights  3 
Addison Terrace Allegheny Dwellings 2 
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Allegheny Dwellings Arlington Heights 2 
Moved within property Moved within property 12 
 
Table 4-19 below shows the moves within public housing of the FSS participants who left 
the FSS program prior to completion.  
Table 4-19. Households that Moved by did not complete the FSS program 
Moved From Moved To Count 
Addison Terrace Arlington Heights 2 
Addison Terrace Bedford Dwellings 2 
Addison Terrace Oak Hill 2 
Addison Terrace Allegheny Dwellings 3 
Addison Terrace Morse Gardens  2 
Bedford Dwellings  Allegheny Dwellings 2 
Within Property  Within Property  3 
 
The Kaplan-Meier survival curve below shows the difference in the probability that a 
household would remain in the FSS program at any given time during the five-year program based 
on whether or not that household moved within HACP public housing during the program.  This 
graph shows that the households that moved within HACP housing were more likely to remain in 
the FSS program than the households that did not move. It is important to note that the Kaplan 
Meier survival estimate is very similar for both groups throughout most of the analysis with a 
difference between the two at the end of the analysis time, between months 55 and 60.  This result 
is concerning and may indicate that there are other factors at the end of this analysis that impact 
the likelihood of those households that moved during FSS participation. For instance, households 
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that are right censored or moved from HACP housing during the study period are included in the 
survival estimate for the period of time that their participation was observed.  Therefore, those 
households were not observed at the end of the 60-month analysis time and those households may 
explain why there was a change in the trajectory of the households that moved within HACP public 
housing and those that did not.  Another possible explanation is that the redevelopment of Addison 
terrace on the trajectory of the households.  This variable will be tested again in the logistic 
regression at the end of the chapter.  
[See Appendix Figure 3. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate Public Housing FSS participants 
who moved while enrolled in FSS.] 
The below table shows that households that moved were significantly more likely to remain 
in the FSS program than households that did not.  However, there was a fairly small number of 
households that moved during FSS participation and many of those moves were related to the 
redevelopment of Addison Terrace.  
 
Table 4-20. Log-Rank Test of Equivalency for Public Housing Households that Moved Within HACP 
Housing  
 Observed Expected 
No Moves 164 146.7 
Moved 38 55.3 
Total 202 202.0 
Chi2 = 7.52    Pr>Chi2 = 0.0061 
 
This analysis determines whether the public housing households moved while enrolled in 
the FSS program were more likely to remain in the FSS program than households who did not 
move within public housing while enrolled in the program. Households that participated in the 
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FSS program for a longer period of time had more time to move while enrolled in the FSS program 
than those who did participated in the program for a shorter period of time. To test whether the 
above result, that the public housing households who moved while enrolled in the FSS program 
were not more likely to leave the FSS program prior to completion was a result of those households 
participating in the FSS program for a longer period or time, or because the households that moved 
were in fact less likely to leave the FSS program, I examined the outcomes of the public housing 
households who moved early in their FSS participation, within the first 24 months, and those who 
did not move at all.  From this analysis, I found that the public housing households who moved 
while enrolled in the FSS program were more likely, but not significantly, to complete the FSS 
program.  There were only 30 public housing households who moved during the first 24 months 
of the FSS program, which is a small number, but represents more than half of the public housing 
households who moved while enrolled in the FSS program.  
 
Table 4-21. Public Housing Households Who Moved During the First 24 Months of the FSS Program 
Compared to Those Who Did Not Move During FSS participation.  
 
 Observed Expected 
0 164 166.18 
1 30 27.82 
Total 194 194.00 
                         Chi2: 0.20         Pr>Chi2: 0.6539 
 
  This analysis shows that when considering the time of the household’s move, households 
that moved during the first three years of the FSS program had a similar likelihood of leaving the 
FSS program as those participants who did not move from one public housing unit to another 
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during the program.  If there was an equal likelihood of exit among the FSS households that did 
and did not move while in the FSS program, there would be about 168 public housing households 
who did not move and about 28 public housing households that did move.  The observed number 
of FSS participants who did not move, 164, and FSS participants who did move, 30, are very 
similar to the expected outcomes.  Therefore, moves within the FSS program are not related to the 
participants’ likelihood of completing the FSS program.  
4.3.1.5 Income at time of FSS program entry  
The average income of the PH FSS households at the time of FSS entry was $8,288 and 
the median income was $3,792, largely due to the high number of households that reported no 
income at the time of FSS program entry.  There were 360, or 33.9%, public housing households 
that reported zero income when they enrolled in the FSS program. Another 344, or 32.4%, of 
public housing households reported incomes of less than $6,000.   
Table 4-22. Public Housing Annual Incomes at FSS Entry 
Annual Income Number % 
0 360 33.9 
1-6,000 344 32.4 
6,001- 12,000 158 14.9 
12,001 – 18,000 79 7.4 
18,001 – 24,000 56 5.3 
24,001 + 64 6.0 
Total 1,061 99.9 
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The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows that public housing households with annual 
incomes above and below the median of $3,792, have a very similar likelihood of completing the 
FSS program.  The log-rank test of equivalency shows that households with incomes higher than 
the median are not statistically more likely to complete the program than those with annual 
incomes of less than $3,792.  
[ See Appendix Figure 4. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for Public Housing Households 
by median income at FSS entry.] 
Table 4-23. Log-Rank Test of Equivalency between households with incomes above and below the median at 
FSS entry. 
Variable Observed Expected 
Income below Median 106 96.18 
Income Above Median 96 105.82 
Total 202 202 
Chi2 = 1.95    Pr> Chi2 = 0.1627 
 
While public housing households with annual incomes of above the very low median 
annual income of $3,792 were not statistically more likely to complete the program than the 
households earning less, I was interested to examine other income amounts to see if there was an 
income level that was a better predictor of success in the FSS program. It is possible that 
households with higher incomes may be more likely to remain in the FSS program than those with 
very low annual incomes at entry.  It is also possible that households with higher incomes may be 
less likely to remain in the program if they already have a job. I conducted the same test using an 
annual income of $10,000 as the dividing point to see if households earning more than $10,000 
were more likely to remain in the FSS program than those earning less. I recognize that $10,000 
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is still an extremely low annual income, but those households are likely to have some wage income.  
There simply are not enough households with higher incomes to test higher income levels.  
Table 4-24. Public Housing Households with Incomes Above and Below $10,000 at FSS Entry 
 Completed Left FSS Moved from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
HH Inc. 
Greater 
than 
$10,000 
48 25.1 57 28.2 67 15.4 64 27.6 236 22.3 
HH Inc. 
less than 
$10,000 
143 74.9 145 71.8 369 84.6 165 72.0 822 77.7 
Total  191 100 202 99.0 436 100.0 229 100.0 1,058 100.0 
 
The Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate shows that the public housing households with 
incomes above $10,000 were not more likely to complete the FSS program than households with 
incomes of less than $10,000.  That is confirmed by the log rank test of equivalency. Error! 
Reference source not found. 
Table 4-25 below shows the log-rank test of equivalency which shows that households 
earning more than $10,000 per year are not statistically more likely to complete the FSS program 
than households earning less than $10,000.  
[See Appendix Figure 5. Kaplan Meier Surivival Estimate Public Housing Participants 
with Income Above $10,000 at FSS Program Entry.] 
 
Table 4-25. Log Rank Test of Equivalency for Households with Incomes Above and Below $10,000. 
 Observed Expected 
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Income below $10,000 142 152.89 
Income above $10,000 57 46.11 
Total 199 199.00 
Chi2 = 3.38     Pr>Chi2 = 0.0662 
 
 Then I conducted the same analysis on the public housing households that had zero 
reported income when they entered the FSS program. Households with zero income do not have 
wages and are not receiving TANF, alimony, social security, or child support.   
 
Table 4-26. Public Housing Households with Zero Reported Incomes at FSS Entry 
 Completed 
FSS 
Left FSS Moved from 
HACP 
Right Censored Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Zero Income 65 34.0 54 26.7 176 40.4 62 26.7 357 33.6 
Income $1 + 126 66.0 148 73.3 260 59.6 170 73.3 704 66.4 
Total 191 100.0 202 100.0 436 100.0 232 100.0 1,061 100.0 
 
 The Kaplan Meier survival estimate shows that public housing households that reported 
zero income at the time of FSS enrollment were more likely to complete the FSS program than 
those who reported an income of $1 or more.  
[See Appendix Figure 6. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate PH FSS Households by Zero 
Income at Entry] 
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The below log rank test of equivalency confirms that households that reported zero income 
at the time of FSS enrollment were significantly (p<0.05) more likely to complete the FSS program 
than those who had reported an annual income of $1.00 or more at the time of FSS entry.  
Table 4-27. Log Rank Test of Equivalency for Public Housing Households with Zero Income at FSS Entry 
 Observed Expected 
Income of $1 or more 148 131.66 
Zero Income 54 70.34 
Total 201 202 
Chi2 = 5.89    Pr > Chi2 = 0.0153 
 
4.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Program Characteristics 
This section examines the impact that different programs have on a household’s likelihood 
of withdrawing from the FSS program prior to completion.  Two hypotheses are tested in this 
section.  The first hypothesis is that households that paid the increased minimum rent of $150 prior 
to enrolling in the FSS program will be more likely to complete the FSS program than households 
that did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to entering the FSS program so that they will 
not have to pay the increased rent.  This program is unique to HACP, and there haven’t been prior 
studies to guide this analysis. It is also possible that households that paid the minimum rent of 
$150 will be more likely to withdraw from the FSS program because they may have enrolled in 
the FSS program only to avoid paying the increased minimum rent and not because of a genuine 
interest in participating in the program.   
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The second hypothesis is that participants who do not have money in their escrow account 
will be more likely to withdraw from the FSS program.  Participants’ who have not experienced 
an increase in income while enrolled in the FSS program do not have money in their escrow 
savings account, and do not have a financial incentive to remain in the FSS program, as they do 
not have escrow savings that would be forfeited when they leave the program.     
 
4.3.2.1 Paid Increased Minimum rent of $150 prior to FSS enrollment 
The increased minimum rent policy had two stated goals, the first was to incentivize 
residents to enroll in the FSS program and the second was to increase rent revenue.  There were 
974 public housing households that paid the increased minimum rent for at least one month 
between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2017.  Of those 974 households, 447 also participated in 
the FSS program during the study period, and of those 474 households, only 312 households 
participated in the FSS program after paying the increased minimum rent of $150.  The remaining 
135 households paid the increased minimum rent after participating in the FSS program.  
 
Table 4-28 Public Housing Households that Paid Increased Minimum Rent During the Study Period 
 N % 
Paid increased minimum rent and did not participate in FSS 527 54.1 
Paid increased minimum rent before FSS participation 312 32.0 
Paid increased minimum rent after FSS participation  135 13.9 
Total 974 100.0 
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The households that entered the FSS program after paying the increased minimum rent 
may have been more likely to remain in the FSS program than other households so that they would 
avoid paying the increased minimum rent.  On the other hand, those households may be less likely 
to remain in the FSS program if their primary motivation for enrolling was to avoid paying the 
increased minimum rent and not to improve other skills.  
The Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate graph below shows the survival estimate for the 
public housing households that paid the increased minimum rent of $150 prior to enrolling in the 
FSS program.  The graph shows that the households that did pay the increased minimum rent had 
a higher survival estimate for most of the FSS program participation, but the survival estimates at 
the end of the FSS program were not different for those who did and did not pay the increased 
minimum rent.  
 [See Appendix Figure 7. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for Public Housing Households 
that Paid Increased Minimum Rent Prior to FSS Enrollment.] 
 
The below Log-Rank Test of Equivalence shows that there is not a statistically significant 
different in the likelihood of completing the FSS program between households that did and did not 
pay the increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment.  
 
Table 4-29. Log Rank Test of Equivalency for Public Housing Households that Paid Increased Minimum 
Rent Before Enrolling in FSS 
 Observed Expected 
Did not Pay increased 
minimum rent prior to FSS 
enrollment 
150.0  138.4 
Paid increased minimum rent 
prior to FSS enrollment 
  52.0   63.6 
Total  202.0 202.0 
Chi2 = 3.10     Pr>Chi2 = 0.0781 
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4.3.2.2 Escrow Savings 
The escrow savings account is the primary incentive for FSS participants to remain in the 
program.  Typically, public housing residents pay roughly 30% of their monthly income in rent, 
and as their income changes, the rent is recalculated.  When households enter the FSS program, 
they are permitted to pay the rent that they paid at the time of FSS entry throughout the program, 
and as their income increases, the would-be increased rent is diverted into an escrow savings 
account where is accumulates until the participant graduates from the FSS program.  Upon 
graduation, the participant receives their savings in a lump sum.  If the participant does not 
graduate from the program, the savings is forfeited to the housing authority.   
The table below shows the average, median, and range of escrow savings by FSS outcome.  
Those who completed FSS had a higher average and median escrow savings amount than those 
who withdrew from the FSS program.  
 
Table 4-30. Public Housing FSS Participants Escrow Savings at End of FSS Participation 
FSS Outcome Average Escrow Median Escrow Range 
Completed FSS $4,134 $2,232 $0 - 45,278 
Withdrew  $1,638 $125 $0 - 20,203 
Moved from HACP $1,257 $132 $0 - 27,327 
Right Censored $2,490 $392 $0 - 32,330 
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The median escrow savings across all outcome types was just $311 and the average was 
$2,110. The table below shows the number of households with escrow savings above and below 
the median of $311 by FSS outcome.  
 
Table 4-31. Public Housing Households with Escrow Savings Above and Below Mediat at the End of FSS 
Participation 
 Above Median Below Median Total 
Completed FSS 141 51 192 
Withdrew 80 122 202 
Moved from HACP 193 244 437 
Right Censored 118 115 233 
 
The Kaplan Meier survival estimate for the households with escrow savings above and 
below the median.  The households with escrow savings above the median were significantly more 
likely to complete the FSS program than those who had escrow savings below the median.  
[See Appendix Figure 8. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates PH FSS Households with escrow 
savings above median] 
Table 4-32. Log Rank Test of Equivalency for Public Housing Households with Escrow Savings Above and 
Below the Median 
 Observed Expected 
Escrow below median 121   70.15 
Escrow above median   80 130.85 
Total  201 201.00 
Chi2 58.98     Pr>0.000 
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The above log rank test of equivalency and the Kaplan Meier survival estimate shows that 
public housing households that had escrow savings higher than the median were more likely to 
remain in the FSS program than those who had escrow savings less than the median.  
There were many households that left the FSS program despite having high levels of 
escrow savings.  There are a few possible explanations for this.  The first is that the escrow savings 
calculation was done by calculating the increased income from the income at the time of program 
entry and calculating what the rent would have been at that income level and subtracting the rent 
at the time of program entry.  Under certain circumstances, households are allowed to withdraw 
money from their escrow funds prior to completion of the FSS program.  Common reasons for 
withdrawing funds include: tuition or job training expenses; car repair that is essentially for getting 
to work; purchasing uniforms, shoes, or tools that are needed for a job. A review of the households 
that had estimated escrow savings of more than $5,000 but left the FSS program prior to 
completion tended to fall into one of two categories.  The first are households that had participated 
in the FSS program for about two years, and during that time period had a significant increase in 
income, and had more than one adult in the household, and in many cases had a full-time student 
in the household.  Those households may have used the escrow funds for educational and job-
related expenses and did not actually forfeit a large amount of escrow savings when they left the 
FSS program.  
The second common scenario was households that had no or very little income at the time 
of FSS enrollment and then had a modest increase in household income, which may be from wages 
or from public assistance programs.  Those households tended to remain in the FSS program for a 
longer period of time which allowed them to accrue escrow savings of more than $5,000.  Those 
households tended to have household incomes of less than $10,000 but because they were only 
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pay $25 per month in rent tended to remain in the FSS program for more than 3 years, their escrow 
savings accrued.  It is likely that those households may have been dismissed for noncompliance 
with the FSS program rules when they had still not secured employment and may have continued 
to receive some form of assistance such as SNAP or TANF in the later years of the FSS program.  
Another possible explanation for households that left the FSS program is that it is possible 
that they had a physical or mental health issue or had family obligations that prevented them from 
continuing to fully participate in the FSS program and their participation ended either voluntarily 
or they were dismissed from the housing authority for noncompliance with the program 
requirements. Unfortunately, the data do not indicate whether the household left the program 
voluntarily or involuntarily.  
 
Section 5:  Logistic Regression  
The prior section provided a univariate analysis of the relationship between the household 
characteristic and program characteristic variables to examine the impact of those variables on the 
FSS participants’ length of FSS participation.  That univariate analysis provided important 
information for better understanding the relationship between leaving the FSS program prior to 
completion, and the variables. That analysis also showed that having children in the household, 
moving within HACP public housing, having an income above the median at FSS entry and paying 
increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment did not explain exit from the FSS program prior 
to completion.  The Kaplan Meier survival estimate curves for those predictors cross, and further 
examination indicated that there are not proportional hazards, which violates the assumption of the 
multivariate Cox Proportional Hazards model.  The predictors household change, zero income, 
and escrow savings are statistically significant in the univariate analysis and are worthy of further 
analysis in the multivariate logistic regression model, particularly because there could be a 
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relationship between escrow savings and zero income at FSS entry because those households with 
no income at FSS entry had the greatest opportunity to benefit from the escrow incentive.   
To further examine these variables, I used a multivariate logistic regression. The dependent 
variable in this analysis is FSS exit prior to completion.   
Logistic regression models were fit to test the association between the likelihood of 
leaving the FSS program prior to month 60 and the predictor variables related to household and 
program characteristics.  This analysis includes the 392 public housing households with an 
observed entry and exit from the FSS program and either left the FSS program or completed the 
FSS program.  This logistic regression includes the following independent variables: children in 
the household, household change, zero income at FSS entry, households that moved within 
HACP housing, and households that paid the increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment.   
The table below reports the odds ratios for the tested variables. Model 1 shows the coefficients 
for those variables in the logistic regression model.  The model shows that households that 
moved and households with a change in household composition significantly less likely to leave 
the FSS program prior to completion.  That finding is consistent with the findings of the 
univariate Kaplan Meier survival estimates and the Log Rank tests of equivalency.  In the 
multivariate model, zero income at the time of FSS entry was not significantly related to the 
outcome.  
 
Table 4-33. Logistic Regression for Public Housing Households that Completed or Witdrew from the FSS 
program 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Children 1.322628 1.391262 1.058309 1.44295 
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Household 
Change 
0.5785632** 0.575103** 0.6298494* 0.5432758* 
Moved 0.475097** 0.4302421** 0.4400879** 0.4286537** 
Zero Income 
at Entry 
0.7302772 0.6205173* 0.7834158 0.7536129 
Min Rent 
before FSS 
0.9665463 0.8444736 0.8579151 0.8118502 
Location FE  X   
Entry Year 
FE 
  X  
Age FE    X 
N 391 383 304 355 
Pseudo R2 0.0351 0.1363 0.0375 0.0831 
*p <0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
Model 2 includes location fixed effects based on the project number. This analysis is 
important because it allows for an analysis of the impact of location. Six observations were 
dropped because they predicted success or failure perfectly due to a small number of observations.  
Interestingly, when considering location fixed effects, household change and moved within HACP 
housing are significant at the 5% level and zero income at entry is significant at the 10%.  Further 
examination revealed that residents in scattered-site North were significantly at the 10% level to 
remain in the FSS program, and residents at scattered sites Northview Heights and scattered-site 
South and Bedford Hill, redeveloped through the HOPE VI program, were more likely to complete 
the FSS program, though not significantly more likely. Scattered-site housing is housing that is 
owned and managed by HACP, but in homes throughout the community, rather than being in a 
large public housing development.  
Model 3 tests for cohort effects based on year of FSS entry.  This analysis showed that the 
FSS participants who entered the program in 2012 were significantly (10% level) to complete the 
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program than those who entered in prior years.  Because many of the participants who entered in 
later years remained in the program at the end of the study period, observations from 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016, and 2017 were dropped because of the small number of observations that perfectly 
predicted FSS program exit.  The households that may go on to complete the program were still in 
the program and right censored.  
Model 4 uses age of head of household fixed effects to determine whether there is a 
relationship between the age of the head of household and FSS program outcome.  Model 4 shows 
that when controlling for head of household age, both households with a change in composition 
and households that moved within HACP public housing were significantly (5% and 10% level 
respectively) less likely to withdraw from the FSS program. This is important because the age of 
households may be related to work experience and life cycle indicators such as household change.  
The analysis in this section is largely consistent with the findings of the univariate analysis. 
Households that experienced a change in household composition and households that moved 
within HACP housing during the FSS program were less likely to withdraw from the FSS program 
prior to completion.  Households with escrow savings above the median were also statistically less 
likely to leave the FSS program prior to completion, but median escrow savings is a poor predictor 
variable because it is so closely tied to FSS program success.  When considering location fixed 
effects, I found that those who lived in Manchester Commons, a scattered-site community 
redeveloped under HOPE VI were statistically more likely to complete the FSS program.  The 
analysis also showed that while not statistically more likely to complete the program, those who 
lived in scattered-site North and scattered-site South or Bedford Hill were more likely to complete 
the FSS program.  It is interesting to see that those in scattered-site communities performed so 
well considering that those households do not receive services onsite. That contradicts one of the 
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assumptions that public housing residents are more likely to complete the FSS program than HCV 
households because they receive onsite services. HACP has a site-based waiting list which allows 
residents to apply to live in a particular property, therefore residents in scattered-site housing may 
differ systematically than those who live in traditional public housing units.  
The following chapter, Chapter 5, will provide a similar analysis of the findings of the 
housing choice voucher households.  In Chapter 6, I will provide a full discussion of the findings 
and compare the outcomes of public housing and housing choice voucher households in greater 
detail.  
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5.0 Housing Choice Voucher Findings 
This chapter presents the findings of the housing choice voucher (HCV) households that 
were enrolled in the Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) program during the study period of January 1, 
2010 to October 1, 2017.  For continuity and ease of comparison, this chapter mirrors the 
presentation of the findings of the public housing households presented in Chapter 4.  Like the 
previous chapter, this chapter is divided into five sections.  First, I will determine the outcomes of 
the FSS program for the HCV households and compare those outcomes to the public housing FSS 
participants. Second, I will conduct the time series analysis to determine whether there are seasonal 
effects that explain exit from the FSS program.  Second, I will use the event history analysis 
framework to determine whether there are particular times in the FSS program when the HCV 
households are more likely to leave the program.  Third, I will compare the results of the HCV 
analysis to the analysis of the public housing households provided in the prior chapter.  Fourth, I 
will address the third research question, what explains exit from the FSS program.  I will test the 
same to hypothesis tested in the prior chapter, household and program characteristics. The 
household characteristics are: household composition, changes in household composition, location 
of HACP housing, moves within HACP housing, and income at time of FSS entry.  I will then 
compare the results of the analysis of the HCV participants to the analysis of the public housing 
participants.  
Lastly, I will conclude the analysis of the HCV FSS participants with the multivariate 
logistic regression models, that further examine the outcomes of the univariate analysis and test 
for fixed effects, including: location of housing, year of FSS entry, and age of the head of 
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household.  The following chapter, Chapter Six, will conclude this dissertation with a discussion 
of the findings.   
5.1 Research Question 1 What are the Outcomes of FSS Participation?  
This section determines the outcomes of the housing choice voucher households that 
participated in the FSS program between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2017.  First, I will 
describe the outcomes of the FSS program, like the public housing households, the possible 
outcomes are left censored, completed the FSS program, withdrew from the FSS program prior to 
completion, moved from HACP housing, or were right censored.  Second, I will provide the 
demographic information for the households in each category to determine whether there are 
discernable characteristics of the households that experience certain outcomes of FSS 
participation.  
5.1.1 FSS Program Outcomes 
There were 1,210 HCV households enrolled in the FSS program during the study period, 
January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2017.  Of those 1,210 households, 540 (44.7%) of the FSS 
participants enrolled in the program prior to January 1, 2010. Because those participants enrolled 
in the FSS program prior to the beginning of the study period, their entry to the FSS program was 
not observed and their length of FSS participation cannot be calculated. Those 540 entries are 
considered left censored and while they are included in the initial review of the demographics of 
the study participants, they are not included in further analysis.  
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Table 5-1. HCV Households that participated in the FSS program during the study period, January 2010 – 
October 2017 
Households Count Percent 
Left Censored, FSS enrollment prior to January 2010, 
the beginning of the data set  
540 44.7 
Right Censored, Household is enrolled in FSS on 
October 1, 2017 the end of the study period 
207 17.1 
Households that exited from HACP while enrolled in 
FSS 
128 10.6 
FSS participants who left the FSS prior to completion 
(60 months) 
262 21.7 
FSS participants enrolled in FSS for 60 months or more 72 6.0 
Total Number of HCV households enrolled in FSS 
during the study period. 
1,209 100.0 
 
There were 207, or 17.1%, FSS participants who were enrolled in the FSS program on 
October 1, 2017, the last day of the study period.  Because those participants were still enrolled in 
the program at the end of the study period, the end of their FSS participation is not observed, and 
the full length of their participation cannot be calculated.  These entries are right censored, and do 
not provide any information about the outcome of their FSS participation, but we can observe their 
entry to the FSS program and can observe their participation during the study period.  These right 
censored entries are included in the survival analysis for the period that they are observed in the 
FSS dataset.   
There were 128, or 10.6%, FSS participants who left HACP housing while they were 
enrolled in the FSS program.  Because the exit from the FSS program coincides with exit from 
HACP housing, we cannot accurately say that the FSS participant deliberately left the FSS 
program. These entries are considered right censored, with no observable FSS exit, and are treated 
the same as the entries for FSS participants who were enrolled in the FSS program at the end of 
the study period.   
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Of the 1,210 HCV households that were enrolled in the FSS program during the study 
period, 875, or 72.3%, participants had partial FSS records and either their entry or exit from the 
FSS program could not be observed using this dataset.  Meaning that of those 1,210 HCV 
households, there are 335, or 27.7%, participants that have complete records and the entirety of 
their FSS participation can be observed.  Of those 335, 262 households withdrew from the FSS 
program but remained in HACP housing and 72 households completed the 60-month program. 
Table 6.1 below, shows the distribution of HCV participants by outcome.  
Of the 334 participants with an observed FSS program entry and exit, 72, or 21.5%, 
completed 60 months in the FSS program and 262, or 78.5%, left the FSS program prior to 
completion of the 60-month program.   
 
Table 5-2. HCV Households with an observed entry and exit from the FSS Program 
Households Count Percent 
HCV Households that withdrew from FSS prior to 
completion 
262   78.5 
HCV Households that Completed the FSS program   72   21.5 
Total  334 100.0 
 
As mentioned in the prior chapter, completing the 60-month program does not necessarily 
mean that the household graduated.  There are some households that completed the FSS program 
prior to the end of the five-year period and others that completed the 5-year period and did not 
meet the graduation requirements.  A 2011 study by Silva, et al. found that approximately 25% of 
the HCV households that graduated did so before the end of the five-year period (Silva et al., 
2011).  Data from HACP’s MTW reports shows that 103 HCV households in the study group 
graduated from the FSS program between 2015 and 2017.  Also, it is important to note is that this 
study period ended on October 1, 2017, so it is possible that some of the HCV households that 
remained in the program on October 1, 2017 graduated by the end of the calendar year.  
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Furthermore, other HCV households likely graduated prior to the end of the five-year period.  It is 
important to note that while this study examines length of FSS participation, that length of 
participation does not indicate graduation.  
 
Table 5-3. HCV Households that Graduated from the FSS Program 2015-2017 
Year N 
2017 29 
2016 33 
2015 41 
Total 103 
 
 
5.1.2 FSS Participants 
This section examines the demographic characteristics of the HCV households that 
participated in the FSS program during the study period. 
The tables below show the demographics and some characteristics of the households that 
experienced by FSS outcome. These data confirm the findings of other researchers that there is 
little demographic variation in the FSS participants.  Most participants are single, Black women 
under the age of 40, who are the only adult in the household.   
Table 5-4 shows that more than 90% of the heads of household in the households that 
participated in the FSS program are women. The table shows the number of male and female-led 
households in the FSS program broken down by program outcome.  This is slightly higher than 
the percentage (84.5%) of the public housing households that had a female head of household.  
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Table 5-4. FSS Participants’ outcomes by sex of head of household 
Variable Left 
Censored 
Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Sex N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Female 510 94.4 67 93.1 245 93.5 112 87.5 190 91.8 1,124 93.0 
Male 30 5.6 5 6.9 17 6.5 16 12.5 17 8.2 85 7.0 
Total 540 100 72 100 262 100 128 100 207 100 1,209 100.0 
 
Furthermore, more than 90% of the FSS participants were black. Table 5-5 below shows 
the FSS program outcomes by race of the head of household.  For comparison, 95.1% of the 
public housing households participating in the FSS program had a black head of household.  
Table 5-5. HCV FSS Participants’ outcomes by race of head of household 
Variable Left 
Censored 
Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Race N % N % N % N % N % 
Black 507 93.9 65 90.3 246 93.9 118 92.9 188 90.8 
White  30 5.6 6 8.3 15 5.7 9 7.1 16 7.7 
Asian 1 0.2 0 0.0 1 0.4 0 0 3 1.4 
American Indian / 
Hawaiian 
2 0.4 1 1.4 0 0 1 0.8 0 0 
Total 540 100 72 100 262 100 127 100 207 100 
 
There were only a few households that identified as Latino.  There were two Latino 
households that withdrew from the FSS program and one that is still in the FSS program and is 
counted as right censored.  
Figure 5-1 shows that most of the heads of households of households that participated in 
the FSS program are under the age of 35.  
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Figure 5-1. HCV FSS Participants by age of head of household 
 
Of the 72 HCV households that completed the FSS program, only 8, or 11.1%, households 
had a head of household under the age of 30. There were 36, or 50.0%, heads of household were 
in their 30s, and 28, or 38.9%, heads of household were over the age of 40. (See Table 5-6).   
 
Table 5-6. HCV FSS Participants by Age of Head of Household 
Variable Left 
Censored 
Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Age N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Under 20 3 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.02 
20-24 49 9.1 0 0 29 11.1 9 7.1 6 2.9 93 7.7 
25-29 124 23.0 8 11.1 64 24.4 28 22.0 53 25.6 277 22.9 
30-34 130 24.1 20 27.8 55 21.0 25 19.7 36 17.4 266 22.0 
35-39 71 13.1 16 22.2 27 10.3 23 17.3 37 17.9 174 14.4 
40-44 51 9.4 5 6.9 20 7.6 17 13.4 19 9.2 112 9.3 
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45-49 49 9.1 10 13.9 25 9.5 6 4.7 22 10.7 112 9.3 
50-54 38 7.0 10 13.9 19 7.3 12 9.4 12 5.3 91 7.5 
55-59 18 3.3 3 4.2 14 5.3 6 4.7 17 8.2 58 4.8 
60+ 7 1.3 0 0 9 3.4 2 1.6 6 2.9 24 2.0 
Total 540 100.0 72 100.0 262 99.9 128 99.9 207 100.1 1,209 99.92 
 
Heads of households who completed the FSS program tended to be older than those who 
left the FSS program prior to completion or moved from HACP housing.  Of the 262 participants 
who withdrew from the FSS program, 93, or 35.5%, heads of household were under the age of 30 
and 82, or 31.3%, heads of households were in their 30s, and 87, or 33.1%, heads of household 
were over the age of 40. Of those HCV households that moved from the HACP while enrolled in 
the FSS program, 37, or 29.1%, had a head of household under the age of 30 and 48, or 37%, had 
a head of household between the age of 30 and 39, and 43, or 33.8%, had a head of household age 
40 or older.   
This is very different from the public housing households, which tended to have a younger 
head of household.  Of the public housing FSS participants, more than half (51.6%) were under 
the age of 30. Additionally, many of the young public housing FSS participants, 308, or 19.0%, of 
the public housing participants moved from HACP housing while enrolled in the FSS program.  
For comparison, only 37, or 3.1%, HCV households with a head of household under the age of 30 
moved from HACP housing while enrolled in the FSS program.  The HCV participants tended to 
be older than the public housing participants, and less likely to move from HACP housing while 
enrolled in the program.  
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This section showed the outcomes of the participants in the FSS program. It shows that of 
the 334 FSS participants with an observed entry and exit from the FSS program, more than ¾ of 
the FSS participants left the program prior to completion. This section also reviewed the 
demographics of the FSS participants and showed that a high percentage of the participants were 
young, single, black women. This finding is consistent with the literature.  
5.2 Research Question 2: When do HCV FSS Participants Leave the FSS Program?  
This section addresses the second research question, when do HCV FSS participants leave 
the FSS program to determine whether there are particular times during the calendar year or the 
FSS program when participants are more likely to leave the program.  First, I will conduct a time 
series analysis to show when FSS participants left the FSS program during the study period of 
January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2017.  Second, I will use the event history analysis framework to 
create a life table to show participants’ exits during the 60-month program.  
As explained in the prior section, there were 262 HCV FSS participants who left the FSS 
program prior to completion. Figure 5-2 below shows the month and year that those 262 
households left the FSS program. This chart does not include the exit from the FSS program from 
those who moved out of HACP housing.   This shows that there was a spike in exit from the FSS 
program in March 2013, when 63 participants left the program.  Those 63 participants make up 
24% of the exits from the FSS program.  With the exception of the spike in exits in March 2013, 
exits from the program are generally fewer than five each month with a few exceptions.  
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Figure 5-2. HCV Participants who left the FSS program and remained in HACP housing from January 2010 
to October 2017. 
 
The 63 FSS participants that left the FSS program in March of 2013, were enrolled in the 
FSS Program for a period of between 4 to 39 months before leaving the program.  Figure 5-3 below 
shows the length of time that those households participated in the FSS program.  A review of the 
demographics, household composition, location, and income levels does not show any patterns for 
those households that exited from the FSS program on March 1, 2013. The high number of exits 
in March 2013 cannot be explained by this data set. This spike in exits likely reflects a data issue 
at HACP.  
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Figure 5-3. Length of FSS participation by HCV FSS participants who exited the program on March 1, 2013 
 
5.2.1 Life Table: HCV Households 
The life table for the HCV participants, in Appendix A, displays the number of FSS 
participants enrolled in the FSS program during the 60-month program.   
[See Appendix Table 2. Housing Choice Voucher FSS Life Table] 
The Life Table shows the number of HCV FSS participants who exited from the FSS 
program during each month of the 60-month program.  This analysis provides an examination of 
points during the program when an FSS participant may be more likely to leave the program.  The 
table calculates the participants’ length of FSS participation starting with month 0, when the 
participant entered the program and calculating participation in the number of months between 0 
and 60.  Participants who remained in the program for 60 months completed the FSS program.   
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The format of the life table for the HCV participants is the same as for the public housing 
participants. The first column shows the time interval, which is a month. The second column shows 
the number of FSS participants enrolled in the FSS program at the beginning of the time interval.  
The third column shows the number of participants that withdrew from the FSS program during 
the month, the fourth column shows the number of households that moved out of HACP housing, 
and the fifth column shows the number of households that were right censored.  Column six shows 
the survival rate which is the likelihood that the FSS participants that began the month in the FSS 
program will remain in the program for the entire month. Column seven is the error estimate and 
Columns eight and nine are the confidence intervals.  
The median survival time, when 50% of participants remain in the program occurred 
between months 24 and 25, showing that more HCV households left during the first two years than 
the last three years.  This is different than the public housing data that showed that the median 
survival time for public housing households was month 30, which was the midpoint in the program.  
In Figure 5-4, the below Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows the survival estimates for 
the FSS participants.  The graph shows a steady decline during the first three years of the program 
which then seems to flatten out after year three.  
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Figure 5-4. Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for all HCV FSS participants  
 
There was little difference in the percentage of HCV households that left the FSS program 
between the years (see Table 5-7). The highest percentage of exits from the FSS program was 
during year 2 when 16.6% of FSS participants withdrew from the program. Years 1 and 5 had the 
lowest percentage of HCV participants leaving the program, 12.5% and 12.4% respectively.  The 
households that exited during year 4 may have completed the program requirements early and 
graduated from the FSS program prior to the end of the fifth year. Still, there was not a considerable 
change in the percentage of households that left over the course of the program, suggesting that 
exit from the FSS program was not time dependent. The prior analysis, which looked at exit by 
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calendar time as well as this analysis looking at exit in program time, suggests that time is not 
related to the outcomes.  
 
Table 5-7. HCV Households and FSS Outcomes by Year 
Beginning 
of Year 
# at 
beginning 
of year  
% 
remaining 
at 
beginning 
of year  
# 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
during 
the year 
% 
Withdrew 
from FSS 
during 
the year 
Moved 
from 
HACP  
Right 
Censored  
Completed 
FSS 
1 671 100.0 84 12.5 53 64  
2 470 70.0 78 16.6 35 37  
3 320 47.7 51 15.9 23 26  
4 220 32.8 31 14.1 11 41  
5 137 20.4 17 12.4 9 39  
End of 
Year 5 
      72    
 
This section has shown that there were not strong seasonal effects that explain exit from 
the FSS program.  There was not a consistent increase in exits at the beginning of the summer to 
suggest that participants were more likely to leave the program when children were out of school. 
The analysis of exit by calendar date did show a high number of exits from FSS on March 1, 2013, 
which is likely explained by a data processing issue by HACP. The hypothesis that there was a 
point in the program when participants were most likely to leave was not supported by the data.  
Exit from the FSS program was not explained by time.  The next section will test participant 
characteristics to see if they can explain the likelihood of exit from the FSS program.  
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5.3 Research Question 3: What explains exit from the FSS program? 
5.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Household Characteristics 
In the first section, I identified the number of households who left the FSS program prior 
to completion.  In the second section, I examined the time, measured both by calendar date and 
length of time in the program, to determine whether either of those measurements explained exit 
from the FSS program.  Neither of those offered a meaningful explanation of FSS exit. In this 
section, I will examine the household characteristics to determine whether they offer an 
explanation of which households are more likely to exit the FSS program prior to completion.   
The variables tested in this section are: household composition, change in household 
composition, housing location, moves within HACP housing, and income at time of FSS entry.  
Each variable and its relationship to the hypothesis that household characteristics explains FSS 
exit will be explained in greater detail in each subsection.  
5.3.1.1 Household Composition 
The number and age of household members may impact a participant’s likelihood of 
completing the FSS program.  Households with a single parent who may be less likely to complete 
the FSS program than a participant who is in a single-person household or a with more than one 
adult.  Table 5-8 below shows that more than ¾ of the HCV households in the FSS program have 
two or more members in the household.  Households with only one household member were not 
more likely to remain in the program than those who had more members of their household.  This 
is very similar to the public housing households, where 72% of public housing FSS participants 
 165 
lived in a household with two or more people and only 28% of participants lived in a single-person 
household.  
 
Table 5-8. HCV Participants’ Household Composition by FSS Outcome 
 Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew from 
FSS 
Moved from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Household N % N % N % N % N % 
One-Person 
Household 
17 23.6 59  22.5 23  18.1 49  23.7 148 22.2 
Households 
with Two or 
more people 
55 76.4 203 77.5 104 81.9 158 76.3 520 77.8 
Total 72 100 262 100 127 100 207 100 668 100.0 
 
Most HCV households (81%) had one adult in the household. Households that completed 
the FSS program may be more likely to have more than one adult, however, there were only 17 
households with more than one adult who completed the FSS program, because that number is so 
low, it is difficult to determine whether having an additional adult in the household makes an FSS 
participant more likely to complete the program.  A very small percentage of HCV households in 
the FSS program had married couples or other adults in the household.  While households with 
more than one adult may be more likely to complete the FSS program, the number of those 
households was very small and difficult to test using statistical methods.  Other adults are adults 
in the household that are not spouses or full-time students.  They may be adult children, parents, 
relatives, or partners of the designated head of household.  Additionally, some households have 
full-time students who are over the age of 18 but attend school full-time.   
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Table 5-9. Number of adults in the HCV FSS household 
 Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew from 
FSS 
Moved from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Household N % N % N % N % N % 
Spouse 2  2.8 2 0.8 4 3.1 4  1.9 12 1.8 
OtherAdult 11 15.3 29 11.1 25 19.7 23 11.1 88 13.2 
Full-Time 
Students  
4 5.6 11  4.2 12 9.4 0 0 27 4.0 
One Adult  55 76.4 220 84.0 86 67.7 180 87.0 541 81.0 
Total 72 100.1 262 100.1 127 99.9 207 100 668 100.0 
 
Table 5-10 below shows the number of HCV households enrolled in the FSS program that 
do and do not have children in the household.  One theory is that households that have children 
will be less likely to complete the FSS program because of childcare responsibilities.  The table 
below shows that most (69.6%) of these households have children. This is very similar to the public 
housing households, where 68.9% of the households participating in the FSS program had at least 
one child in the household. 
 
Table 5-10. HCV FSS Households With and Without Children by FSS Outcomes 
 Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew from 
FSS 
Moved from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Household N % N % N % N % N % 
Children 49 68.1 185 70.6 90 70.9 141 68.1 465 69.6 
No children 23 31.9 77 29.4 37 29.1 66 31.9 203 30.4 
Total 72 100 262 100.0 127 100.0 207 100 668 100.0 
 
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows that households that did and did not have 
children had nearly the same likelihood of success in the program and the number of households 
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with children than withdrew from the FSS program are nearly identical to the number of 
households that were expected by the model to withdraw from the FSS program.   
[See Appendix Figure 9. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate HCV Households with Children] 
Table 5-11 below shows the log-rank estimates of the expected outcomes for households 
that had children.  This analysis shows that there is not a significant difference between the 
households that have children and those that do not in terms of the likelihood to complete the FSS 
program.  Therefore, the hypothesis that households who had children under the age of 18 may be 
less likely to complete the program due to childcare responsibilities has not held true. This result 
is very similar to the result of the comparison of the public housing households that did and did 
not have children in the household.  Like these HCV households, Public housing households who 
did and did not have children in the household had a nearly equal likelihood of completing the FSS 
program.  
 
Table 5-11. Log Rank Estimate- HCV Households with Children at FSS entry 
 Observed Events  Expected Events 
No Children 77 76.57 
Children 185 185.43 
Total 262 262 
Chi2 = 0.00          Pr>chi2 = 0.9532 
5.3.1.2 Change in Household Composition 
Changes in household composition, when a household member enters or leaves the 
household may create a disruption that may lead to the participant being more likely to leave the 
FSS program.  The analysis shows that households that had a change in household composition 
while enrolled in the FSS program were more likely to remain in the program that households that 
did not experience a change in household composition.  Of the 262 HCV households that left the 
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FSS program prior to completion, 43 (15.8%) households experienced a change in household 
composition. This provides some evidence that having a change in the household composition, the 
addition and subtraction of household members may not be disruptive to progress in the FSS 
program. In fact, households with a change in household composition were more likely to remain 
in the FSS program than households that did not have a change.  This is consistent with the results 
of the same test for public housing households.  The result is significant at the p<0.001 level 
therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that changes in household composition negatively 
impact the likelihood of withdrawing from the FSS program.  Of the 43 households that had a 
change in household composition, 29 had the addition of at least one family member and 12 had a 
reduction in the number of household members. Further analysis showed that the addition of 
children to the household did not affect the household’s outcomes in the FSS program.  
 
Table 5-12. HCV Changes in household composition while enrolled in the FSS program 
 N % 
Changes in HH Composition 219 84.2 
No Change in HH 
Composition 
 43 15.8 
Total 262 100.0 
 
The Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimate shows the survival estimates for the FSS participants 
that did and did not have a change in household composition while enrolled in the FSS program.  
This shows that households that had a change in household composition had a higher survival 
estimates than those who did not have a change in household composition.  
[ See Appendix Figure 10. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate HCV households with a change in 
composition.] 
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The below log rank test of equivalency shows that households with a change in household 
are significantly more likely to remain in the FSS program than households that did not have a 
change in household composition.  This is contrary to my expectation that changes in the household 
composition would create a disruption that would lead to the FSS participant leaving the program.  
This is particularly interesting because 29 of the households that an addition to their household.  
 
Table 5-13. Log-Rank Test of Equivalency for HCV Households with a change in household composition. 
 Observed 
Events  
Expected 
Events  
No Change 219 167.94 
Change 43   92.06 
Total 262 260.00 
Chi2: 44.38       Pr>Chi2 0.000 
 
Due to the mechanics of this analysis, HCV households that remained in the FSS program 
for a longer period of time had more time to experience a change in household composition while 
enrolled in the FSS program than the households who left the FSS program earlier.  To test whether 
this result reflected the length of FSS participation, or the effect of household changes, I conducted 
the same analysis with households that moved early, within the first 36 months of the FSS program, 
and the households who did not experience a change in household composition to determine 
whether this finding reflects the impact of change in household composition accurately.  The 
Kaplan Meier survival estimate, located in the appendix, and the log rank test of equivalency, 
Table 5-14 below, show that households who experienced a change in household composition 
during the first 36 months of FSS participation were significantly less likely to leave the FSS 
program prior to completion than households that did not experience a change in household 
composition.  There were 34 HCV households that had a change in household composition during 
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the first 24 months of the FSS program and did not complete the FSS program.  There were three 
additional households that experienced a change in household composition during their FSS 
participation and left the program later in the program, between months 25 and 59.  
 
Table 5-14. Log Rank Test of Equivalency: HCV Households that Experienced a Change in Household 
Composition within the first 24 months of FSS participation and households that did not experienced a 
change in household composition while in FSS.  
 Observed Expected 
0 219 206.89 
1 34 46.11 
Total 253 253.00 
Chi2: 3.98       Pr>Chi2: 0.460 
 
5.3.1.3  Income 
The median household income at the time of FSS program entry was $8,929 and the mean 
income was $11,511. The minimum household income was 0 and the maximum was $49,685.  For 
the households that completed at least 60 months in the FSS program, the median annual income 
was $11,848 at FSS entry and the average was $15,773. The median annual income for FSS 
participants who left the program prior to completing 60 months was $9,335 and the average 
annual income for those households was $11,474 at FSS entry. This is similar to the amounts for 
all households at the beginning of the FSS program, with the median income being slightly lower 
and the mean income beings slightly higher than the statistics for those entering the FSS program.  
 
Table 5-15. HCV FSS Participants by income at FSS entry 
Income Level at FSS Entry N % 
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0 99 14.7 
$1-6,000 161 24.0 
$6,001 – 12,000 128 19.0 
$12,000 - $18,000 109 16.2 
$18,001 - $24,000 82 12.2 
$24,001 +  93 13.8 
Total  672 99.9 
 
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows that there was ultimately little difference in the 
likelihood of withdrawing from the FSS program among households earning more or less than the 
median income at the time of FSS entry.  Households earning less than the median household 
income were slightly more likely to remain in the FSS program but was not statistically significant.  
 [See Appendix Figure 11. Kaplan Meier Estimates HCV Households with Income above median 
at FSS entry.] 
The below log-rank test for equality of survival functions among households that did and 
did not earn more than the median household annual income at the time that the household entered 
the FSS program is below.  This test confirms that while the households that earned less than 
$11,474, were slightly more less likely to withdraw from the FSS program, it was not statistically 
significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis that there is not statistical difference between the 
likelihood of leaving FSS between the two groups cannot be rejected.  
Table 5-16. Log Rank test of equivalency for HCV participants with income above and below the median at 
FSS entry. 
 Events Observed Events Expected 
Income below median at FSS 
entry 
155 158.42 
Income above median at FSS 
entry  
107 103.58 
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Total 262 262 
Chi2 = 0.19        Pr>chi2 = 0.6647 
 
Table 5-17 below shows the incomes of the FSS participants at the last observation, either 
the date that the participant left the FSS program, moved from HACP housing, completed the FSS 
program, or for the right-censored households, their income on October 1, 2017, the last day of the 
study period.  
Table 5-17. HCV Income at Last Observation by FSS Outcome 
Income level Completed 
FSS 
Left FSS Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
0 5 30 7 16 58 
1-6,000 13 63 22 34 132 
6,001-12,000 18 65 20 48 151 
12,001-18,000 9 39 16 31 95 
18,001-24,000 7 36 23 30 96 
24,000 +  21 29 40 48 138 
Total  72 262  128 207 669 
 
5.3.1.4 HCV Household Location and Moves 
This section examines the housing choice voucher households to determine whether the 
location or moving from one housing unit to another impacted their likelihood of withdrawing 
from the FSS program prior to completion. Figure 5-5 below shows the location of the HCV FSS 
participants by zip code.  The map shows the number of FSS participants with a voucher in each 
zip code at the time of FSS enrollment. There is a higher number of HCV households enrolled in 
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the FSS program who live in zip codes 15206, 15210, and 15219 with between 58 and 90 HCV 
households participating in the FSS program in those zip codes.  These results are not surprising 
because rental housing tends to be less expensive in Northwest and South Pittsburgh (Blackhurst 
& Briem, 2018; Blackhurst et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 5-5. Number of HCV households enrolled in FSS by zip code. 
 
Table 5-18 below shows the location of the HCV household’s unit by program outcome.  
This table shows that while HCV households tend to be concentrated in particular zip codes, the 
location of housing does not seem to determine the outcomes of FSS participation. Neighborhoods 
with the highest number of voucher holders included Carrick (90), Hill District / Uptown (86), 
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East Liberty/Larimer (84), and the Northside (57).  When split among outcomes, the number of 
households in each category is relatively small, with just a few households in most categories.   
 
Table 5-18. HCV Participants’ Location by Zip Code 
Zip Code Neighborhood Left FSS Completed 
FSS 
Moved 
From 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
15201 Lawrenceville 8 1 5 4 18 
15203 Strip District 1 1 0 2 4 
15204 Sheraden 15 4 8 16 43 
15205 Westwood/Carnegie 7 3 4 10 24 
15206 E. Liberty  30 10 20 24 84 
15207 Homestead 7 3 6 14 30 
15208 Homewood 15 5 4 10 34 
15210 Carrick 35 9 15 31 90 
15211 Duquesne H. 3 4 3 6 16 
15212 Northside / Brighton 
Heights 
25 6 14 12 57 
15213 Oakland 6 2 2 4 14 
15214 Northview Heights / 
Perry North 
18 3 9 10 40 
15216 Beechview 6 0 3 1 10 
15217 Sq. Hill / Greenfield 1 0 0 0 1 
15219 Hill / Uptown 41 2 11 32 86 
15220 Elicott 5 1 1 4 11 
15221 East Hills 7 1 3 3 14 
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15222 Downtown 0 0 2 1 3 
15224 Bloomfield/Garfield 7 0 5 7 19 
15226 Brookline 0 1 2 0 3 
15227 Hays 1 0 0 2 3 
15233 Manchester 5 1 0 2 8 
15235 Penn Hills 1 0 0 0 1 
County Allegheny County  18 7 11 12 48 
Total   262 72 128 207 669 
 
Of the 669 housing choice voucher households that participated in the FSS program, 148 
moved from one rental unit to another while observed in the FSS program.  Of those, 21 households 
later moved out of HACP housing all together. Of the 334, that completed or dropped out of the 
FSS program, 53 who moved while enrolled in FSS ultimately left the FSS program while 31 
ultimately completed the program.  
 
Table 5-19. Number of moves among HCV households while enrolled in the FSS program 
 Left FSS  Completed 
FSS 
Exit from 
HACP 
Housing 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
Number of 
moves 
53 31 21 43 148 
 
Table 5-20 below shows at the neighborhood and zip code level the moves by households 
that completed the FSS program. There were a few instances where multiple households moved 
from the same zip code to the same zip code.  
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Table 5-20. Moves for Households that completed the FSS program 
From 
Neighborhood 
From 
Zip 
Code 
To Neighborhood To Zip Code Count 
Lawrenceville 15201 Lawrenceville 15201 1 
Lawrenceville 15201 Northside 15212 1 
Lawrenceville 15201 Allegheny Co. Allegheny Co. 1 
Sheraden 15204 Sheraden 15204 2 
Sheraden 15204 Carrick 15210 1 
Sheraden 15204 Summer Hill 15214 1 
Sheraden 15204 West End 15220 1 
Westwood/Carnegie 15205 Sheraden 15204 1 
E. Liberty/Larimer 15206 Westwood/Carnegie 15205 1 
E. Liberty/Larimer 15206 E. Liberty/Larimer 15206 2 
E. Liberty/Larimer 15206 Hill / Uptown 15219 1 
Homestead 15207 Southside 15203 1 
Homestead 15207 E. Liberty/Larimer 15206 1 
Homewood 15208 Allegheny Co. Allegheny Co. 1 
Carrick 15210 Westwood/Carnegie 15205 1 
Carrick 15210 Carrick 15210 1 
Duquesne Heights 15211 Carrick 15210 1 
Northside 15212 Sheraden 15204 1 
Northside 15212 E. Liberty/Larimer 15206 1 
Northside 15212 Duquesne Heights 15211 1 
Northside 15212 Northside 15212 1 
Northside 15212 Allegheny Co. Allegheny Co. 1 
Summer Hill 15214 Northside 15212 1 
Hill / Uptown 15219 Oakland 15213 1 
Hill / Uptown 15219 Hill / Uptown 15219 3 
Hill / Uptown 15219 Allegheny Co. Allegheny Co. 1 
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Manchester 15233 Northside 15212 1 
 
Table 5-21 below shows the households that moved within HACP housing while 
participating in the FSS program.  These participants exited the FSS program prior to completion.  
This table shows that many of these households lived in East Liberty, Northside, Carrick, and 
Homewood, there weren’t any patterns in where the households moved to.  Households tended to 
move between the aforementioned neighborhoods, where less expensive rental housing is 
available.  There were also a number of households that moved within their neighborhood.  It is 
possible that those households wanted to remain in their neighborhood but wanted to live in a 
different rental unit.  The neighborhoods where the FSS participants who did not complete the FSS 
program are not different from the neighborhoods where the participants who completed the 
program lived.  
Table 5-21. HCV Households that moved within HACP housing while participating in the FSS program. 
Zip Code Neighborhood Zip Code Neighborhood Count 
15201 Lawrenceville 15201 Lawrenceville 1 
15204 Sheraden 15220 Elicot 1 
15204 Sheraden 15204 Sheraden 1 
15204 Sheraden 15214 Northview 1 
15204 Sheraden 15206 E. Liberty 1 
15205 Carnegie 15210 Carrick 1 
15205 Carnegie 15204 Sheraden 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15208 Homewood 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15221 East Hills 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15224 Bloomfield 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15206 E. Liberty 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15201 Lawrenceville 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15213 Oakland 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15201 Lawrenceville 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15214 Northview 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15207 Homestead 1 
15206 E. Liberty 15219 Hill / Uptown 1 
15207 Homestead 15207 Homestead 1 
15207 Homestead 15208 Homewood 1 
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15208 Homewood 15208 Homewood 2 
15208 Homewood 15212 Northside 2 
15208 Homewood 15219 Hill / Uptown 1 
15208 Homewood 15206 E. Liberty 1 
15210 Carrick 15210 Carrick 1 
15210 Carrick 15233 Chateau 1 
15210 Carrick 15224 Bloomfield/ Garfield 1 
15210 Carrick AC Allegheny Co. 1 
15210 Carrick 15219 Hill / Uptown 1 
15210 Carrick 15210 Carrick 1 
15211 Duquense H. 15214 Northview 1 
15211 Duquense H. 15212 Northside 1 
15212 Northside 15219 Hill / Uptown 1 
15212 Northside 15212 Northside 1 
15212 Northside 15214 Northview 1 
15212 Northside 15208 Homewood 1 
15213 Oakland 15210 Carrick 1 
15214 Northview 15212 Northside 1 
15214 Northview 15211 Duquesne H.  1 
15216 Beechview 15208 Homewood 1 
15219 Hill / Uptown 15219 Hill / Uptown 3 
15219 Hill/Uptown AC Allegheny Co 1 
15219 Hill / Uptown 15216 Beechview 1 
15220 Elicot 15214 Northview 1 
15221 East Hills AC Allegheny Co 1 
15224 Bloomfield/ Garfield 15212 Northside 1 
15224 Bloomfield/ Garfield 15224 Bloomfield/Garfield 2 
15227 Hays 15220 Elicot 1 
15233 Chateau 15212 Northside 1 
 
Table 5-22 below shows the number of HCV households that moved while enrolled in the 
FSS program by FSS outcome.  This table shows that a higher percentage of households that 
completed the FSS program moved while they were enrolled in the FSS program.  This table also 
suggests that moving while enrolled in the FSS program did not create a disruption that lead to the 
FSS participant from withdrawing from the program.  
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Table 5-22. HCV FSS Participants Who Moved While Enrolled in the FSS Program 
 Completed 
FSS 
Withdrew from 
FSS 
Moved from HACP Right Censored 
 N % N % N % N % 
Moved  30 41.7 53 20.2 21 16.4 43 20.8 
Did Not Move 42 58.3 209 79.8 107 83.6 164 79.2 
Total  72 100 262 100 128 100 207 100 
 
The Kaplan Meier survival analysis below shows that households that moved with their 
voucher were more likely to remain in the FSS program than households that did not move. This 
analysis also shows the likelihood of leaving the FSS program among movers and non-movers 
over time. This finding is contrary to the hypothesis that moving while participating in the FSS 
program would create a disruption and would lead to the household being less likely to continue 
FSS participation.  An alternative explanation is that FSS participants were able to use their 
vouchers to move to areas that were closer to jobs and family and remained connected to the FSS 
service coordinators.  
[Appendix Figure 13. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate HCV Households that Moved During 
FSS] 
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows that the households that moved while enrolled 
in the FSS program were more likely to remain in the program than those who did not.   The below 
log-rank test of equivalency shows that the households that moved are significantly more likely to 
remain.  Of the 262 households, only 53 households, or 20.2%, moved.    
 
Table 5-23. Log Rank test of equivalency for HCV Households that Moved with their voucher while Enrolled 
in FSS 
 Observed Expected 
Did not move 209 155.53 
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Moved 53 106.47 
Total  262 262 
Chi2 45.77         Pr>Chi2 0.000 
 
The number of household members determines the size of the rental unit for which the 
household is eligible.  If there is a change in household composition, the household could be given 
a new voucher to reflect the change in household size. For that reason, some of the households that 
moved may have moved because of a change in household composition.  Of the 53 households 
that moved, 17, or 32%, households also had a change in household composition. Upon further 
review, I found that only three of those 17 households had a move and change a in household 
composition that occurred at approximately the same time. The move may have been a reflection 
of the change in household size.  There were also 14 HCV households that moved and had a change 
in household composition, while going on to complete the program.  Of those, only three 
households moved at the same time or soon after a change in household composition, which may 
indicate that there was a relationship between the change in household composition and the move.  
The other households had a change in household composition that occurred at a different time than 
the move and the move is likely to be because of a reason other than the change in household. Of 
note, with those much smaller numbers for HCV households, we can be less certain of drawing 
conclusions with that combination, but this analysis suggests that there is not a strong relationship 
between moving and change in household composition change.  
Table 5-24. HCV FSS Participants who moved and had a household change while enrolled in FSS.  
 Moved HH Change Both Moved and 
HH Change 
Moved at or 
soon after HH 
change 
Left FSS 53 41 17 3 
Completed FSS  31 30 14 3 
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This analysis determined that moving while enrolled in the FSS program did not create a 
disruption effect that would lead to the HCV households who moved to be more likely to leave the 
FSS program prior to FSS completion than the households that did not move.  Due to the mechanics 
of survival analysis, households that remained in the FSS period for a longer period of time had 
more time to move while enrolled in the FSS program.  As a robustness check, I examined the 
households that moved early in their FSS participation, within the first 24 months, and the 
households that did not move at all.  I confirmed that the HCV households that moved from one 
rental unit to another using their voucher while enrolled in the FSS program were not more likely 
to leave the FSS program than the households that remained in the same rental unit for the duration 
of their FSS participation.  In fact, the HCV households that moved during the first 24 months of 
FSS participation were significantly (p<0.001) more likely to remain in the FSS program than 
households that remained in the same rental unit for the duration of their FSS participation.  
 
Table 5-25. HCV Log Rank Test of Equivalency: HCV Households that Moved within the first 24 months of 
FSS program participation 
 Observed Expected 
0 209 185.15 
1 40 63.85 
Total 249 249.00 
Chi2: 13.54          Pr>Chi2: 0.0002 
The above table shows there were 40 HCV households that moved within the first 24 
months of their FSS participation who left the FSS program prior to completion.  If HCV 
households who moved and those who did not move had an equal likelihood of leaving FSS prior 
to completion, there would have been about 63 households who moved, rather than the 40 
households that did move.   
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This section shows that household characteristics are related to FSS program outcome, but 
not in the way originally hypothesized.  Having children in the household did not explain the 
likelihood of FSS exit. Like the public housing households, HCV FSS participants who moved 
with their voucher or had changes in household composition were more likely to remain in the FSS 
program than households that did not. Changes in household composition and moves appear to be 
positive changes for a household that were not disruptions to prevent the participant from 
completing the FSS program.  
5.3.2 Section 4: Hypothesis 2: Program Characteristics 
The prior section examined the household characteristics and their relationship to the 
household’s FSS outcomes.  This section examines the impact of two program characteristics: the 
increased minimum rent policy, and the escrow savings account.  Two hypotheses are tested in 
this section.  The first is that that households that paid the increased minimum rent of $150 prior 
to enrolling in the FSS program will be highly likely to complete the FSS program than households 
that did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to entering the FSS program. The increased 
minimum rent policy is unique to HACP, which used its MTW status to develop the policy in 
2010. HACP is the only housing authority in the country with this program.  For that reason, there 
haven’t been prior studies to guide this part of the analysis. The alternative is that households that 
paid the minimum rent of $150 will be more likely to withdraw from the FSS program because 
they may have enrolled in the FSS program only to avoid paying the increased minimum rent and 
not because of a genuine interest in participating in the program.   
The second hypothesis is that participants that do not have money in its escrow account 
will be more likely to withdraw from the FSS program.  There are two reasons for this.  First, the 
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escrow account is an important incentive for remaining in the program. As a participant’s escrow 
account increases, the participant has greater incentive to remain in the program to receive the 
funds as a lump sum when they complete the 60-month program. The second reason is that 
participants that do not have savings in the escrow account will be more likely to withdraw from 
the program because those households have not experienced an increase in earnings during the 
program, which is a signal that the program is not helping that person to achieve self-sufficiency. 
If the participant has not had an increase in income while enrolled in the FSS program, they may 
leave the program because they were not receiving any financial benefits from participating.  
 
5.3.2.1 Increased Minimum Rent  
This sub-section determines whether households that paid the increased minimum rent 
prior to enrolling in the FSS program will be more likely to remain in the program so that they will 
not have to pay the increased minimum rent when they leave FSS before completion of the 
program.  
 
Table 5-26. HCV Households that Paid Increased Minimum Rent Before Enrolling in FSS  
 N % 
No Min Rent Before FSS 487 72.8 
Min Rent Before FSS 181 27.1 
Total  669 99.9 
 
The below Kaplan-Meier survival estimate shows that the participants who paid increased 
minimum rent prior to enrolling in the FSS program were more likely to remain in the FSS program 
than those who did not.  This is contrary to the findings of the Public Housing analysis which 
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showed that there was not a significant difference in FSS completion between those who did and 
did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment.  
[See Appendix Figure 14. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for HCV Households that Paid 
Increased Minimum Rent Prior to FSS.] 
This analysis shows that the hypothesis was correct, households that paid the increased 
minimum rent prior to entering the FSS program were more likely to complete the program than 
households that did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to enrolling in the FSS program.  
The below log-rank test for equality shows that households that paid the increased minimum rent 
before entering FSS were significantly more likely to remain in the FSS program.   
 
Table 5-27. Log-Rank Test of Equivalency HCV Households that Paid Increased Minimum Rent 
 Observed 
Events 
Expected 
Events 
No Min Rent Before FSS 216 176.36 
Min Rent Before FSS    46 85.64 
Total 262 262 
Chi2 = 27.55       Pr>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
5.3.2.2 Escrow Savings 
The hypothesis is that HCV households that have higher than median escrow savings will 
be more likely to remain in the FSS program than households that have low levels of escrow 
savings.  There are two reasons for this.  First, households that have a high level of escrow savings 
will be more likely to remain in the FSS program so that they will receive those funds in a lump 
sum upon FSS completion.  The second reason is that escrow savings is a sign of increased income, 
which likely means that the household is successful in the FSS program, if they are achieving 
positive outcomes, they will be more likely to stick with the program that is working. The median 
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cumulative savings was just $214, and the average is $2,075. Table 5-26 below shows the average 
and median escrow savings by FSS outcomes.  
 
Table 5-28. HCV FSS Participants with Escrow Savings by FSS Outcome 
 Completed FSS Left FSS Moved from 
HACP 
Average Escrow Savings $5,624 $886 $2,083 
Median Escrow Savings $3,348 $22 $323 
Range of Escrow Savings $0-29,403 $0-20,782 $0-30,452 
 
The alternative explanation is that households that completed the FSS program are likely 
to have higher levels of escrow savings in part because they spent more time in the program and 
had more time to accrue savings. HCV households who left HACP housing often are able to keep 
their escrow savings, particularly if they are moving to home ownership or to market-rate rental 
housing. 
Of the HCV households who left the FSS program prior to completion, only 23 households 
had escrow savings of more than $2,200.  Of the households who left FSS with calculated escrow 
savings, a few patterns emerged.  First, there were many households who earned very little income 
at the time of FSS enrollment, and when they gained employment, their income increased 
significantly, typically to more than $20,000, and their escrow savings accumulated quickly.  With 
increased incomes and savings, those households tended to leave the FSS program soon after 
gaining employment. Most of those households were before the midpoint of the program and may 
have not wanted to continue with the program if they achieved their goal of finding employment. 
Of the 23 HCV households that left the FSS program with escrows savings of more than $2,200, 
nine participants fell into this category.  
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The second pattern that emerged were households that earned little income when they 
enrolled in the FSS program, the participant earned very little income when they enrolled in the 
FSS program, obtained employment, and started earning wages of more than $20,000, but then 
lost the job while still in the FSS program and received public assistance funds through TANF, 
SNAP, general assistance or social security.  These households tended to participate in the FSS 
program for a longer period of time, many of them remaining for 55 months before leaving the 
program.  Those participants may have met the graduation requirements prior to month 60 and 
graduated from the FSS program early. Many of these exits from the FSS program may have been 
involuntary after the participant failed to meet the program requirements. This was the case of 10 
of the 23 households.   
The remaining four households that did not fall into one of these two categories either had 
extremely low incomes at the time that they enrolled in the FSS program and while their incomes 
remained low, were able to accumulate some escrow savings while enrolled in the program, or did 
not seem to have a discernable pattern.  Like the public housing households, it is possible that 
some of these participants withdrew some of the escrow savings for education or job-related 
expenses during the program and did not actually forfeit escrow funds.  
 [See Appendix Figure 14. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for HCV Households that Paid 
Increased Minimum Rent Prior to FSS.] 
 
Table 5-29 below shows the log rank test of equivalency which shows that households that 
had escrow savings above the median were significantly more likely to remain in the FSS program 
than those who did not.   
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Table 5-29. Log Rank Test of Equivalency HCV FSS Participants with Escrow Savings Above Median  
 Events Observed Events Expected 
Escrow Savings Above Med. 174 84.50 
Escrow Savings Below Med. 88 177.50 
Total 262 262 
Chi2 = 149.63             Pr>Chi = 0.000 
 
This section shows that HCV households that paid the increased minimum rent and had 
escrow savings above the median were more likely to remain in the FSS program.  This is different 
than the findings for the public housing FSS participants, which showed no statistical difference 
in the likelihood of FSS completion between the households that did and did not pay increased 
minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment.   Both HCV and PH FSS participants with higher levels of 
escrow savings were more likely to remain in the FSS program than those who did not for both 
public housing and HCV. The escrow savings accrued while the participant was in the program, 
therefore, residents who remained in the program for a longer period of time, had a greater 
opportunity to accumulate escrow savings.  The opportunity to receive the escrow savings is a 
strong incentive for the participants for both the public housing and housing choice voucher 
programs, who have saved money to remain in the FSS program until graduation.  As explained 
in Chapter 3, residents accumulate escrow savings when their incomes increase.  As the 
participant’s income increases, their rent is recalculated to reflect 30% of the household’s income, 
but rather than paying the difference in rent to the housing authority, the FSS participant is able to 
divert that increased amount into an escrow savings account, which the participant in able to 
withdraw in a lump sum upon graduation from the FSS program.  The escrow savings is a strong 
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incentive for residents to remain in the FSS program, but only for those participants who have 
experienced an increase in income and have been able to acquire savings.  For the participants who 
have not had an increase in income, it is not a strong incentive.  Residents of both the public 
housing and the HCV program who remained in the FSS program for the full 60 months were more 
likely to have an increase in income and escrow savings.  
5.4 Logistic Regression 
This previous section tested the hypotheses that HCV household characteristics or program 
characteristics may explain exit from the FSS program.  The univariate analysis showed that HCV 
households with a change in household composition, participants who moved using their voucher, 
households that paid increased minimum rent, and HCV households that had escrow savings above 
the median were statistically more less likely to leave the FSS program than households that did 
not have those characteristics.  This section will use multivariate regression analysis to further 
explore those findings and see if they remain true in a multivariate analysis.   
Model 1 tests the household and program characteristics used in the univariate analysis to 
show that in the multivariate regression analysis, participants in an HCV household that had a 
change in household composition during FSS participation were significantly, at the 5% level, less 
likely to leave the FSS program prior to month 60 than those who did not experience a change.  
Those participants who moved using their housing choice voucher were more likely (10% level) 
to remain in the program.  The multivariate analysis did not include escrow savings as a variable 
because it was so closely related to success in the program.  As explained in the prior section, 
households who remained in the FSS program for a longer length of time and had higher increases 
 189 
in income had higher levels of escrow savings.  Because the variable was so closely related to 
success in the program, it was omitted from the logistic regression.  
Model 2 includes location fixed effects to determine whether there is a relationship between 
housing location by zip code and FSS program exit. The results for this model were very similar 
to the others.  HCV residents in zip code 15211, which covers Mount Washington and Duquesne 
Heights were significantly (at the 10% level) more likely to complete the FSS program than 
households living in other zip codes.   
Model 3 examines the data to determine whether there are cohort effects and systematic 
differences depending upon the year that the FSS participant entered the program.  This analysis 
finds that participants that entered the program in 2012 were statistically (at the 5% level) less 
likely to leave the program prior to completion and those that entered in 2013 were statistically 
(10%) level less likely to leave the program than those that entered during other years.  Like the 
public housing analysis, those that entered in years 2016 and 2017 were dropped from the analysis.  
When controlling for cohort effects, households that moved with their vouchers were not more 
likely to complete the FSS program, suggesting that the households that moved being more likely 
to complete the program may be related to when they entered the program.  
Model 4 shows that controlling for the age and sex of the head of household, participants 
with change in the household composition were statistically less likely (at the 1% level) to leave 
the FSS program prior to completion. Households that moved using their vouchers were also less 
likely (at the 5% level) to leave the FSS program prior to completion.  
Table 5-30. Logistic Regression Model 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Children 0.7465909 0.652413 0.6621437 0.6449482 
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Household 
Change 
0.3432417*** 0.3399558*** 0.2881029*** 0.3082136*** 
Moved with 
HCV 
0.4107304** 0.3795965** 0.6385128 0.3793532** 
Income at 
Entry 
Above Med. 
1.069746 1.022253 1.273124 1.67848 
Paid 
Increased 
Min. Rent 
0.7493885 0.8536645 0.3905519** 0.8907111 
Location FE  X   
Year of FSS 
Entry FE 
  X  
Age/Sex FE    X 
N 333 315 298 269 
R2 0.0782 0.1077 0.1746 0.1911 
*p <0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01 
 
The findings of the multivariate logistic regression are similar to the findings of the 
univariate analysis in the prior section with some exceptions.  Paying the increased minimum rent 
prior to FSS entry did not predict FSS program outcome, except when controlling for the year of 
FSS program entry.  Households that moved with their voucher while enrolled in the FSS program 
were more likely to complete the FSS program, except when controlling for year of program entry.  
 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter shows that the HCV households that participated in the FSS program were 
similar to the public housing participants, in some regards but not all.  FSS outcomes were not 
affected by children in the household or the income level at the time of FSS entry.  Changes in 
 191 
household composition, moving within HACP housing were shown through the survival estimates 
and log rank test of equivalency and logistic regression that they were significantly related to FSS 
outcomes.  The survival estimate and the log-rank test of equivalency showed that households that 
paid the increased minimum rent were more likely to complete the FSS program than those who 
did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to FSS participation, however, the logistic regression 
showed that paying increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment was not significantly related 
to the outcome.  
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6.0 Discussion of Findings and Conclusion 
This chapter concludes this study with a brief review of the study, an overview of the key 
findings, and a thorough discussion of the findings of the study including a comparison of the 
outcomes of the public housing (PH) and Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) participants, a review 
of the impact of household composition and changes in the household, a discussion of the location 
of the FSS participant’s housing and moves within Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh 
(HACP) housing and moves from HACP housing. In this, I will also discuss the impact of the 
financial incentives of the FSS program — the escrow savings accounts and the increased 
minimum rent policy. I will then revisit the arguments that I raised in the introduction and provide 
evidence from this study to further support those arguments. Following that discussion of the key 
findings, I will summarize the findings and will conclude the chapter by situating this study into 
the academic literature, with suggestions for policy design and future research.     
6.1  Study Overview  
This study confirmed the findings of prior studies of FSS programs that showed that despite 
FSS leading to higher incomes and levels of savings for some participants, there is a very high rate 
of attrition from the FSS program (Silva et al, 2011; HUD, 2011; Lee & McNamara, 2018; Rohe 
& Kleit, 1997; Kleit & Rohe, 2005; Ficke & Piesse, 2004; Anthony, 2005). While there is 
agreement in the literature about the outcomes, there is inconclusive analysis for the prospective 
reasons for the high attrition rates from the program. This gap is filled by an examination of the 
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differences in the participants’ characteristics of the PH and HCV participants and their outcomes 
from the FSS program — completion of the 60-month program, those who left FSS prior to the 
end of 60 months, those who moved from the HACP housing program while enrolled in the FSS, 
and those who remained in the FSS program on the last day of the study period, October 1, 2017.  
If this study only focused on those who successfully completed the FSS program, my study would 
be limited to 191 public housing households and 72 housing choice voucher households.  By 
looking at the FSS from a different perspective, my study included 1,058 public housing 
households and 669 housing choice voucher participants, which led to a richer analysis of the 
outcomes of those who enrolled in the FSS program.  It is important to consider the outcomes of 
all FSS participants, including HCV residents because there are some important differences 
between these two groups of housing residents in Pittsburgh.   
This study addressed three research questions. 1.) What are the outcomes of FSS 
participation? 2.) When do FSS participants leave the program? 3.) What explains exit from the 
FSS program? To answer the third question, I tested two hypotheses related to program and 
participant characteristics.  The first hypothesis was that participant characteristics: children in the 
household, changes in the household composition, housing location, moves within HACP housing, 
and income at FSS entry may explain a participant’s likelihood of completing the program.  The 
second hypothesis was that the participant’s likelihood of completing the FSS program could be 
explained by program characteristics: whether the participant lived in public housing or had a 
housing choice voucher, whether the household paid increased minimum rent prior to entering the 
program, and whether the household had escrow savings above or below the median.  
This study analyzed administrative data collected by HACP from January 1, 2010 to 
October 1, 2017.  The data was collected by HACP on the standard HUD-50058 form in 
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accordance with HUD regulations.  The primary purpose of data collection is to confirm program 
eligibility, measure occupancy, and calculate rent payments. However, the data also include 
information about household characteristics including, age, sex, race, ethnicity, number of 
household members, age of household members, whether the household participated in the FSS 
program, income, changes in income, locations of housing, and changes in location of housing. 
Entries were made when the household entered HACP housing and then on a biennial basis, unless 
the household had a change in income or household composition in the interim.  A final entry is 
also recorded when the household leaves HACP housing.  This dataset allowed me to calculate 
length of FSS participation and examine key household and program characteristics that may have 
affected the households’ outcomes.   
Because I was interested in examining length of FSS participation, I used an event history 
framework to calculate length of participation among the public housing and housing choice 
voucher participants, based on certain household and program characteristics.  Using event history 
analysis not only allowed me to examine those who left the FSS program prior to completion, but 
the framework also handles attrition well.  If I had conducted a panel study, I would have been 
limited to studying the households that completed the program and had 60 observations.  Using an 
event history analysis framework allowed me to examine the households that had fewer 
observations either because they withdrew from the program, moved from HACP housing during 
the study period, or remained in the FSS program at the end of the study period.  By using binary 
variables, I was able to group the participants and compare the outcomes for those groups using 
the Kaplan Meier survival estimates and Log Rank test of equivalency.  After conducting the 
univariate analysis, I then used a logistic regression to conduct a multivariate analysis of the 
households that completed and withdrew from the FSS program.   
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6.2  Findings  
6.2.1 Research Question 1: What are the outcomes of the FSS program? 
The possible outcomes for the FSS participants are:  
1) Completed 60 months in the FSS program;  
2) Left the FSS program prior to completion but remained in and HACP housing program; 
3) Moved from an HACP housing program while enrolled in the FSS program; or  
4) Remained in the FSS program on the final day of the study period, October 1, 2017.   
For reference, the table displaying the number of public housing and housing choice 
voucher households with each outcome is below4.   
Table 6-1. Outcomes of FSS participants between January 2010 and October 2017 
 Withdrew 
from FSS 
Completed 
FSS 
Moved from 
HACP Housing 
Right 
Censored 
Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Public 
Housing 
202        43.5 191         72.6 436        77.3 229        52.5 1,058    61.3 
Housing 
Choice 
Voucher 
262        56.5 72            27.4 128        22.7 207        47.5 669        38.7 
Total  464         100.0 263         100.0 564     100.0 436        100.0 1,727   100.0 
 
My first conclusion is that there are significant differences between the outcomes of the 
PH and HCV households. Table 6-1 shows that more than half, or 61.3%, of FSS participants, 
 
4 This table does not include the FSS participants who enrolled in the program prior to the beginning of the 
study period. Those participants were discussed in chapters 4 and 5.  
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were public housing residents.  There were far fewer HCV residents enrolled in the program, 
despite there being more households in HCV housing than public housing.5   
There stark differences between the PH and HCV participants continue throughout the 
study.  Of the FSS participants who completed the FSS program, 191, or 72.6%, were public 
housing residents and only 72, or 27.4% were HCV households.  This shows that there were far 
fewer HCV participants who completed the 60-month program during the study period. This 
research provides evidence to support the argument that PH and HCV participants may need to 
have FSS programs that are tailored to better meeting their needs. As discussed in Chapter 2, prior 
research has focused on successful PH participants in the FSS program, but few studies have 
included the HCV participants or compared the differences in outcomes among the participants of 
the two different housing programs.  By looking at the data a different way, we see that 191 of the 
1,058, or 18.1%, of public housing households that enrolled in the FSS program during the study 
period completed the FSS program compared to the 72 of the 669, or 10.8%, HCV households that 
enrolled in the FSS program during the study period.  The HCV households are far less likely to 
initially enroll in the FSS program, and when they do enroll, they are far less likely to complete 
the FSS program than the PH households. With that in mind, the analysis shows that a small 
proportion of both PH and HCV households complete the programs, but the completion rate is far 
worse for the HCV households.  
As expected, a high number of FSS participants from both the PH and HCV programs 
withdrew from the FSS program prior to completion.  Of the 1,058 public housing participants, 
202, or 19.1%, withdrew from the program but remained in HACP housing.  Of the 669 HCV 
 
5 At the beginning of the study period, there were 4,463 HCV non-elderly/non-disabled households and 2,879 
public housing non-elderly/non-disabled households (HACP, MTW Plan 2017). 
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households in the FSS program, 262, or 39.1%, withdrew from the FSS program, but continued to 
use their voucher.  When comparing FSS program exits of the public housing and the HCV 
households, we see that more HCV households in raw numbers withdrew from the FSS program 
than public housing households, despite there being many more PH households enrolled in the 
program.  This shows that the HCV households were far more likely to withdraw from the FSS 
program but remain in HACP housing that the public housing participants.  This was expected 
because it is typically easier for those in public housing to access the services because they are 
often offered on-site.  A study from Kleit and Rohe (2015) suggests that contact with FSS service 
coordinator is an important determinant of success.  Because PH residents live in housing that is 
owned and managed by the housing authority, it is much easier for public housing residents to 
have regular contact with the service coordinator than housing choice voucher households that live 
farther away from the HACP properties. As explained in Chapter 2, FSS participants work closely 
with their service coordinator to develop their Individual Training and Service Plan (ITSP), which 
lays out the participant’s plan for overcoming the barriers to self-sufficiency including the services 
the resident will receive and the incremental milestones they will meet. The proximity of the PH 
FSS residents to their service coordinators and services may explain why there is a significant 
difference between the likelihood of an HCV participant and a public housing participant leaving 
the FSS program prior to completion.  
Additional evidence of these differences between the PH and HCV households’ length of 
FSS participation is shown in the Kaplan Meier survival estimate in Figure 6-1. The top line 
represents the survival estimate for the public housing participants while the bottom line represents 
the survival estimate for the HCV households. The graph shows that the FSS participants with a 
housing choice voucher are significantly more likely to leave the FSS program prior to completion 
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than the FSS participants who lived in public housing.   That is further confirmed by log rank test 
of equivalency, see Table 6-2 below.  
 
Figure 6-1. Kaplan- Meier survival estimates public housing and housing choice voucher FSS participants 
 
Again, the results of the log rank test of equivalency shows that the housing choice voucher 
participants are significantly (p<0.001) more likely to withdraw from the FSS program prior to 
completion than the participants who lived in public housing. If the public housing and housing 
choice voucher participants were equally likely to exit the FSS program, there would be 299 public 
housing households leaving the FSS program and 165 HCV participants leaving the program. 
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Table 6-2. Log Rank Test of Equivalency for Public Housing and Housing Choice Voucher FSS Participants 
 Events Observed Events Expected  
Public Housing 202 299.2 
Housing Choice 
Voucher 
262 164.8 
Total 464 464.0 
Chi2 = 91.60    Pr>chi2 = 0.0000 
  
When evaluating the outcomes of the FSS program, I also analyzed the demographic 
characteristics of households to determine whether there were any discernable patterns that 
warranted further examination.  As in other FSS studies, the PH and the HCV FSS participants in 
Pittsburgh did not have significant differences in terms of sex, race, ethnicity or marital status.  As 
explained in Chapters 4 and 5, the majority of PH and HCV FSS participants in Pittsburgh were 
unmarried African American women who had children in the household. This is consistent with 
prior studies of FSS program participants which showed that differences in FSS outcomes are not 
attributable to these participant characteristics (Anthony, 2005; Kleit and Rohe, 2015).  
A striking outcome that was less expected was the high number of public housing 
households that moved from HACP while enrolled in the FSS program.  Table 6-1 in the previous 
section shows the outcomes of the public housing and housing choice voucher households.  The 
436 public housing participants that moved from HACP housing while enrolled in FSS represent 
the largest group of FSS participants who enrolled in the program after January 1, 2010.  Of those 
436 public housing households that moved from HACP housing while enrolled in the FSS 
program, 308, or 70.6%, were under the age of 30.  This represents another key difference between 
the public housing and the HCV households.  The public housing households, particularly those 
with a head of household under the age of 30 are far more likely to move from HACP public 
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housing than the HCV households.  There are two possible explanations for this.  First, as 
explained in Chapter 5, the public housing FSS participants tended to be younger than the HCV 
participants.  For those young public housing residents, a five-year program may be too long for 
those residents and they may be better served by a shorter program.  The second explanation, as 
shown in Chapter 2, significant numbers of public housing units were demolished during the study 
period.  Many of those moves may have been involuntary because of a development was rebuilt 
or closed.  
HCV participants were less likely move from HACP housing. Only 128, or 19.1, of the 
HCV households left HACP housing during the study period.  HCV households with a head of 
household under the age of 30 were less likely to move, with only 37 (28.9%) of the 128 housing 
choice voucher households that moved during the FSS program. This may signal that the housing 
choice voucher residents were more satisfied with their housing than the public housing residents. 
Unfortunately, information about tenants that leave HACP housing has not been collected in a 
systematic way.  Having more information about participants who move from HACP housing and 
whether they moved to market-rate housing, were evicted, or moved in with friends or family, 
would be helpful.  It would allow us to determine whether the FSS program is providing the 
resources needed for those households to achieve self-sufficiency even if they did not complete 
the full 60 months in the program.  The FSS program should be more flexible to meet client needs. 
The program could be shorter or longer, depending upon the needs of the participants.   
Further examination revealed that the public housing participants tended to be younger 
than their housing choice voucher counterparts. Of the public housing FSS participants, 852 
(51.6%) were under the age of 30. Housing Choice Voucher heads of households were more evenly 
distributed by age, with 373 (30.9%) heads of household under the age of 30.   
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Table 6-3. Outcomes of Public Housing and Housing Choice Voucher FSS Participants Under the Age of 30.  
 Completed FSS Withdrew from 
FSS 
Moved from 
HACP 
Right Censored Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
Public 
Housing 
84 14.0 92 15.3 308 51.3 116 19.3 600 99.9 
Housing 
Choice 
Voucher 
8 4.1 93 47.2 37 18.8 59 29.9 197 100 
 
This section has shown that there are significant differences between the PH and the HCV 
FSS participants which suggest that the standard FSS program may not meet the needs of these 
two distinct groups of program participants.  For instance, young public housing residents under 
the age of 30 were more likely to move from HACP housing while enrolled in the FSS program, 
while that was not true of the young HCV participants.  While the young HCV participants were 
not more likely to move than the older HCV residents, very few, only 8, completed the FSS 
program.  That suggests that the FSS program wasn’t meeting the needs of the young HCV 
participants either.  A program that recognizes the needs of young participants and is tailored to 
the needs of participants under the age of 30 may lead to higher success rates.  It may also help 
those young residents to gain critical skills and begin to establish a strong work history at a young 
age which may lead to higher incomes and reduced reliance on housing subsidies in later years.  
The FSS program represents an opportunity for young residents to gain education, earn a 
GED, receive job training, and establish work history at a young age, all of which contribute to 
their employment and financial status later in life.  However, the high number of moves suggests 
that the five-year FSS program is not the most appropriate program for young public housing 
residents who are more mobile than the older public housing and housing choice voucher residents.  
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While HCV FSS participants under the age of 30 are less likely to move than the young public 
housing FSS participants, only 8, or 4.1%, of the 197 HCV participants under the age of 30 
completed the FSS program, compared with 84, of 14%, of the young public housing participants.  
 
6.2.2 Research Question 2: When do FSS participants enter and exit from the FSS 
program?  
The research shows that contrary to my expectations, there is no seasonal variability in 
entry or exit from the FSS program.  My analysis of the seasonal effects shows there was one point 
in the program, March 2013 for HCV residents, when there was a higher than usual number of 
exits. If there was a significant change in program operation or quality of services during the study 
period, there may have been a noticeable exit from participants.  The sudden spike of 63 FSS exits 
from the HCV households in March of 2013 (see Figure 5-2) seems to be an isolated event, and 
may have reflected a data correction by HACP or a concentrated review and dismissal of those 
who were failing to meet FSS program requirements. 
This research showed that there were no points in the FSS program where participants 
exited. There is also no difference in this between PH and HCV households.  I introduced this 
question because Santiago, Galster, and Smith identified critical points, after 4 months, after 12 
months, and after 24 months, when the participants of an enhanced FSS program in Denver were 
more likely to leave the program (Santiago et. al, 2017).  My findings from the HACP case study 
showed that there were not identifiable points in the FSS program when PH or HCV participants 
were more likely to leave. 
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My conclusion was further supported by the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates that showed 
that decline in FSS participation was gradual for both the public housing and housing choice 
voucher participants. I had expected to find that there was an increased likelihood of exit from the 
FSS program after the first or second year, and was surprised to find that exit from the FSS program 
was not time dependent.  This analysis of exits from the FSS program also showed that exit from 
the FSS program could not be explained by length of time in the program, or by the calendar date, 
and may be related to other factors, which were tested in the final section of the analysis.  
This study is unique because it considers the role that time, measured as both calendar time 
and length of time in the program, may have on FSS enrollment and exit.  Prior FSS studies have 
not used the event history analysis framework, and, with the exception of Santiago, Galster, and 
Smith’s 2017 article, the literature tends to focus on explaining success or failure in the FSS 
program without looking at the relationship of time to the outcomes.  While the analysis of time 
of exit and length of program participation do not explain program exit, confirming that there isn’t 
a time when participants are more likely to leave the program is important to policymakers and 
our understanding of program participation.  
 
6.2.3 Research Question 3: What explains withdraw from the FSS program prior to 
completion?  
After identifying the PH and HCV households that completed and withdrew from the FSS 
program, and determining that exit from the FSS program could not be explained by time, I tested 
two additional hypotheses for explaining FSS program exit: household characteristics and program 
characteristics.  This study finds that household characteristics — children in the household, 
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changes in household composition, and moves within HACP housing programs — do not explain 
the household’s likelihood of completing the FSS program.  This study found that public housing 
households earning less than $10,000 when they enrolled in the FSS program were significantly 
(p<0.10) less likely to leave the FSS program than households with incomes higher than $10,000, 
and public housing households that reported no income at FSS enrollment were also significantly 
(p<0.05) less likely to leave the FSS program than households with higher earnings at FSS 
enrollment. This was not true for the HCV households, where income at FSS entry was not 
significantly related to the length of FSS participation.  
This study also examined three program characteristics: 1) whether the FSS participant 
paid increased minimum rent prior to FSS entry, 2) whether the household had escrow savings, 
and 3) compared the outcomes of the public housing and HCV households which were discussed 
in the first section of this chapter.  This study found that the public housing households that paid 
increased minimum rent prior to FSS entry were significantly (p< 0.10) less likely to leave the FSS 
program prior to completion that the public housing households that did not pay the increased 
minimum rent prior to enrollment.  For the HCV households, those that paid the increased 
minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment were significantly (p<0.001) less likely to withdraw from 
the FSS program than the HCV households that did not pay the increased minimum rent. The study 
also found that both public housing and housing choice voucher households that had escrow 
savings above the median were significantly (p<0.001) less likely to leave the program prior to 
completion than participants with escrow savings below the median.   
A thorough discussion of these findings is provided in the remainder of this section.  
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6.2.3.1  Hypothesis 1: Household Characteristics 
The household characteristics tested in Chapters 4 and 5, examined household composition, 
change in household composition, household location, change in household location within HACP 
housing, and income at time of FSS program entry.  These variables test three important questions 
that were raised in the literature.  The first was the impact of having children in the household.  
Having children in the household could lead to participants leaving the FSS program because of 
having childcare responsibilities that made it difficult to complete the program.  
Some prior studies (Kleit & Rohe, 2015; Van Ryzin, et al., 2001) suggest that due to the 
lack of variation in the household characteristics, it is difficult to use household characteristics to 
predict a household’s success in the FSS program, while others found that household 
characteristics such as: children in the household (Lee & McNamara, 2018; Rohe & Kleit, 1997; 
Wood, et al., 2008), adults in the household (Shroder, 2002), family obligations (HUD, 2011), 
marital status (Anthony 2005) do impact FSS outcomes.  This study found that children in the 
household did not impact the public housing or HCV participant’s FSS outcomes, and because so 
few participants were married, marital status were not tested.    
 
Changes in Household Composition 
During the 5-year FSS program, many public housing and HCV participants experienced 
changes in their households.  The changes included new babies and children joining the household, 
adults entering and exiting the household, or children reaching adulthood.  I hypothesized that 
those changes in the household could impact the household’s likelihood of the household 
completing the FSS program.  Any change in the number of household members could create a 
change in the functioning of the household, and those changes may lead to financial changes or 
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changes in childcare responsibilities, which may create barriers to completing the FSS program.  
In addition to the logistical challenges that may arise when household members enter or exit the 
household, there may also be emotional stress as well that could impact the likelihood that an FSS 
member is able to complete the program.   
In both the PH and HCV households, those that experienced a change in household 
composition were statistically more likely (p<0.001) to complete the FSS program than those who 
did not experience a change in household composition. This is contrary to the hypothesis that 
changes in household composition would lead the participant to be less likely to complete the FSS 
program.  Due to the mechanics of the survival analysis, the households that remained in the FSS 
program for a longer time period had more time to experience a change in household composition 
during FSS participation.  When I conduced the same analysis for the FSS participants who 
experienced a change in household composition within the first 24 months of FSS participation, I 
found that the public housing participants with a change early in FSS participation were more 
likely, but not significantly more likely (p<0.18), to remain in the FSS program.  HCV households 
that experienced a change in household composition were slightly less likely to complete the FSS 
program than those who did not experience a change in household composition.  For the public 
housing households, my hypothesis that changes is household composition may increase the 
likelihood that the participant does not complete the FSS program was incorrect.  Changes in 
household composition did not decrease the likelihood of the public housing participant’s 
completing the program.  For the HCV households, the hypothesis may be correct, but additional 
analysis is necessary to better understand what types of changes impact the likelihood of 
completing the FSS program.  
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Table 6-4 shows that housing choice voucher households were also far more likely to 
experience a change in household composition than public housing households.  
 
Table 6-4 Comparison of Household Change in Public Housing and HCV Households that did not complete 
the FSS program 
 Household Change No Household Change Total 
 N % N % N % 
Public Housing 62 30.7 140 69.3 202 43.5 
Housing 
Choice 
Voucher 
219 83.6 41 15.6 262 56.5 
Total 281 60.6 181 39.0 464 100 
 
 
Location and moves within HACP housing 
This study did not find that the location of public housing and HCV participants had a 
strong impact on the household’s FSS outcomes, but the small number of FSS participants in each 
public housing development and zip code, made it difficult to conduct a statistical analysis of the 
relationship between housing location and FSS program outcomes.   
While public housing residents are limited in their housing options to the available public 
housing units operated by HACP, voucher households may have more flexibility in choosing their 
home.  However, there are still some constraints of the housing options for voucher households 
because they must find a landlord who is willing to accept the housing choice voucher and offer a 
unit that passes the physical inspection and has a rent that is under the fair market rent.  These 
criteria restrict the number of housing options for voucher households and causes HCV households 
to be clustered in lower-income neighborhoods.  Prior studies of the relationship between housing 
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location and employment outcomes have had mixed results with some studies finding that physical 
proximity to jobs was associated with higher wages (Allard & Danzinger, 2002) while another 
study found no connection between location and employment (Hu & Giulano, 2017).  Other studies 
(Oakley & Burchfield, 2019; Zuberi, 2010) suggest that housing location alone does not lead to 
higher incomes and the availability of social services is important. Studies of HCV households 
also had mixed results with one study (Lee, et al., 2017) finding that residents still live in high 
poverty neighborhoods, while other studies found that voucher residents who got jobs moved to 
lower-poverty neighborhoods (Shen & Sanchez, 2005) or moved to neighborhoods with better 
access to jobs (Lam, 2015).  
During the five-year FSS program, many participants moved.  Of the 1,058 public housing 
FSS participants that entered FSS during the study period, 436, or 41.2%, moved out of HACP 
public housing while enrolled in the FSS program.  In addition to nearly half of public housing 
participants leaving HACP housing during the program, and additional 180, or 16.9%, moved 
within HACP housing.  These moves include voluntary and involuntary moves, and the data does 
not indicate whether these households move voluntarily or involuntarily.  Involuntarily moves 
from HACP housing may be evictions, and involuntary moves within HACP housing may be 
because of the redevelopment of the building, urgent maintenance, or being rehoused after a 
change in household composition.  During the study period, redevelopment in Addison Terrace 
started and it is likely that many of the moves from Addison Terrace were involuntary.  
Additionally, families are often rehoused when there is a change in household composition so that 
there is an appropriate number of bedrooms for the family.  Families that are in stable housing are 
able to make decisions about whether, when, and where they move (Lubell, 2015).  Involuntary 
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moves can create stress and disrupt social ties (Manzo, et al., 2008) while voluntary moves to 
better neighborhoods may reduce stress (Briggs et al., 2010).  
I expected to find that moves within HACP public housing would create a disruption that 
would make those participants less likely to complete the FSS program.  The analysis did not 
support that hypothesis and showed that public housing residents who moved while in the FSS 
program were significantly, p<0.05, less likely to leave the FSS program than participants who 
remained in the same housing unit for the duration of their FSS participation. There are several 
possible explanations for this. First, the FSS program staff could have made an additional effort to 
ensure that residents who moved continued to be supported by the FSS program’s services.  
Second, those who moved from Addison Terrace may have moved to newer housing that they 
preferred.  Third, those who moved voluntarily may have selected another housing development 
that they preferred, and were closer to family, friends, work, or other supports that increased their 
likelihood of completing the FSS program.  Like the analysis of the household composition, the 
public housing households that remained in the FSS program for a longer time period, had more 
opportunities to move while in the FSS program.  I tested the outcomes of the public housing 
participants who moved within the first 24 months of their FSS participation to the outcomes of 
the public housing participants who did not move while enrolled in the FSS program to determine 
whether there were still significant differences between to two groups. The analysis found that the 
likelihood of public housing households that moved within the first 24 months of their FSS 
participation and the public housing participants that did not move while enrolled in the FSS 
program had a nearly equal likelihood of leaving the FSS program prior to completion.  Therefore 
my hypothesis that moving within public housing created a disruption that would lead participants 
to leave the FSS program prior to completion was not supported.   
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The housing choice voucher households were less likely to leave the HACP housing 
program than the public housing residents. Of the 669 HCV households that enrolled in the FSS 
program during the study period, 128, or19.1%, moved from HACP housing and returned their 
voucher while enrolled in the FSS program.  Furthermore, of those 669 households, with an 
observed entry into the FSS program, 148, or 22.1%, moved with their housing choice voucher 
from one rental unit to another during the study period.  Like the public housing households, it is 
impossible to know whether those were voluntary or involuntary moves.  Involuntary exits from 
HACP’s voucher program may have been a result of eviction or landlord not renewing the lease 
and the voucher holder was unable to find another housing unit. While vouchers may increase a 
voucher household’s housing choices, there is still some degree of instability as landlords may 
leave the program or decide not to renew a lease (Nguyen, 2018). Voluntary moves may have been 
to homeownership, market-rate rental units, moving in with family, or leaving the area.  Moves 
with the housing choice voucher from one rental unit to another could also be voluntary or 
involuntary.  Without additional information, it is impossible to know whether those moves were 
by choice.  Reasons for involuntary moves could be that the landlord did not renew the lease, the 
rental unit did not pass inspection, or the household had a change in household composition that 
necessitated a rental unit of a different size.  Voluntary moves could include: moving to a better 
unit or moving closer to family, friends, work, or to a preferred neighborhood.  HACP voucher 
households that moved to Allegheny County are identified in the data set and were permitted to 
remain in HACP’s FSS program.  There were 48 HCV households that moved from the City of 
Pittsburgh to Allegheny County during the study period.  Of those 48 households, 7 (14.6%) left 
the FSS program prior to completion.  
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Like the public housing households, the HCV households that used their voucher to move 
from one rental unit to another rental unit during the study period were statistically (p<0.001) less 
likely to leave the FSS program than households that did not move.  Again, this contradicts the 
theory that households that moved during the FSS program would be less likely to finish due to 
the disruption of moving. When I compared the outcomes of the HCV households that moved 
within the first 24 months of FSS participation to the HCV participants who did not move while 
enrolled in the FSS program, I found that the households that moved early in FSS participation 
were significantly (p<0.001) more likely to remain in the FSS program than the HCV households 
that did not move while enrolled in the program.  These households may have been able to use 
their voucher and the flexibility of the HCV program to find housing closer to work or HACP 
services. While additional analysis is needed to determine exactly why the voucher households 
who moved were more likely to remain in the program, these results suggest that some of the 
participants were able to make positive moves. My hypothesis that moves while enrolled in the 
FSS program would create a disruption and would lead to the HCV households leaving the FSS 
program prior to completion was not supported.  
 
Income at Time of FSS Program Entry 
I expected to find that households that had higher incomes when they enrolled in the FSS 
program would be more likely to remain in the FSS program than those who had lower incomes.  
This would support the theory that prior work history explains the likelihood of success in the FSS 
program, (Anthony, 2005; Lee & McNamara, 2018; Rohe & Kleit, 1999; Santiago, Galster & 
Smith, 2017) the idea being that the FSS program may be more beneficial to residents who are 
looking for a better job than the job that they have, but they have work history and experience.  In 
order to test that theory, I found the annual median income at the time of FSS entry for both public 
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housing households, ($3,792) and housing choice voucher households ($11,848), and coded 
households as either being above or below the annual median income.   
The public housing households have extremely low annual incomes, with two-thirds of 
public housing households reporting incomes of less than $6,000 at the time of FSS program entry 
and one-third of public housing households reporting no income at all.  The analysis showed that 
having an income above or below the median for public housing households, $3,792, did not 
significantly impact the likelihood of completing the FSS program.  Because that income level was 
so low, I was interested in seeing if public housing residents earning more were more likely to 
remain in the program.  I conducted the same analysis using $10,000 as the threshold and tested 
public housing residents with an annual income above or below $10,000 at the time of FSS entry 
and found that public housing households earning less than $10,000 were significantly (p<0.10) 
less likely to leave the FSS program than households earning more than $10,000.   
A 2018 study by Lee and McNamara found that FSS benefits were greatest for those with 
little to no work history. I conducted the same analysis for public housing residents who reported 
no income at all at the time of FSS entry.  I found that those households with zero income were 
significantly (p<0.05) more likely to remain in the program than households earning an income at 
the time of FSS enrollment. This finding was significantly less important when the additional 
analysis was added with the multivariate logistic regression. The finding that households with no 
income at FSS entry is contradictory to prior studies (Anthony, 2005; Rohe & Kleit, 1999; 
Santiago, et al., 2017; MDRC, 2014) that suggest that FSS participants with prior work history are 
more successful in the FSS program than households with little or no work history.  The 
households with no income may have had the most to gain from the FSS program, as they were 
not even receiving public assistance funds such as TANF or social security at the time of their FSS 
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entry.  Households with zero income at the time of FSS entry also had more potential to increase 
their incomes while enrolled in FSS and thus to increase escrow savings.  In this study I used 
income at FSS entry as a rough proxy for work history, and of course it is likely that some of these 
participants may have worked in the past, but were unemployed when they entered the FSS 
program.  There is room for additional research on the relationship between work history and FSS 
outcomes to better understand the relationship between work history, the financial incentive of the 
escrow savings, and FSS program outcomes.  
For the housing choice voucher households, I found that there was not a significant 
difference in FSS outcomes between the HCV households that earned less than the median income 
$8,929, and those that earned less at the time of FSS enrollment.  
 
Summary of Hypothesis 1: Household Characteristics 
This analysis has shown that there are some substantial differences between the public 
housing and the HCV participants in terms of age of the head of household, likelihood of leaving 
HACP housing programs, and income at the time of FSS entry.  While public housing households 
were significantly more likely to complete the FSS program than the HCV households, these 
household characteristics did not explain that difference.   
• Having children in the household did not have a significant impact on the likelihood 
of public housing or HCV households completing the FSS program.   
 
• Change in household composition seemed to be related to positive FSS outcomes 
for both public housing and HCV households, but when considering time of change, 
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there was no difference between households with early changes in household 
composition and no change for either public housing or HCV households. 
 
• Household moves also seemed to be related to success for both the public housing 
and HCV households, but when considering the time of move, only HCV 
households were significantly (p<0.001) more likely to remain in the FSS program 
than non-movers.  Public housing households that moved within the first 24 months 
and public households that did not move while enrolled in FSS had a similar 
likelihood of completing the FSS program.  
 
• Income at FSS entry was related to FSS program success for the public housing 
households. Public housing households that had no income at FSS entry were 
significantly (p<0.05) to remain in the FSS program and public housing households 
with incomes of less than $10,000 were significantly (p<0.10) to remain in the FSS 
program than households with higher incomes at FSS enrollment.  HCV households 
with incomes above and below the median at FSS entry had a similar likelihood of 
completing the FSS program.  
6.2.3.2  Hypothesis 2: Program Characteristics 
So far, we have learned that outcomes of the FSS program are not easily explained by time 
or household characteristics. I will now discuss the test of the second hypothesis, program 
characteristics to determine whether they explain the outcomes of FSS participation.   
First, I will examine the households that paid the increased minimum rent prior to entering 
the FSS program to determine whether or not those households were significantly more likely to 
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withdraw from the FSS program prior to completion than households that did not pay the increased 
minimum rent prior to enrolling in the FSS program.  Second, I will examine the impact that 
escrow savings had on FSS participants likelihood of withdrawing from the FSS program prior to 
graduation.  
 
Increased Minimum Rent 
I expected to find that the households that paid the increased minimum rent of $150 prior 
to entering the FSS program would have different outcomes than households that did not pay the 
increased minimum rent. A review of the academic literature did not yield any studies that 
addressed the impact of an increased minimum rent policy, or other rent reform programs, on FSS 
outcomes.  A review of the annual plans and reports of the other moving to work agencies showed 
that while some housing authorities had implemented rent reform policies, none of those housing 
authorities had a policy comparable to HACP’s increased minimum rent policy.  I expected to find 
that households that paid the increased rent prior to entering the FSS program may be more likely 
to remain in the FSS program in order to avoid paying the increased minimum rent.  As long as 
those households remained in the FSS program, they could continue to pay rent based upon their 
household income, with the minimum being $25 for public housing and $50 for housing choice 
voucher households.  On the other hand, those households may be more likely to withdraw from 
the FSS program because they may have only joined the program to avoid paying the increased 
minimum rent and not because a genuine interest in participating in the program.  
The univariate analysis of the HCV data revealed that households that paid the increased 
minimum rent were significantly (p<0.001) less likely to withdraw from the FSS program than 
households that did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to enrolling in the FSS program. Of 
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the 181, or 27.1%, HCV households that paid the increased minimum rent prior to enrolling in the 
FSS program, only 46 withdrew from the FSS program during the study period.  There were 216 
households that did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment that did not 
complete the FSS program.  However, the logistic regression showed that those who paid the 
increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment were not significantly more likely to leave the 
FSS program prior to completion. The difference between these two outcomes may be that the 
univariate analysis using the Kaplan-Meier survival curve includes the households that moved 
from HACP housing and those that remained in the program at the end of the study period, while 
the logistic regression only included those that had an observed end to their FSS participation 
either by completing the 60-month program or by exiting the program.   Additionally, the number 
of households that paid the increased minimum rent and exited the FSS program prior to 
completion was only 46 households, this small number may also explain the difference in 
significance between the two models. I recommend that further analysis be conducted in the future 
when there are more observations which may lead to a more accurate analysis of the impact of the 
increased minimum rent policy on FSS completion.  
The public housing households that paid the increased minimum rent prior to FSS 
enrollment were also significantly (p<0.10) less likely to withdraw from the FSS program than the 
public housing households that did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment.  
The multivariate logistic regression showed that the households that paid the increased minimum 
rent prior to FSS enrollment were not significantly more likely to remain in the program than those 
that did not pay the increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment.  I recommend further analysis 
of the impact of the FSS program when there have been more FSS participants who have paid the 
increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment.  
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Escrow Savings 
The main incentive for households to remain in the FSS program is the escrow savings 
account. During the FSS program, participants continue to pay the rent that they paid when they 
entered the FSS program, and rather than having their rent increase when their income increases, 
participates are able to divert the would-be rent into an escrow savings account that they are able 
to withdraw upon graduation from the FSS program.  It was challenges to conduct the analysis of 
the escrow savings account because the escrow savings amount is closely tied to length of time in 
the program.  Therefore, households that remained in the program longer, tend to have higher 
amounts of escrow savings.  Despite this challenge, the analysis showed that those that completed 
the FSS program did have higher incomes and levels of savings than those who left the program 
early.  
Households that have escrow savings are expected to be less likely to withdraw from the 
FSS program because if they withdraw from the program, they will forfeit the savings in their 
accounts.  However, there were still a group of public housing and housing choice voucher 
households that left the FSS program when they may have had high levels of escrow funds.  As 
you may recall from Chapter 4, the calculation of escrow funds was not included in the data set 
and was calculated based on what the escrow funds could have been.  It is possible that the 
households that would have had considerable escrow funds may have withdrawn the money early 
for educational or employment-related expenses.  
The public housing households that may have had high levels of escrow funds when they 
left the FSS program tended to fall into one of two categories.  The first were households that had 
very low incomes when they enrolled in the FSS program and any increase in income allowed 
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them to accrue a significant amount of savings during their long participation in the FSS program.  
Those households tended to leave the FSS program in the last year, and it is likely that they were 
dismissed from the program for non-compliance.   
The second category of public housing participants who had high escrow savings when 
they left the program also had a full-time student in their household, and it is more than likely that 
they withdrew those funds for education-related expenses prior to leaving the FSS program.  This 
is evidence that the household did have an increase in household income and used the funds for an 
eligible expense, and even though they did not complete the program, the household is likely better 
off at the end of their FSS participation than at the beginning both in terms of income and 
education.   
Of the HCV households, there were only 23 FSS participants who left the FSS program 
with escrow savings of more than $2,200.  Those participants also mostly fell into one of two 
categories.  The first category is the households that enrolled in the FSS program with very low 
incomes and started earning salaries of more than $20,000 while in the program.  Those households 
accumulated escrow savings very quickly and tended to leave the FSS program shortly after 
experiencing an increase in wages.  Again, it is possible that those households had used some of 
their escrow savings for education or job-related expenses and did not actually forfeit savings of a 
few thousand dollars.  Of the 23 households that may have had escrow funds of more than $2,200 
when leaving the FSS program, nine households fell into this category.  
The second category of HCV households that left the FSS program when they may have 
had escrow savings of more than $2,200 also enrolled in the FSS program with low wages, and 
experienced a sharp increase in wages, often earning more than $15,000 or $20,000 followed by a 
sudden decrease in income when their income dropped to less than $10,000. That suggested that 
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those households were no longer earning wages and were once again receiving public assistance, 
and may not meet the requirements for FSS graduation. Those households tended to leave the FSS 
program at or around the 55-month mark. Those participant’s exit at that late point in the program 
suggests that they may have been dismissed from the program for not meeting the FSS graduation 
requirement of being free of public assistance for at least one year prior to the end of their FSS 
contract.  FSS participants who experienced a job loss may, under some circumstances have their 
FSS contract extended and remain in the FSS program for up to two additional years.  Without 
additional information about why the participant left the FSS program, it is impossible to determine 
whether those FSS exits were voluntary or involuntary. Again, it is also possible that these 
households had used their escrow savings for educational or employment-related expenses during 
the time period that they were working and did not forfeit escrow funds when they left the program.  
Without knowing whether the household had used their escrow funds for eligible expenses 
or if they forfeited those funds when they left the FSS program, it is difficult to assess the extent 
to which the escrow savings were an incentive for remaining in the program or make inferences 
about the participants decision making process.  What this calculation does offer, is a means for 
quantifying income change while in the FSS program.  What we learn from this is that even if the 
public housing or housing choice voucher household did not complete the 60-months in the FSS 
program, they may have benefitted from the program.  There may have been instances where the 
household participated in the FSS program until they secured employment, and if that was their 
ultimate goal, they stopped participating in the program.  In the case of the public housing 
households that had full-time students in the household, they may have been able to use money 
that would have been spent on rent and instead used it to pay tuition expenses.  Even though those 
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households did not complete 60-months in the program, the FSS program may have enabled them 
to obtain educational services that otherwise would have been unaffordable.  
What is distressing is the high number of public housing and housing choice voucher 
households that did not experience an increase in escrow savings, which indicates that they did not 
have an increase in income or escrow savings during their time in the program.  Many households 
from both housing programs completed 60 months in the program with little increase in income.  
Also distressing is the high number of HCV households that experienced multiple periods of 
employment and unemployment, suggesting that the linear trajectory of the FSS program, which 
was built upon the theory of change model, is not reflective of the experience of low-income 
households that are trying to obtain and retain employment.  For the households in this category, 
supportive services to help participants to keep jobs that they have may be as beneficial as the 
services to help them to obtain their first job.  
 
Summary of Hypothesis 2: Program Characteristics 
This section has shown that program characteristics may offer a better explanation of FSS 
outcomes than household characteristics.  Earlier in the chapter I compared the outcomes of the 
public housing and HCV participants and showed that the public housing participants were 
significantly more likely to remain in the FSS program than the HCV participants.  The prior 
section also tested two other program characteristics: paying increased minimum rent prior to FSS 
enrollment and escrow savings, to determine whether these program characteristics impacted FSS 
outcomes.  
• The increased minimum rent policy may have an impact on FSS outcomes, but 
further research is needed to determine how the policy affects FSS outcomes.  
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• The analysis also shows that both public housing and HCV households that had 
high levels of escrow savings were significantly more likely to remain in the FSS 
program.  
 
6.3 Summary of Findings  
This study has shown that the FSS program isn’t working as it is currently designed.  More 
participants from both public housing and housing choice voucher households drop out of the 
program than complete it, and many residents do not remain in either HACP housing program for 
the duration of the program.  Furthermore, many of the public housing households that complete 
60 months in the program do not meet the requirements to officially graduate from the program.  
This is consistent with the findings of other FSS programs reviewed in Chapter 2 (Anthony, 2005; 
Kleit & Rohe, 2005; Bloom et al., 2005; HUD, 2011; Lubell et al., 2003).  While the FSS program 
isn’t working for the majority of participants, the outcomes are significantly worse for the HCV 
participants than the PH participants.  Both the enrollment and completion rates for the HCV 
households are significantly lower than for the PH households.  The poor outcomes for both the 
HCV and PH participants is the likely explanation of low enrollment and high attrition rates.  This 
study and others (Anthony, 2005; Kleit & Rohe, 2005; HUD, 2011) have looked at the FSS 
participants and their families to try to explain their lack of success in the program.  
The program characteristics hypothesis also provided important information.  This analysis 
showed that paying increased minimum rent prior to FSS participation was not a good incentive 
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for participants to remain in the FSS program.  In this instance, finding that this policy is not 
meetings its objective of increasing FSS participation, is very important because it provides 
important information to policymakers who are considering whether to adjust the increased 
minimum rent policy.  Knowing that paying the increased minimum rent prior to FSS enrollment 
does not impact the likelihood of remaining in the FSS program may help HACP to develop a 
policy that does encourage residents not only to enroll, but to remain in the FSS program.  
This study also showed that households with escrow savings were more likely to remain in 
the FSS program that those who did not.  Escrow savings is an important incentive for residents to 
remain in the FSS program (Rohe & Kleit, 1999; Sard, 2001; Ficke & Piesse, 2004; HUD, 2011) 
and the findings of this study that households with higher escrow savings were more likely to 
complete the program were consistent with prior studies.  
The analysis of the households who left the FSS program when they may have had some 
money in the escrow account was also interesting, even if it did not provide a definitive explanation 
of the household’s decision-making process.  For instance, those households may have used their 
escrow savings for eligible education and job-related expenses while enrolled in the FSS program 
(24 CFR§305). While the data allowed for an analysis of the escrow savings, it did not provide 
any information about FSS funds used while enrolled in the FSS program.  Also, identifying 
households that may have left the program involuntarily was also interesting.  While the escrow 
savings account is an important incentive for participants to remain in the program, there are some 
households that had savings, despite not having a successful outcome in the program.  The HCV 
households that experienced periods of higher and lower employment are one important example.  
That example shows that these households did not continue to make linear progress toward self-
sufficiency and experienced periods of employment and unemployment. In general, participants 
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who are successful in the program and have increased their income significantly over a substantial 
time period have escrow savings.  For those residents, the escrow account is an incentive to remain 
in the program, but it does little to incentivize those who have not found employment and realized 
financial benefits to FSS participation.  
The differences between the public housing and HCV households in terms of age, income 
at program entry, and ease of service delivery suggests that there may be benefits to developing 
different programs for residents in public housing and the housing choice voucher program.   This 
study has shown that the public housing residents tended to be younger, have lower income, and 
be more likely to move from the FSS program during the five-year period.  For those residents, a 
different approach catering to young residents who aim to develop the skills needed to begin their 
careers and need assistance getting into the workforce may be more appropriate.  
Both of the hypotheses, household and program characteristics, provided important insight 
to the outcomes of FSS participation.  Households that experienced changes in location within 
HACP housing and had changes in household composition were more likely to remain in the FSS 
program than those that did not experience those changes.  This showed that these were positive 
changes and were not disruptive to the household’s FSS participation.  
Another interesting finding that calls the program design into question was the high number 
of young public housing residents who moved from HACP housing during the program.  For these 
household’s the five-year program was not appropriate and they may be better served by a shorter 
program.  For the HCV households that are more likely to leave FSS prior to completion, a 
different approach to provide services to help residents remain employed or find steady 
employment may be more successful.   
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The public housing and HCV housing program provides income-based rent to residents, 
which may reduce the stress and anxiety associated with high housing costs (Newman & Harkness, 
2002).  While these housing programs may provide increased stability to low-income residents, 
public housing tends to be located in low-income neighborhoods (Lee, et al., 2017) and HCV 
residents have constraints on their housing choices (Blackhurst et al., 2019), which may leave 
residents far from the services and employment opportunities they need to achieve self-sufficiency 
and transition to market rate housing.  The main assumption of the FSS program is that the PH and 
HCV programs will create stable housing that enables residents to participate in the FSS program, 
receive services, and find stable employment.  This study has shown that there is a high number 
of moves both within the PH and HCV housing programs and a high number of moves out of the 
PH and HCV housing programs.  Furthermore, public housing buildings and HCV residents tend 
to be clustered in low-income neighborhoods that are not necessarily in close proximity to services 
and jobs.  While the income-based subsidized housing programs certainly provide some level of 
stability for many families, there are many other important factors to achieving self-sufficiency 
that are not met by the FSS program. 
6.4 Surprises  
The biggest surprise was finding that households that had changes in household 
composition and location were more likely to remain in the FSS program than participants that did 
not have a change in household composition or a move within HACP housing.  I expected to find 
that having household members entering or leaving the household would create a disruption in the 
household that would impact FSS participation.  The changes could affect the household income, 
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childcare responsibilities, and other dynamics within the household.  Similarly, I expected to find 
that moves within public housing or moves from one rental unit to another using the housing choice 
voucher would impact the likelihood of the participant leaving the program.  In actuality, 
households with these changes were more likely to remain in the program, than those who did not.  
These moves could have been positive moves for the household to housing that they preferred or 
housing that was situated in an area that was closer to employment, services, or family.  While I 
expected to find that these changes would be disruptions, it seems that they were positive changes 
and improvements for the participants.  
The second surprise was that income at the time of FSS entry did not affect the outcome of 
FSS participation.  I expected to find that FSS participants who had wages over $10,000 at the 
time of FSS entry may be less likely to complete the FSS program because they would have less 
potential for escrow savings or they may feel that the FSS program was less helpful to them if they 
already had a job.  I also expected to find that households with no or extremely low incomes may 
be more likely to remain in the program because they had more to gain from FSS participation.  
They may be able to develop the skills that they needed to become employed and the supports that 
they need to remain employed.  Those households also had the highest potential for establishing 
escrow savings if they increased their income while in the program.  I was surprised to find that 
level of income at FSS enrollment did not have a significant impact on FSS outcomes fort either 
public housing or housing choice voucher households.  
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6.5 Conclusions  
This section concludes the study with a discussion of the contribution of this study, 
implications for action, and recommendations for future research as well as some closing remarks.  
6.5.1 Contribution  
This study contributes to the literature on FSS evaluations by adding a case study from 
Pittsburgh.  The Pittsburgh case is important because it used its MTW designation to develop an 
increased minimum rent policy to incentivize households to enroll and remain in the FSS program.  
Amid policy discussions about implementing work requirements for those receiving housing 
assistance, this study has shown that even with the supports offered through the FSS program, it 
is still difficult for many residents to obtain steady employment at a livable wage.  The analysis of 
the escrow savings, which serves as a metric for increase in income during FSS participation, 
revealed that many HCV households cycled through multiple periods of employment and 
unemployment, and that retaining work seemed to be a significant challenged.   
By using the event history framework, this study also used a different approach that 
examined exit from the FSS program rather than studying success.  The FSS framework also 
allowed for the analysis of the households that moved from HACP housing during the study period 
and those who remained in the program on October 1, 2017.  Other methods of analysis are not as 
well equipped to analyze those who did not have observed outcomes during the study period.  
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6.5.2 Implications for Action  
As an MTW agency, HACP has greater leeway in designing its FSS program than non-
MTW agencies (Webb et al., 2016). Designing an FSS program that provides the appropriate level 
of support and incentives for FSS enrollment and completion are critical to the FSS program’s 
success and HACP’s ability to meet the objectives of the MTW demonstration program (HUD, 
1996). As discussed in Chapter 1, FSS is based on a theory of change model that affordable housing 
provides a stable platform upon which residents can address barriers to self-sufficiency and move 
to economic independence. This research shows that with the results discussed, the program does 
not address much that perhaps is needed by participants to stay in the program. This study supports 
prior studies suggesting that FSS program design is a better determinant of FSS program success 
than household characteristics (Kleit & Rohe, 2015; Kleit & Page, 2008; Riccio & Babcock, 2014).  
For that reason, my recommendations to HACP and HUD are to use the findings of this study and 
other FSS program evaluations to redesign the FSS program.  HUD has allowed the selected MTW 
agencies to tailor their FSS programs to best meet the needs of its residents and utilize community 
resources.  HUD should take the lead on evaluating the MTW agencies’ program changes and 
consider allowing the non-MTW agencies to benefit from those findings and incorporate 
promising practices into their FSS programs.  My three recommendations: 1) create effective 
financial incentives; 2) tailor the FSS program to public housing and HCV households; 3) consider 
shorter timeframes and increasing program flexibility.  
In this study the increased minimum rent policy and the escrow savings accounts both serve 
as important financial incentives for remaining in the FSS program.  Households that paid the 
increased minimum rent prior to enrolling in the FSS program and the households that had escrow 
savings were more likely to remain.  Other MTW agencies such as: Charlotte, NC; Lincoln NE; 
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Vancouver, WA; New York, NY; and Boston, MA have used their MTW status to develop 
financial incentives for FSS participants ranging from work requirements to financial benefits 
(Rohe, 2015; Webb, et al., 2106; Verma et al, 2018; Riccio & Babcock, 2012).  While the reviews 
of these programs offer mixed results, there is strong evidence that financial incentives are 
important to successful FSS programs.  A 2018 study of a self-sufficiency program at the New 
York City Housing Authority suggests that early financial incentives proportional to the 
accomplished goal lead to both higher enrollment and engagement by residents (Verma et al., 
2018). My critique of the FSS program design is that the escrow savings is a strong incentive for 
those who are successful in the program but does not incentivize those who have not had an 
increase in wages.  Small financial incentives early in the program may help to retain some of the 
participants who do not experience an increase in wages in early in the program. For instances, 
there could be financial incentives for meeting an educational goal before the participant finds a 
new job.     
This study raised questions about HACP’s increased minimum rent policy and its ability 
to incentivize residents to remain in the FSS program. This analysis builds previous research on 
the impact of the increased minimum rent policy on FSS enrollment and rent revenue at HACP 
(Deitrick & Bert, 2019). When examining the relationship between paying the increased minimum 
rent prior to FSS program enrollment and FSS program outcomes, the results of this study were 
inconclusive, but suggested that the increased minimum rent policy is a weak incentive, at best, 
for FSS participants to remain in the FSS program.  Furthermore, there was a set of households 
who paid the increased minimum rent after leaving the FSS program.  While the data do not 
indicate whether these participants left the FSS program voluntarily, it is interesting to see that 
there is a number of households that paid the increased minimum rent of $150 after leaving the 
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program.  This provides additional evidence that the increased minimum rent policy was not 
effective in incentivizing participants to remain in the FSS program. My recommendation to 
HACP is to revisit the increased minimum rent policy and consider whether there are other 
incentives that may be more useful.   
The second implication for action is that there is a significant difference in outcomes 
among public housing and housing choice voucher household participating in the FSS program.  
This study has shown that the households from the housing choice voucher program were far less 
likely to complete the FSS program than those who lived in public housing.  This outcome was 
expected because it is much harder for the housing authority to provide services to those who have 
vouchers because they live farther away.  Prior research (Kleit & Rohe, 2015) suggested that the 
amount of contact between the service coordinator and FSS participants is an important factor in 
determining whether the participant will complete the program. There may be ways for the housing 
authority to adjust the FSS program for HCV participants and increasing the amount of contact, 
either in person or by telephone. Another option may be to identify additional resources in the 
community where the HCV participant lives, and allow them to design a training and service plan 
that includes local services on a case-by-case basis.  That way, HCV participants would have more 
flexibility in receiving services in their community and may be more likely to continue to 
participate in the program. Lastly, there may be some options to create an additional or different 
financial incentive for HCV households. Since the escrow savings account has proven to be a 
strong incentive, there may be an opportunity to adjust the increased minimum rent policy to allow 
the households to divert the increased minimum rent, $75 for HCV households, into an escrow 
savings account.  This would jump-start their escrow savings and create an opportunity for HCV 
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households to save up to an additional $4,500 if the household was able to save $75 each month 
for 60 months.   
The third implication for action is that there was a high number of moves from HACP 
housing among the public housing residents. FSS participants in public housing tended to be 
younger than the participants who had housing choice vouchers and were also far more likely to 
move from HACP public housing while enrolled in the FSS program.  Unfortunately, there isn’t 
any information on why those households left HACP housing, and it is not possible to determine 
whether those households left voluntary or involuntarily.  If there is a high number of evictions 
among the young FSS participants, HACP could introduce some housing counseling or budgeting 
assistance into the FSS program.  If those young FSS participants are moving voluntarily, there 
may be an opportunity for HACP to redesign the FSS program to tailor to the needs of its younger 
and more mobile residents.  HACP could consider changing the timelines from a five-year 
program, to a series of one-year programs.  Residents may be more likely to enroll in a one-year 
program than a five-year program, and by having a shorter-term goal, it may make the program 
and success seem more attainable. If residents should leave HACP housing prior to the end of five 
years, they could still leave with some achievements that could serve them well in the future.  
6.5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
While this research has provided important information about the outcomes of the FSS 
program in Pittsburgh, there are still some unanswered questions. There are three good 
opportunities for future research.  The first is to expand upon this work with additional quantitative 
and qualitative research.  Exit interviews with FSS participants, whether they completed or left the 
FSS program prior to completion, would provide important information for improving the 
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program.  These exit interviews would help researchers to identify the reasons why participants 
leave early and learn about the success of FSS program graduates.  By having a better 
understanding of barriers and motivators, HACP could better address the strengths and weaknesses 
of its program.  Toward the end of the study period, HUD issued a notice to public housing 
authorities about FSS data collection and reporting (HUD, 2016). The notice was issued because 
HUD found discrepancies in the Housing Authorities’ reports and the electronic data submission 
to HUD in the 50058 records. The notice provides specific instructions for all housing authorities 
to submit the FSS records for each participant to HUD on an annual basis at minimum and to 
ensure that the FSS addendum is included with any additional data submissions from FSS 
participants during the course of the year (HUD, 2016). This improved data collection should lead 
to more precise evaluations of the FSS program, and resolve the discrepancies between the 
outcomes reported in the housing authorities’ annual reports and the data that are submitted to 
HUD.   
A second opportunity for research is to expand this work to include more MTW housing 
authorities and conduct a comprehensive study of the various ways that MTW housing authorities 
have used their MTW status to create different policies for their FSS program.  While HACP’s 
increased minimum rent policy did not lead to the expected outcomes, there may be other housing 
authorities have made successful adjustments to their FSS programs.  That may help other current 
MTW agencies, and future MTW agencies when the demonstration expands to include additional 
housing authorities.  Standardizing the FSS reporting in the annual reports would also improve 
evaluations as it would allow for a better comparison of FSS program outcomes across housing 
authorities and enable researchers to pinpoint which housing authorities experience better FSS 
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program outcomes than others.  While those annual reports are publicly available, the uneven 
reporting does not allow for a comparison across the MTW agencies.  
A third opportunity for additional research is a close examination of the role of the service 
coordinator and the services provided to residents.  A thorough understanding of the services 
offered, services utilized, and the outcomes of the residents may lead to a better understanding of 
the residents’ outcomes and satisfaction with the FSS program.  A 2015 study by Kleit and Rohe 
found that consistent and frequent contact between the service coordinator and residents was an 
important component to success in the FSS program.  A social network analysis approach that 
examines the service network and the relationship to HACP and its residents may provide a more 
complete understanding of resident outcomes.  Establishing a strong network of service providers 
in the community that is built on trust and mutual goals is critical to providing social services 
within a community (Deitrick, 2007). The trust between community organizations, the housing 
authority, and residents is a critical factor in FSS success.  That link has not been explored in this 
study.  
6.5.4 Concluding remarks  
The FSS program is designed with the expectation that participants will meet incremental 
milestones as they work toward self-sufficiency.  The primary financial incentive, the escrow 
savings, is designed to reward those who have increased wages, but there are no incentives for 
those who are not having success to remain in the program.  This study has shown that FSS 
program exits tend to be gradual throughout the course of the program and program exit may 
reflect dissatisfied and discouraged participants.  An FSS program that offers financial incentives 
to reward smaller achievements may give participants the incentive and encouragement they need 
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to remain in the program.  This study also showed that there was a large group of public housing 
residents under the age of 30 who moved out of HACP housing while enrolled in the FSS program.  
For those residents the 5-year time frame is unrealistic.  A program that targets the young residents 
with the services that they need may be more effective, even if it is a shorter program.  
The FSS program represents an important opportunity for connecting low-income 
households with the resources they need to help them to improve their household’s financial 
outcomes. This study contributes to a set of FSS evaluations that have shown that this program is 
not effective.  Hopefully the MTW agencies will learn from one another and begin to take 
advantage of their opportunity to redesign their programs and create effective incentive structures 
and programs that will lead to improved outcomes for their residents.  The MTW demonstration 
is expected to expand to include an additional 100 housing authorities, as the FSS program is an 
integral part of the MTW demonstration, it is important that these agencies reconsider their 
programs to better serve their residents.   
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Appendix A Public Housing and Housing Choice Voucher Tables and Figures  
Appendix A provides the large tables and Kaplan-Meier survival estimates that were not 
included in Chapters 4 and 5 for readability purposes.  
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Appendix Table 1. Public Housing Life Table  
Interval Total 
Left 
FSS 
Lost 
Std. 
Survival 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
1,2 1,056 11 5 0.9895 0.0031 0.9812 0.9842 
2,3 1,039 8 14 0.9819 0.0041 0.9717 0.9884 
3,4 1,017 8 17 0.9741 0.0049 0.9624 0.9822 
4,5 992 5 25 0.9691 0.0054 0.9566 0.9781 
5,6 962 6 12 0.9630 0.0059 0.9495 0.9730 
6,7 944 4 12 0.9589 0.0062 0.9448 0.9695 
7,8 928 3 11 0.9558 0.0064 0.9412 0.9668 
8,9 914 2 14 0.9537 0.0066 0.9388 0.9650 
9,10 898 8 16 0.9451 0.0072 0.9291 0.9576 
10,11 874 3 10 0.9419 0.0074 0.9254 0.9548 
11,12 861 2 22 0.9396 0.0076 0.9229 0.9528 
12,13 837 7 28 0.9317 0.0081 0.9139 0.9458 
13,14 802 3 16 0.9281 0.0083 0.9100 0.9428 
14,15 783 1 15 0.9269 0.0084 0.9086 0.9417 
15,16 767 2 15 0.9245 0.0085 0.9059 0.9396 
16,17 750 2 12 0.9220 0.0087 0.9031 0.9374 
17,18 736 4 13 0.9170 0.0090 0.8974 0.9329 
18,19 719 2 4 0.9144 0.0092 0.8946 0.9307 
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19,20 713 0 11 0.9144 0.0092 0.8946 0.9307 
20,21 702 0 11 0.9144 0.0092 0.8946 0.9307 
21,22 691 7 15 0.9050 0.0097 0.8841 0.9224 
22,23 669 3 15 0.9009 0.0100 0.8795 0.9187 
23,24 651 7 11 0.8912 0.0105 0.8686 0.9100 
24,25 633 10 14 0.8769 0.0113 0.8529 0.8973 
25,26 609 5 11 0.8697 0.0116 0.8449 0.8907 
26,27 593 2 12 0.8667 0.0118 0.8417 0.8880 
27,28 579 3 6 0.8622 0.0120 0.8367 0.8840 
28.29 570 6 16 0.8530 0.0125 0.8266 0.8756 
29,30 548 2 11 0.8498 0.0126 0.8232 0.8728 
30,31 535 3 8 0.8450 0.0128 0.8180 0.8684 
31,32 524 2 7 0.8418 0.0130 0.8144 0.8655 
32,33 515 1 17 0.8401 0.0131 0.8126 0.8640 
33,34 497 3 5 0.8350 0.0133 0.8070 0.8593 
34,35 489 1 6 0.8333 0.0134 0.8051 0.8578 
35,36 482 1 8 0.8316 0.0135 0.8032 0.8562 
36,37 473 3 8 0.8262 0.0137 0.7974 0.8514 
37,38 462 3 7 0.8208 0.0140 0.7915 0.8465 
38,39 452 2 11 0.8172 0.0142 0.7874 0.8431 
39,40 439 4 11 0.8096 0.0145 0.7792 0.8363 
40,41 424 3 10 0.8038 0.0148 0.7729 0.8310 
42,43 399 0 8 0.7979 0.0151 0.7664 0.8257 
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43,44 391 2 16 0.7937 0.0153 0.7618 0.8219 
44,45 373 4 7 0.7851 0.0157 0.7524 0.8141 
45,46 362 1 7 0.7829 0.0157 0.7500 0.8121 
46,47 354 4 6 0.7740 0.0163 0.7402 0.8041 
47,48 344 1 9 0.7717 0.0164 0.7377 0.8020 
48,49 334 0 14 0.7717 0.0164 0.7377 0.8020 
49,50 320 2 11 0.7668 0.0166 0.7323 0.7976 
50,51 307 0 11 0.7668 0.0166 0.7323 0.7976 
51,52 296 5 6 0.7537 0.0174 0.7177 0.7859 
52,53 285 4 10 0.7430 0.0179 0.7059 0.7762 
53,54 271 3 6 0.7347 0.0184 0.6967 0.7687 
54,55 262 4 11 0.7232 0.0189 0.6841 0.7584 
55,56 247 2 5 0.7173 0.0192 0.6776 0.7530 
56,57 240 7 11 0.6959 0.0203 0.6541 0.7337 
57,58 222 1 9 0.6927 0.0205 0.6506 0.7308 
58,59 212 4 7 0.6794 0.0211 0.6360 0.7188 
59,60 201 0 12 0.6794 0.0211 0.6360 0.7188 
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Appendix Figure 1. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for public housing households with and without children. 
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Appendix Figure 2. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate Public Housing FSS participants with changes in 
household composition. 
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Appendix Figure 3. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate Public Housing FSS participants who moved while 
enrolled in FSS. 
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Appendix Figure 4. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for Public Housing Households by median income at FSS 
entry. 
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Appendix Figure 5. Kaplan Meier Surivival Estimate Public Housing Participants with Income Above $10,000 
at FSS Program Entry.  
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Appendix Figure 6. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate PH FSS Households by Zero Income at Entry 
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Appendix Figure 7. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for Public Housing Households that Paid Increased 
Minimum Rent Prior to FSS Enrollment.  
 245 
 
Appendix Figure 8. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates PH FSS Households with escrow savings above median 
 
Appendix Table 2. Housing Choice Voucher FSS Life Table 
 
Month 
FSS 
Participants 
at 
beginning 
of month 
Exit 
FSS 
Moved 
from 
HACP 
Right 
Censored 
Survival Error 95% C.I. 
1,2 671 7 3 1 0.989 0.004 0.978 0.995 
2,3 660 9 3 2 0.976 0.006 0.961 0.985 
3,4 645 8 4 1 0.964 0.007 0.947 0.976 
4,5 632 4 3 4 0.958 0.008 0.939 0.971 
5,6 621 6 9 4 0.948 0.009 0.929 0.962 
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6,7 602 9 6 6 0.934 0.010 0.912 0.951 
7,8 581 6 3 7 0.924 0.010 0.901 0.942 
8,9 565 12 5 3 0.905 0.012 0.879 0.925 
9,10 545 6 6 9 0.894 0.012 0.867 0.916 
10,11 524 6 3 10 0.884 0.013 0.856 0.907 
11,12 505 11 6 17 0.864 0.014 0.835 0.889 
12,13 470 5 4 7 0.855 0.014 0.824 0.881 
13,14 454 9 2 2 0.838 0.015 0.806 0.865 
14,15 441 5 4 2 0.828 0.016 0.796 0.857 
15,16 430 4 1 4 0.821 0.016 0.787 0.849 
16,17 421 5 3 2 0.811 0.016 0.777 0.849 
17,18 411 11 5 2 0.789 0.017 0.753 0.820 
18,19 393 10 2 3 0.769 0.018 0.732 0.802 
19,20 377 4 0 4 0.761 0.018 0.723 0.794 
20,21 369 3 1 1 0.754 0.018 0.716 0.788 
21,22 364 8 4 4 0.738 0.019 0.699 0.772 
22,23 348 2 5 3 0.733 0.019 0.694 0.768 
23,24 338 12 4 2 0.707 0.020 0.666 0.744 
24,25 320 9 1 0 0.687 0.020 0.646 0.725 
25,26 310 6 0 2 0.674 0.021 0.632 0.712 
26,27 302 4 5 1 0.665 0.021 0.622 0.704 
27,28 292 5 1 5 0.653 0.021 0.610 0.693 
28,29 281 9 5 3 0.632 0.022 0.588 0.673 
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29,30 264 4 1 1 0.622 0.022 0.578 0.663 
30,31 258 0 0 2 0.622 0.022 0.578 0.663 
31,32 256 2 2 1 0.618 0.022 0.573 0.659 
32,33 251 4 1 8 0.608 0.022 0.563 0.649 
33,34 238 2 2 2 0.602 0.022 0.557 0.644 
34,35 232 3 2 1 0.595 0.022 0.549 0.637 
35,36 226 3 3 0 0.587 0.023 0.541 0.629 
36,37 220 4 1 4 0.578 0.023 0.530 0.619 
37,38 211 6 1 1 0.559 0.023 0.513 0.603 
38,39 203 5 1 1 0.546 0.023 0.499 0.590 
39,40 196 3 3 3 0.537 0.023 0.490 0.582 
40,41 187 0 2 3 0.537 0.023 0.490 0.582 
41,42 182 2 2 4 0.531 0.024 0.484 0.576 
42,43 174 3 0 6 0.522 0.024 0.474 0.567 
43,44 165 3 0 1 0.512 0.024 0.464 0.558 
44,45 161 1 0 2 0.509 0.024 0.461 0.546 
45,46 158 3 1 2 0.499 0.024 0.451 0.546 
46,47 152 0 0 4 0.499 0.024 0.451 0.546 
47,48 148 1 0 10 0.496 0.024 0.447 0.542 
48,49 137 1 1 2 0.492 0.024 0.443 0.539 
49,50 133 1 2 1 0.488 0.025 0.440 0.535 
50,51 129 2 1 4 0.485 0.025 0.436 0.532 
51,52 123 2 1 2 0.477 0.025 0.427 0.524 
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52,53 118 1 1 4 0.472 0.025 0.423 0.520 
53,54 112 1 0 8 0.468 0.025 0.418 0.516 
54,55 103 1 0 3 0.463 0.025 0.413 0.512 
55,56 99 6 0 2 0.435 0.026 0.383 0.486 
56,57 91 0 0 4 0.435 0.026 0.383 0.486 
57,58 87 2 1 7 0.425 0.027 0.372 0.476 
58,59 77 0 2 3 0.425 0.027 0.372 0.476 
59,60 72 0 0 0 0.425 0.027 0.372 0.476 
 
 
Appendix Figure 9. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate HCV Households with Children 
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Appendix Figure 10. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate HCV households with a change in composition. 
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Appendix Figure 11. Kaplan Meier Estimates HCV Households with Income above median at FSS entry. 
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Appendix Figure 12. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate HCV Households with Escrow Above the Median at FSS 
Entry 
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Appendix Figure 13. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate HCV Households that Moved During FSS 
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Appendix Figure 14. Kaplan Meier Survival Estimate for HCV Households that Paid Increased Minimum Rent 
Prior to FSS.  
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